在傳統認知論中，知識等於真實的信念加上合理相信的理由。在尋找合理的理由時，我們采用歸納法，從已經被肯定的知識中，推論相信新知識的合理理由。可是這裹有一個問題，若每一項知識也是從先前的知識推論出來，那層層遞進地推論追溯上去，那最初的知識如何肯定呢。傳統上基礎主義認為在知識的最底層，是一些不需論證自我肯定的基礎知識，作為所有知識推論的基礎。調和主羲則否定有基礎知識的存在，所有知論的推論是個巨大的循環，只能檢視整個知識系統的一至性，有沒有內部矛盾或對世界觀測的不協調。這篇功課討論調和主義理論本身的問題，探討調和主義能否成立。

The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge

In this essay, I am evaluating Bonjour’s coherence theory of empirical knowledge (CTEK) against foundational theory of empirical knowledge (FTEK). First, I will outline what is the regress problem and compare the responses from FTEK and CTEK. Then I will examine the objection against CTEK regarding its relationship with external world. I will further extend the objection by arguing CTEK is asserting a fundamental assumption that the external world itself has to be coherent for CTEK to be justified. At last I am going to conclude CTEK is unsuccessful in overcome the objection in strictly epistemological sense but it is successful in practical sense.

Since Plato, traditional view of knowledge is justified true belief. A piece of belief is only qualified as knowledge if it is justified. A belief is justified based on the validity and soundness of its argument, which is implicitly depends on the premises used in the argument are also justified. Each premise on its own is also a piece of belief which required the justification of the premise’s premises. As a result, we have a regression of justifications for premises that keep tracing back, which is known as “the regression problem”. FTEK deals with the regression problem by stating there are some foundation beliefs at the very bottom of chains of premises and the regression terminates when the basic beliefs are reached. There are two version of FTEK. The strong version stated that the basic beliefs are self-justified without the need of further premises. The weak version stated that the basic beliefs are initially credible that are likely to be true. The CTEK rejects the notation of basic beliefs, instead of having the regression of premises go on infinite linearly, the inference is circular. An epistemic system is justified by its internal coherence.

However, the circular nature of CTEK runs into the problem of begging the question, which a belief cannot be justified unless it is already justified. The solution is to reject the linear conception of inferential justification and uses a holistic or systematic conception of inferential justification instead. CTEK separate the justification into two categories, justification of a particular belief and the global justification of the entire cognitive system. The justification of a particular belief appears linear, since the premises regression will soon reached some acceptable beliefs in the context. If no acceptable belief is reached, the premises regression will continue moving in a circle. In this case, the justification of the overall knowledge system comes under questions. In CTEK, the justification of the entire system is based on its degree of coherence. A coherent system must be internally consistence, which means there is no internal conflict, but it has more than just consistency. Coherent is the systemic connection between the components of the system, how observable facts can be explained and predicted. The justified knowledge system is the one with the highest degree of coherences out of all the alternative consistence systems.

In the paper, Bonjour lists three objections to CTEK on questioning the fundamental questions of the connection between coherence and justification. Out of the three objections, Bonjour spends most of the paper in defending against objection number two, the relationship of CTEK and external world. I think this is the strongest objection against CTEK and I also think Bonjour successfully defends CTEK against this objection. However, Bonjour omitted an underlining assumption in his defence that the external world has to be coherent in order to justify his argument. In the following paragraphs, I will first out the objection, go over Bonjour’s response to the objection and illustrate his hidden assumption with a counter example.

The strongest objection to CTEK is that since CTEK is justified only in terms the internal coherence of the beliefs in the system, it does not have any relationship with the external world. A self-enclosed system of beliefs cannot constitute empirical knowledge. Bonjour’s defense is pretty straight forward, it simply link the coherent belief system in CTEK to observable facts from external world. He argues that in CTEK, the coherent system of beliefs must also coherent with reliable observation of the external world in long run. When a particular observation does not coherent with the belief system, CTEK can either neglect the particular observation as an incoherent exception to the belief system or refine the belief system to include the new observation. If there are too many incoherent exception observations accumulated in the belief system, the belief system will become less coherent with the world and eventually it will be replaced by a more coherent belief system. The belief system is continuously updating itself upon new observation to maintain its degree of coherence. The input from external world has causal relationship with the CTEK belief system where the belief system is justified by its coherence with observable facts of the external world. One of the key pieces in Bonjour’s argument is to establish what can be constituted as reliable observations yet at the same time is not a basic belief. He argues that spontaneous introspective beliefs on spontaneous sensa beliefs are very likely to be true. The reliability of cognitively spontaneous beliefs is part of the coherence system along with the observation of the external world. Therefore it is not a prior truth in the sense that it is required as the foundation for justification of the knowledge.

Bonjour based CTEK’s justification on the coherence of the belief system and the reliable observation of external world in long run. Let’s granted that the belief system and the observations are reliable, however Bonjour failed to address the underlining assumption that the external world is coherence in long run. If the external world is not coherence, then no belief system can stay coherent due to CTEK has a causal relationship with the external world. Bonjour uses the spontaneous visual belief a red book and the lack of spontaneous visual of a blue book to illustrate how the belief system is linked to the external world. What if there is a chance that the book randomly change colour every time I observe it? How can I conclude there is a red book on my desk but not a blue book on my desk? Even though I can trust my spontaneous beliefs from my sensa of the book, I cannot trust the object under my observation stays the same between my two observations. It is possible that the cover of the book is made of the latest colour changing e-paper technology, which in the case we can provide a coherent account for the observable fact. However, it is also possible that there is no scientific theory can possible explain why the book change its color. It could be the act of God and it is simply a miracle that the book changed from red to blue for no apparent reason. The CTEK justification adopt an objective clock work world view that rule out the existence of any supernatural power, such as an omnipotent God who defies all laws of physics.
In theory, we cannot epistemological justify the CTEK because we cannot epistemological justify the world is coherent. Hume argues that “Uniformity of Nature”, which is essentially the same as coherence of the world, cannot be justified, yet it is rational and non-optional for us to accept the habit of inductive inference. Practically, we can assume the world is coherent almost all of the time and take it as a weak foundation that it is probably initially true until shown otherwise. CTEK is actually a very weak FTEK in disguise; the base belief of CTEK is that the world is coherence to provide the foundation to build coherent belief systems.

However, it would be totally absurd to argue the world is not coherent. If the world is not coherent, then even FTEK is not possible to have any knowledge system. Just like FTEK cannot convince the ultimate skeptic, CTEK also fail to convince the ultimate skeptic that there is justification on any knowledge. Given the fact that assumption of the world is coherent must dialectically acceptable in the context of any knowledge theory to have any meaning, we can grant this assumption a priori status outside of any epistemic dialog. With this particular exception, I conclude that CTEK is successful in overcoming the objection regarding the relationship of coherent belief system and the external world.

Reference:
[1] Laurence Bonjour, The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge, Philosophical Studies 30 (1976) p281-312

苖卡兒(Descartes)說﹕我思故我在。雖然我們可以肯定自己的存在﹐但如何可以證明在我們思想以外的世界也是存在呢﹖如何去證明人生不是一場夢﹐不是只有獨自一個人的意識漂浮在虛無之中。這篇哲學功課的題目﹐大慨正好對號入座哲學給一般人的印象﹐怎麼哲學問這個無聊的問題。其實這個問題只是大問題的其中一環﹐問世界存在的本質是什麼。這篇功課對比了Moore和Russell兩位哲學家的論證﹐前者從康德(Kant)以理論為起點﹐推論出在人與人的意識以外﹐必然存在一個外在的世界。後者則把問題反過來﹐質疑為什麼不接受世界存在﹐畢竟認為世界不存在的人精神有問題。最搞笑是話說某次Russell講學﹐其中有一個聽眾相信世界不存在﹐那當然除他以外的其他人也不會存在。可是他聽得半桶以為Russell在認同他的觀點﹐演講完畢走上台對Russell說﹐他很高興聽到有人認同他認為其他人不存在的觀點﹐一個多麼的自相多盾的說法。我證明世界存在的論証很簡單﹐如果世界不存在的話﹐我就不需要寫這篇文章交功課﹐教授也不需要花時間去改功課。既然我寫了這篇文章出來﹐教授又要花間去改﹐那就證明了世界是存在的了。

In this essay, I am going to evaluate Moore’s and Russell’s proof of the existence of external world. I will first outline Moore’s argument and Russell’s argument respectively. Then I will point out the difference in the scope of claim in the two arguments. Moore’s argument asserts a smaller scope of claim than Russell’s, thus it is more defendable. Furthermore, I will propose counter examples to nullify Russell’s argument. At last, I am going to propose my proof to the existence of external world to address the shortcomings in both Russell and Moore’s argument.

On the surface, Moore’s argument is surprise simple. It is so simple that it does not seem to be very convincing. His argument can be illustrated as the following. By holding out two hands, here is one hand and here is another hand. There are two hands exists in front of you. If those hands exist, which is something you cannot deny, there must be external world. [1-p451]

Let’s us understand Moore’s claim a little bit more. Moore’s claim is actually an argument to convince a skeptic who does not believes there is an external world but maintain the belief that there is still an external mind outside of his own mind. In another word, to begin with he has to at least believe that there is other mind, who is trying to convince him that there is an external world, already exists outside of him. Moore’s claim will not work on soloist who does not even believe there is anything outside of his own mind. Moreover, Moore’s claim is based on Kant’s early doubt that “the existence of things outside of us … must be accepted merely on faith, and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their (here, their refer to the external world, not those people) existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof.” [1- p439]. Most important of all, Moore’s claim does not survive Descartes style of self-meditation scrutiny. Moore believe there exists an external world and convince the other minds he experience in his external world to believe there really is an external world, but he can never proof to himself that he is not a sole existence that all the external world he experience are merely a product of his own mind.

Moore’s argument is pretty straight forward. He is playing word games on Kant’s argument by separating the definition of the terms use by Kant. He redefines “things outside of us”, “external things” and “things external to our mind” as three separate terms. (Notice that that he uses the term “things outside of US” instead of “things outside of ME”.) He excluded transcendent things from his argument, since that belongs to the department of metaphysics. Then he flipped the argument to equate “external things” to “things not internal to our mind”. Notice this slight change of term is the slate of hand he played to separate “things that can meet in space” from “physical objects” and here is he introduced the term “present in space” which supposed to have a lesser definition than “things that can meet in space”. He used a few examples like shadows, after image to illustrate his points, but I am not going to repeat the arguments here due to the limitation of space. Now, here he plays the finally trick, he used the “two hands” as a common experience shared between two different minds, which the skeptic cannot deny. Since there is a gap between the two minds and now there is a common experience come form that gap, there must be something existence between the two minds originate that experience, so the external world must exist.

Let’s move on to Russell’s argument, if that is qualified an argument. First of all, Russell’s claim is more ambitious than Moorse’s. Russell actually goes one step more to define the nature of external world, which is the existence of matter. Moorse is smart to leave the external world remains undefined which gives him more room to play with his definition tricks. Instead of arguing for the existence of matter, Russell simply makes the instinctive belief assertions without even bother to argue for it. To begin with, one cannot doubt his own existence and the existence of the sense data he experienced. Russell is quite frank to admit that “we can never prove the existence of things other than ourselves and our experience” [2-p.14], then he immediate follow by asserting that “although this is no logically impossible, there is no reason whatever to suppose that it is true.” and appeal to the common sense hypothesis to assert there are external objects that cause our sensations. Here he had commit the two fallacies. First, the appeal to common sense is begging of question. Second, even given that we can indeed somehow rule out the soloist possibility, his so-call argument still suffered from the false dilemma fallacy. He assumes that if we can rule out the soloist hypothesis, our sense data must come from physical objects, but he forgot the origin of experience can skipped the existence layer and come from the transcendent layer directly. For practical reason, we may operate on the “external object exists” instinctive belief proposed by Russell, but he should at least compare and evaluate all alternatives instincts before concluding his particular version of instinct is most simple thus should be the most possible solution.

In [2-p15] and chapter 3, Russell uses more examples to illustrate his instinctive belief of the existence of external object. In [2-p15], he uses the existence of a cat that is independent of his perception as an example. He thinks it is quite natural to think that a cat will continue to exists and feel hungry regardless of his sense-data. There is a famous counter example which is also a cat, Schrodinger’s cat. According to Quantum theory, the wave equation is only collapse at the moment of observation. Strictly speaking, Schrodinger’s cat are free to seize its existence when there is no observer, except that once when it is being observed, its state variable collapse to a known state and catch up with what supposed to happen during the unobservable moments. The Schrodinger’s cat does not sound nature to most people, but it conforms to the laws of quantum physics. Therefore whether something sounds nature or not cannot be used to justify the intrinsic belief. In chapter 3, Russell uses the common between public space and private space to argument for his existence of matter. I can nullify his arguments with two terms, “Virtual Reality” and “Augmented Reality”. In virtual reality, there is no public space and each one’s private space is truly private to him. In augment reality, although there still a public space, but the sense data of the public space can be augmented and altered before it arrive at the private space. In addition, Russell argues that a blind man cannot experience light. With the latest technology, the vision chip, a blind can actually experience light more or less like a seeing person although he never experience lights. The vision chips implanted in his retina stimulate the visual nerve to send image to the brain. In theory the whole visual process can stay digital and electrical without anything related to light. Therefore light must be something that can be reduced and transformed into a set of computer equations and can be recreated using digital processors.

Both Moore and Russell did not give a satisfying proof of the existence of external world to a soloist. I am going to propose my solution in the last paragraph in an attempt to bridge the gap left open in Moore and Russell’s argument. My proof that I am not a lone existence in this world is very simple. If I am alone in this world, no one is going to mark my philosophy paper and I will have no reason to write it. The very fact that I am writing this philosophy paper is the proof that I am not alone in this world, which imply there must exists an external world. Now, assume that there is a philosophy professor who is marking this philosophy paper. The very fact that he is marking this paper also is a proof of the existence of an external world; otherwise he has no reason to mark this paper. In fact, if there is no external world, why would anyone bother to read a paper trying to proof the existence of the external world? Therefore the mere existence of this philosophical paper on its own is the proof of the existence of the external world. Q.E.D.

Reference:
[1] Paul K. Moser and Arnold Vander Nat, Human Knowledge Classical and Contemporary Approaches, 2003, Oxford Press
[2] Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, 1912, Feedbacks

在生物學上如何決定一個器官的功能﹐是一個具爭議性的課題﹐這涉及如何分辨運作正常或失靈。心臟的功能是泵血﹐但發出啪啪的心跳聲﹐又算不算心臟的功能呢﹖如果一個人的心臟能夠泵血但不會發出心跳聲﹐他的心臟又算不算運作正常呢。在近代生物學的傳統﹐生物的各個器官的功能﹐可以用進化論去解釋﹐從物競天擇適者生存的定律﹐去推論什麼是器官的功能。任何器官的功能﹐最終也是以增加生存或繁殖後代的機會為準則。心臟若果不能泵血﹐生物便會死亡﹐所以泵血是心臟的功能。但心跳聲並不會增加進化優勢﹐所以那便不是心臟的功能用。

用這個說法去解釋生學的功能有一個問題﹐就是沒有辨法定義與無關進化的生物或器官的功能。例如人類解剖到外星人﹐人類並不知道外星人如何進化﹐那便無從決定外星人器官的功能。又例如X-Men漫畫裏的Cyclops﹐他的眼睛可以射出激光﹐可是那個能力是因為基因突變﹐並不是從物競天擇進化而來。根據這個功用源於進化的定義﹐射出激光並不是Cyclops眼睛的功能﹐但這個說法明顯地十分荒謬。這篇功課便是探討生物學上功能的定義﹐並提出能夠應付上述情況的新功能理論。

What is function in biology?

Abstract: In this paper, I am going to argue Prior’s account of functional analysis is most promising theory of function in biology based on the selected important desiderata for a theory of biological function. I will then defense Prior’s view against Neander’s attack from the prima facie problem with teleological explanations.

In the second half of the course, we have surveyed many accounts on theory of function in biology. Namely we have studied a few rejected classical theory of function in [1] and [2], the standard etiological approach proposed by Wright [1], the system approach proposed by Cummins [2], the goal oriented approach proposed by Boorse [3], the forward-looking approach proposed by Bigelow [4] and the functional analysis approach proposed by Prior [6]. Neander’s paper does not make any new proposal but rather fortify the Wright’s argument. Godfrey-smith’s paper spoil the fun of the party by proposing that the two major camps in this debate, Wright and Cummins respectively, are talking about two different notation of functions. Out of the all the functional theory, I think Prior’s account that is based on a modified Cummins approach is the most promising approach to explain what is function in biology. I will first summarize the desiderata for a theory of biological function by collecting all the functional criteria from all the papers.

An acceptable account of theory of biological function must able to answer the following questions:

1. An acceptable functional theory must distinguish between function and merely effect. For example, the heart’s function is to pump blood; its function is not to make throbbing sound. This example is used by both Wright and Cummins. This is pretty much one of the most fundamental acid test for any functional theory.

2. An acceptable functional theory must explain both artificial (conscious) and natural (biological) function. Actually in my opinion, throwing away this criterion will open up all the limitation of biology functional theory. If we can treat artificial function and natural function as two distinguish and non-intersecting categories, most of the argument in functional theory will simply disappear. Biological function will become much like physical function and chemical function that is just a descriptive account of the causation effects and what happen as it is. However Wright, Cummins and pretty much everyone else choose to keep the criteria, I have to include it in this paper to keep the premise consistence with all the papers

3. An acceptable functional theory must distinguish function from malfunction, non-function, vestige, statistically normal function, accident and unintended function. This criterion is where the different functional theories disagree with each others, in another word this is the heated battle ground. The Cummins camp attacks the Wright camp that the etiological approach cannot deal with any one of those distinctions or all of the above. The Wright camp defenses the etiological theory by counter argue that their account can handle the distinctions. One problem I observe is that the actual meaning of function seems twisted one way or another by each camp to fit their functional theory. Here I will propose an acid test for each type of distinction to keep the criterion simple. A heart that cannot pump blood, say there is some genetic defect and the heart is born with a missing a valve, is a malfunction heart. An appendix is a non-functioning and vestige organ in human. If a virus causes 99% of the population to go blind, the function of an eye is still to see. The function of a belt bucket is not stopping bullet, although sometimes accident does happen and it does stop bullet and saves life. The function of Prior’s hypothetical grape-prawn peeler is to shell prawn. Alternatively, we can substitute a real world example for the grape-prawn peeler. When laser was invented, it was intended be used as laser weapon, but it turns out laser also is very useful in reading data from DVDs.

4. An acceptable functional theory must take into account of super function. Here is an example of super function. Normally the function of an eye is to see. However in the comics X-Men, Cyclops, a mutant superhero, can shoot laser from his eyes. Therefore function of his eye is both seeing and shooting laser. Yet we do not know whether shooting laser from eyes has any evolutionary advantage or even an inheritable genetic trait. The comics do not mention he has any offspring and just the fact of being a mutant always puts his life in great danger. In the next section, I am going to outline Prior’s functional theory and contrast it with Wright’s etiological theory. I will examine both theories base on the desiderata defined above. Prior’s define function statement as the output of functional analysis. “According to this account the ascription of a function is both theory and interest relative – the function of a particular organ will be that of its effects which features in our best account of some interesting (higher-level) capacity of the organism in question.”[6] He also said that his account is familiar similar to Cummins’ functional analysis that “functions are appealed to in order to explain the capacities of their containing systems, and not the existences of the item to which the function is attributed.”[6] In contrary, Wright’s etiological account states that “The function of X is Z means: (a) X is there because it does Z, (b) Z is a consequence (or result) of X’s being there” [1] In short, Prior’s theory does not care about how the organ comes into place, it only cares about the effect and relationship between the organ and the organism or the organism and the ecosystem. On the other hand, Wright’s theory requires the function to explain how the organ comes into place.

Both Prior and Wright’s theory easily pass the first criteria although they have different explanation. In Prior’s account, he can follow Cummin’s explain the function of heart under the context of the blood circulatory system. Since the pumping of blood but not making the heart beating sound is a desired effect of the heart in the circulatory system in explaining its capacity, we can distinguish the function of the heart as pumping blood against making noise is merely an effect. Wright would explain the function of heart by stating that the heart pumping blood gives evolutionary advantage to the species hence increase the fitness to survival for those who population within the species who process this genotype, as a result a blood pumping heart exists because that is what was selected for. The heart beating sound does not give any evolutionary advantage, it is a selected of, a trait merely got inherited tagging the tagged along with the pumping function of heart. Since the first criterion is the most basic requirement of any functional theory, I am not surprised both theories can explain it well.

The second criterion is does not have much controversy since both Prior and Wright deliberately took the effort to make their theories compatible with artificial selection. Prior’s approach actually originates from functional account of artificial function and extend it to cover natural function. The function of a mechanical part is determined by its design intention within the mechanical system. In the pre-Darwin where creationism rules the study of nature theory, natural function pretty much share the same account as artificial function. The only difference is the conscious agent for artificial function is human and the conscious agent for natural function is God. Medieval doctors explain biological function in term of physiological function which a result of the functional analysis procedure for the whole body. However this account is not without problem. By definition no one know the real intention of God, so the natural function is really only based on what people’s guesses about God’s intention or on powerful religion figure’s claim on knowing the intention of God. If the intention is not known or incorrect, the function could be totally wrong. For a long time in the history, people think generating emotion is also a function of the heart, which is obviously wrong under the light of modern science. Wright’s approach is the opposite; it extends the biological account of natural function to cover artificial function by replacing natural selection with the selection by the designer or user. In this sense, it actually simplifies the problem of the etiological account. The biggest problem of etiological account is base on the natural selection theory which it is somewhat questionable as we learn in previous lectures. Replacing natural selection with an artificial selection originated from a conscious agent eliminate the uncertainty in the equation. If there is any doubt, we can always get clarification by asking the agent for his selection criteria.

Prior’s theory does not have much problem with the third criterion. Once the nominal function is identified through functional analysis in the context of the system and its capacity, any derivation from the nominal function can treat as malfunction, non-function or accident. If the system changes and the nominal function are no longer required, it becomes a vestige. If the context of the system and its capacity is indentified correctly in related to a higher level system, we can deduce the intention of the function and figure out the difference between the statistical normal function and the nominal function. Unintended function can be deal with by a running a new functional analysis after updating the context and capacity of the system. Wright account has a harder time answering the question posed by the third criterion. Malfunction and non-function can be understand in the relationship of token and type, deviations from of token from the type that lower the fitness can be seen as a malfunction or non-function. Vestige is the easiest to deal with since the etiological account keeps track of the historical record of the function. Statistical normal function is a bit harder to deal with using the backward looking account, but if we patch the etiological theory with Bigelow’s [4] forward looking account, we can still distinguish between function and statistical normal function. For example, a virus that blind 99% of the population would not change the function of the eye, because having an eye that can see still have an evolution advantage. In the etiological account if a function is not inherited then we can treat it as an accident instead of a function. Backward looking account cannot deal with unintended function, but it has no problem in the forward looking account since unintended function is still a function as long as it has a selective advantage.

I believe the forth criterion really sets the two theories apart. According to the comics, Cyclops acquires the ability of laser eye due to first generation genetic mutation. Clearly there is no previous selection history Wright can use in the backward etiological account. Having a laser eye does not make him more attractive to women, so it does not give him any reproductive advantage. In the world of X-men, the government hunts down mutants, the evil mutants launch a war on the good mutants for world domination and occasionally the good mutants have to defense the Earth from alien invasion. Mutants seem to have a worse survivability compare to the normal people. If there is no forward selection advantage, we cannot use Bigelow’s forward etiological account. However, it would be odd to say shooting out laser is not a function of Cyclops’ eyes because that’s what they really do. Prior’s account has no such problem, we can examine Cyclops as mutant, which is a different system compare to normal people. We can easily perform functional analysis on his eyes and concludes they have the function of seeing thing and shooting lasers. This approach is exactly how the medieval doctors determine the function of human body parts and the X-File scientist in Area 51 figure out functions of alien body parts when they dissect the alien.

In Neander’s paper [5], she argues against Cummin’s account following a different strategy. She employed the prima facie general problem concerning all teleological explanations which explains the means by the ends; a development or trait is explained by reference to goals, purposes of functions. Teleological explanations appeals to the effects but it is often that the purposes, goal and functional effects are never realized. In the case of artificial function, instead of appeal to the actual effect of the function, the teleological explanations appeal to the intended effect of the agent. When the purposes go unfulfilled, the agent still has a purpose. Clearly, the explanatory power of purposive explanations does not derive from their explicit reference to future effects so much as their implicit reference thereby to past intentional attitudes to those future effects. In short, teleological explanations are just a species of ordinary casual explanation. The problem with biological function is there is no intentional agent. Prior cannot appeal to God nor Mother Nature’s intention or evolutionary design, since those misguided pseudo-explanation are not scientifically respectable.

In Prior’s paper, he sort of response to the teleological problem by stating that it is just a “fundamental fact about human beings (or animals, plants, insects) that they are highly interested in survival and reproduction.” [6] He dodged the theological question of the ultimate intention by simply assuming it is a fact. He also stated that the ultimate purpose of biological life from is contagious by citing an example of an imaginary world with human life form wish to die happily instead of survive and procreate. I am not very please with Prior’s defense since his defense is pretty weak. He is just making a groundless assumption about human nature or biological life form in general. I can already contradict his idea about human purpose with any major religion beliefs. For example: to Christianity, the purpose of human being is not to survive or to reproduce; rather it is to go to heaven; to Buddhist, the purpose of human being is to reincarnate and reach nirvana.

I am going to response Neander teleological problem by using the human centric view that stating it is us, the human being, gives purpose to the nature. Nature may not have any purpose by itself; but that does not mean human cannot assign some purpose to the nature. At the end of the day, it is human, neither God nor Mother Nature, is where the conscious agent that all the teleological intention ends. With the advance of modern science, like genetic engineering, geo-engineering, climate control, space colony, human will eventually has the power to shape the nature to the way we want. There will be no natural intention, everything is artificial intention. For the time being, natural intentions are merely artificial intention that we haven’t figure out a way to control yet. To summarize, the function of an egg to a chicken is a mean to reproduce. The function of an egg to human is breakfast, and the function of a chicken to human is lunch or dinner. Prior’s account is the most possible explanation for function, my minor twist to Prior’s account is human is in the center of all system, so we are the conscious agent and eventually nature function will be mostly equivalent to artificial function, except that nature function is generated by evolution engineering.

References:
1. Wright, Larry (1973) “Functions” Philosophical Review. Vol. 82, pp. 139-68
2. Cummins, Robert (1975) “Functional Analysis” Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 72, pp. 741-64
3. Boorse, Christopher (1976) “Wright on Functions” Philosophical Review. Vol. 85, pp, 70-86.
4. Bigelow, John, and Robert Pargetter (1987) “Functions” Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 84 (4), pp. 181-96.
5. Neander (1991) “The Teleological Notion of ‘Function’” Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
6. Prior (1985) “What is Wrong with Etiological Accounts of Biological Function?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
7. Godfrey-Smith (1993) “Functions: Consensus Without Unity” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.

進化論的其中一個很多爭議的問題﹐是達爾文提出物競天擇適者生者這個大自然定律﹐不能解釋物種如何進化出某些基因特質。例如生物學家用進化論﹐如何能推論出人類的姆指是從何進化而來呢。哲學家Sober提出一種說法﹐認為進化論根本不能解釋物種如何進化出某些基因特質。進化論應該要反過來解讀﹐去解釋沒有某些基因特質的其他物種為什麼絕種。物種從基因突變產生新的基因特質﹐大自然定律淘汰了不適合生存的基因﹐剩下來的基因便是能夠存活並繁殖後代。另一哲學家Neander則提出相反說法﹐說因為基因轉變有累積性﹐進化論可以解釋物種基因特質的變化。其實這個爭議有點無聊﹐在我看來不過是雙方在咬文嚼字﹐大家對進化論中因果關係的定義沒有共識﹐才會有這個有點牛頭不對馬嘴的辯論。

Does natural selection explain why you and I have opposable thumbs?

In the debate between negative and positive natural selection, Sober argues that natural selection does not contribute to the existence of individual traits within the population. Neander argues that the cumulative natural selection process shapes the genetic properties of the population. Nanay backs up Neander’s claim and argues both arguments do not take limitation of environment resources in the account. In this essay, I will further enhance Nanya’s argument by stressing how direct competition over resource among individuals with different traits can be affected the process natural selection. I will present an argument that cumulative selection process could decisively alter the genetic trait of the population in the presence of direct competition; thus explain the why you and I have opposable thumbs.

In [1], Neander summarize Sober’s argument for the negative view of natural selection. Sober argue that natural selection cannot explain why you and I have opposable thumbs, natural selection can only explain why all our distance cousins without opposable thumbs are eliminated by natural selection. The negative view states that natural selection cannot create new traits; it can only destroy traits that are not fit for survival. The traits of individual either come from inheritance or random mutation. Natural selection did not create the tree of life: it just determines which branches were removed and which remained. [1, p68]. Sober illustrate the negative view of natural selection using an example of a class of third grade students who can read and write at the level of third grade. Every student in the third grade class can read and write at the third grade level because that is exactly the selection criteria of the class. No student who cannot read or write at third grade level is selected into the class in the first place. Therefore, merely the fact that the student is in the third grade class does not explain how each student acquires his reading and writing skill.

In [4], Walsh makes a distinction between two types of explanations national selection, the wide scope and narrow scope. The wide scope explanation explains the frequency of traits within a population is biased by cumulative selection. The narrow scope explanation explains why a given individual possesses a particular trait. Walsh agrees with Neander that natural selection is two-stage process by taking into account of the reproduction factor. In the first stage, the new traits from random mutation are selected to pass down to the offspring. The second stage then has a biased population base to start the next iteration of reproduction. Traits that affect reproductive success will cumulatively alter the population make up in the long run. Walsh argues that the two-stage process only address the wide scope explanation by answering how a trait type is arise within a population from the selection advantage of that trait, but it does not answer the narrow scope question that explains how the trait token occurs in each individual of the population.

In [5], Nanay tries to address the narrow scope question by bringing in another factor into the equation, namely the limitation of resource in the environment. Nanay argues if individuals with different traits are compete for the same environment resources and the total population the environment can support has a limit, then elimination of individuals of one trait alter the chances of survival of other individuals with a different trait. The trait is more fit to survive in the competition of scare resource will have a selection advantage. In short, the distribution of different traits within the population is a zero sum game. The adaptation of one trait is in the expense of another mutually exclusive trait that is inferior in term of survival fitness. The elimination of the later trait is the other side of the same coin of the survival of the former trait. Nanay provides an indirect explanation to the narrow scope question by making the claim that individual with a certain trait exists because its parent with the same trait survive and reach reproductive age thanks to other individual with a different trait in the previous generation failed to survive and reproduce.

In this long debate started by Sober and Neander, we can observe a trend that is going on. The negative view camp first posed a question that cannot be answered by natural selection. The positive view camp counter attack by introducing new parameters into the equation of natural selection and claim there is a causal relationship between the survived trait is the selected trait. For example, Neander introduces the reproduction factor and Nanay introduces the limitation of environmental resources. The negative view camp defense by narrowing the definition of the natural selection question and focus on how the the inheritance linage of an individual occurs. I am not satisfy with Nanay’s indirect explanation because there are still rooms for the negative view camp to further narrow down the natural selection question and dodge the bullet. The elimination of trait B does not necessarily imply the inheritance of trait A, given that there are numerous other traits out there that are also completing for survival. I would like to introduce a parameter into the natural selection equation and seal the escape route of the negative camp once for all. The new parameter I would like to introduce is direct competition of reproduction of individual with different traits within the population. Nanay argues that indirect competition of scared resource in environment for survival and reproduction can indirectly explain why how a particular trait arises in an individual. Then the trait contributes to the direct competition of reproduction and survival can directly explain how a particular trait arises in an individual. Let me illustrate what direct competition is with a real world example, the moose horn. Male moose fight using their horn for the right to mate with female moose. Suppose in one generation, there is a random mutation of the moose horn genes and create two different genetic traits. Trait A is the normal horn gene that grows horn with regular strength. Trait B is the super horn gene that grows much stronger horn. The individual with super horn gene will win the fight and able to mate and reproduce offspring. Those offspring with super horn gene will further displace the normal horn gene in the next generation. By applying mathematical models, given that the survival fitness of individuals with the super horn gene is equal to individuals with normal horn gene in all other aspect, the super horn gene will spread over the entire population following the equation geometric series. In the case of direct competition in reproduction, we can answer the narrow scope question decisively. Individual trait token is inherited because the trait token has a reproduction advantage in the population. The other trait token lose the reproduction completion to this trait token in the previous generation. Instead of explaining the natural selection in terms of how the survival of the fitness affect probability distribution of trait token in the population, my explanation explains the inherence linage of individual traits in a winner takes all survival games.

Let me illustrate my explanation further by going back to Sober’s classic analogy of a third grade class. In Nanay indirect explanation, there are limited seats in the third grade class, only students who passed the second grade can be promoted to the third grade. The twist is the mark scheme of the exam uses bell curve to determine who pass and who fail. Those at the bottom of the class that failed the second grade exam are equivalent to those individuals with traits do not survive to reproductive age. It is arguable that the indirect explanation still does not explain how each student in the third grade class acquires their third grade reading and writing ability, rather it is the third grade reading and writing standard is adjusted to meet the ability of last student who barely survive the exam cut off threshold. In my direct competition explanation, it is not a typical third grade class. It is a third grade class in a ninja assassin school. The ninja assassin school does not teach reading or writing, rather it teaches killing and self-defense. The second grade exam is not a pencil and paper test, it is literally a fight for survival. The second grade students are put inside a huge boxing ring and asked to have round robin fights using their best killing or self-defense skill. Those who remain standing at the end of the exam period got promoted to the third grade. It is irrelevant how the students acquire their killing or self-defense skill prior to the exam, because only killing or self-defense skill matter in the selection process.

In my conclusion remarks, I am drawing the significant of opposable thumbs in the direct competition of reproduction and survival. It is evident that without opposable thumbs, human cannot use tools and more important weapons. Imagine there are two tribes of pre-historical human; one tribe developed an opposable thumb while the other did not. For the first few millenniums before human invent stone tools and weapons, the opposable thumb did not give the former tribe neither survival advantage nor disadvantage. The two tribes populate the environment and multiply with roughly the same rate. Yet the balance of power is tipped once the tribe with opposable thumb developed tools and weapons. With the help of tools and weapons, the former tribe is able to genocide the later tribe when they are fighting for the control of the land. Having the opposable thumb and the ability to use weapon is a decisive winning factor in pre-historical warfare. Since the ancestors of our non-existed distant cousin without opposable thumbs are killed by our ancestors who have opposable thumbs, natural selection explains why you and I have opposable thumbs. Survival of the fitness does not only explain the survival of a particular genetic trait in relationship to the environment, it also explains the survival of a particular genetic trait in relationship to other traits. Natural selection is not a marathon that let all the traits develops on its own and then figure out which trait pass the finishing line first. Natural selection is like the Stanley cup play off, it makes different traits play head to head against each other and let the fittest traits be the winner.

References:
1 . Neander (1995) “Pruning the Tree of Life” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 46, pp. 59-80.
2 . Sober (1995) “Natural Selection and Distributive Explanation: A Reply to Neander”, BJPS. Vol. 46, pp.384-397.
3 . Neander (1995) “Explaining Complex Adaptations: A Reply to Sober’s ‘Reply to Neander’”, BJPS. Vol. 46, pp. 583-87.
4 . Walsh (1998) “The Scope of Selection: Sober and Neander on What Natural Selection Explains” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 76 (2) pp. 250-64.
5 . Nanay (2005) “Does Cumulative Selection Explain Adaptation?” Philosophy of Science, Vol 72, pp. 1099–1112.

在電視新聞和報章評論中﹐我們常常聽見政治人物和團體說權利與自由這兩個字。在一般人的字典裏﹐權利就是權利﹐自由就是自由﹐他們並不為意在不同的語境下﹐權利和自由有著兩種裁然不同的定義。在我們談論權利的時候﹐我們要清楚是在說那一種權利。同樣在我們談論自由的時候﹐我們也要清楚是在說那一種自由。不然大家雖然同說權利和自由二字﹐但這兩個字卻代表完全不同的意思﹐結果雙方雞同鴨講﹐不但溝通不到反而加深誤解。

兩種權利

權利可以分為消極權利和積極權利兩種。消極權利是指人生安全受到保障的權利﹐而積極權利則是指獲取生活必需品的權利。權利不能夠獨立存在﹐權利必然絆隨義務。正確點來說﹐一個人的權利﹐是建立於眾人的義務之上。只有當眾人也履行他們的義務﹐一個人才能夠獲得他的權利。消極權利中的消極﹐﹐便是指義務上的消極。每個人只要安份守己﹐不作出損害他人性命財產的行為﹐所有人的消極權利就受到保障。換一句話說﹐每個人什麼也不用做﹐每個人的消極權利就已經受到保障了。相反積極權行中的積極﹐是指義務上的積極。若有人沒有足夠的生活所需﹐其他人必需要作出物質上的犧牲﹐才能夠保障那個人的積極權利。理論上不論在任何情況下﹐也可以滿足所有人的消極權利﹐現實中能不能實行是另一回事。但在某些特定情況下﹐如發生大飢荒或世紀大災難時﹐理論上根本無法滿足所有人的積極權利。因此消極權利是比積極權利更基本的權利﹐所以也是更加重要的權利。

理論歸理論﹐人類社會不是烏托邦。在現實中﹐消極權利有積極的一面﹐而積極權利也有其消極的一面。若果每個人只盡自己的消極義務﹐那麼每個人的生命財產還不未得到充份的保障﹐因為總會有些不履行消極義務的壞人﹐會作出捐害他人性命財產的事。在這個情況下﹐每個人也同時有積極的義務﹐去保護其他人免受壞人的侵犯。在現代社會中﹐這個責任由政府負責。我們通過檄交稅款﹐讓政府成立警隊法庭監獄﹐去懲罰那些不遵守消極義務的人﹐讓每個人的消極權利也有保障。若一個人在社會上能夠自給自足﹐可是因為有人破壞他的生計(如中國大陸強行徵收農地)﹐讓他不能夠賺取生活所需﹐那麼其他人便要履行積極義務去接濟這個人﹐。在這個情況下﹐只要好好保障他的消極權利﹐其他人不用作出任何物質犧牲﹐便已等同保障他的積極權利。

消極權利是每個人的基本權利﹐差不多是從古至今任何社會能夠正常運作的先決條件﹐基本上沒有什麼可以爭議。可是積極權利卻極具爭議性﹐因為若要維護所有人的積極權利﹐便必定要一些人履行其積極義務作出犧牲。一個人到底要作出多少犧牲﹐才算是盡了積極義務呢。若果這些物質犧性並非自願﹐又有沒有侵犯他們的消極權利呢。若一個人因他控制以外的因素﹐如自然災害或他的消極權利受到侵犯﹐沒法去滿足他的積極權利﹐一般而言其他人也樂於履行他們的積極義務﹐向那些不幸的人暫時供應生活所需。可是若果一個人是因為自身因素﹐如能力不足﹐懶躲或愚昧﹐長期沒有辨法滿足自己的生活所需﹐那其他人有沒有滿足他積極權利的義務呢。又如何介定一個人生活所需不足﹐是因為外在因素還是自食其果呢。這一連串也是討論積極權利時也要考慮的問題。

兩種自由

自由也可以分為消極自由和積極自由兩種定義。消極自由是指免受干預的自由﹐亦是傳統上對自由的定義。在這個定義下不自由是指他人限制我去做能我夠做到的事情。我做不到我能力以外的事情﹐如不能飛或不能凌空跳起十尺﹐並不算是不自由。同樣道理我們也不會說一個盲人沒有閱讀的自由﹐或說一個破子沒然走路的自由。在消極自由的定義下﹐現代用語經濟自由帶有內在矛盾﹐沒有經濟自由說穿了即是貧窮。若果貧窮是純萃因為能力不足﹐沒法賺取足夠的金錢﹐那與盲人或破子的何子一樣﹐窮人並不是沒有經濟自由﹐而是他們根本沒有經濟能力。正確的說法﹐是他人控操社會制度﹐在不公義和不公義情況下窮人沒法謀生﹐他們失去賺錢的自由。消極自由並不等同政府完全不干預﹐否則每個人都可以任意干預其他人﹐完全自由便等於沒有自由。只有通過有限度地限制每個人的自由﹐限制每個人只能對別人作最小的干預﹐才能夠保障每個人最大的自由。在此定義中自由並非至高無上的價值﹐現實中我們有時需要在自由與公義﹐平等﹐效率或繁榮等其他價值中作出取捨。只是我們要分清楚前因後果﹐我們是放棄自由去換取其他的東西﹐而非那些東西增加我們的自由。

積極自由則從另一個介定自由﹐當一個人只有擁有對自己的主權﹐他才擁有自由。若果說當自己的主人﹐只是在不受別人干預的情況作關於自身的決定﹐那積極自由與消極自由並沒有分別。可是若果把自身分成高低兩個層面﹐便可以說當一個人淪為低層欲望的奴隸﹐並不能真正地為自己作出決定當自己的主人。若一個人只是順從肉體﹐文化﹐宗教﹐階級等枷鎖的意願﹐並不是獨立地自主地作出對自己有益處的決定﹐在這個時候便可以為他好作理由﹐去干預他低層欲望作出的決定﹐強迫他擺脫低層欲望的束縛﹐解放他的高層意志讓他擁有真正的自由。

兩個自由的定義有各自的問題。在消極自由的定義中﹐只要人的意願不受到干預﹐便是擁有自由。當一個人想做什麼也能做到﹐他所有欲望也能夠滿足﹐他便擁有絕對的自由。若一個人有不能滿足的欲望﹐他便是沒有自由。要解決不自由的問題有兩個方法﹐一個方法就是盡辨法滿足欲望﹐第二個辨法便是讓欲望消失。當一個人完全沒有欲望﹐什麼也不要求什麼也不想做﹐別人完全不能干預他﹐他也擁有絕對的自由﹐儘管他什麼也沒有做。否定自我或許是靈修或成佛之道﹐但也成為當權者洗腦的工具﹐讓人民否定自己的欲望訴求﹐縱使他們沒有自由﹐只要他們不追求自由﹐他們便不是不自由了。在積極自由的定義中﹐每個人只有依靠高層意志作出決定才是真正自由﹐可是高層意志帶有客觀性和唯一性﹐對每個人必定是放諸四海準﹐每個人也會作出同樣正確選擇。結果不論是高層意志代表什麼﹐基督教口中的真理﹐民族主義者口中的國家認同﹐或是馬克思所只的唯物辯證歷史觀﹐也可以則淪為當權者的藉口﹐美其名解放人民想思﹐實際上干預他們的意願奴役人民。

Reference:
Basic Rights – Henry Shue
Two Concepts of Liberty – Isaiah Berlin

城市規劃是現代社會不可缺少的一環﹐政府制定法例管理公共空間﹐讓大多數市民能夠分享使用公共空間。可是這些規則漠視露宿者使用公共空間的權利。限制公共空間不準非指定用途﹐對於一般市民影響不大﹐因為他們對去公園是散步玩樂﹐街道是從一點走到另一點的通道﹐他們在家中有私人空間作私人活動﹐如睡覺吃飯或大小二便。但對於露宿者來說﹐街道公圍天橋底便是他們的家﹐不許他們在公共空間活動﹐便等於對他們趕盡殺絕。Jeremy Waldron在Homeless and the Issue of Freedom一文中﹐嘗試指出限制公共空間的用途﹐等同剝削露宿者的個人自由﹐否定他們身為人類的尊嚴。我這篇論文主要檢視他的論點﹐並挑出其中數點漏洞作出反證。在原文設定的特定條件下﹐把露宿者驅逐出城市﹐並不會構成侵犯自由的問題。

Homeless and still free

In “Homeless and the Issue of Freedom” [1], Jeremy Waldron argues that imposing restrictions to forbid unwanted activities on common properties will limit the freedom of homeless people and violate their human dignity. In this essay, I am going to first examine and illustrate Waldron’s claim. Then I will provide a counter argument to demonstrate the freedom of homeless people is violated even with all the restrictions imposed on common properties.

Waldron lay out the foundation of his argument by stating distinctions between different types of properties; they are the private property, collective property and common property. Private property is owned by private citizen. The owner of the property has the power to determine who is allowed to access and what is allowed performed in his property. If someone violates his property rights, say by sneaking into his property, the owner can persecute the trespasser with the aid of the government by simply asking the police to remove unwelcome trespassers. In contrary to private property, collective property is not owned by any private citizen, it is owned by the government. Some collective properties, such as government office and military base, are not open to the public, but a subset of the collective property is fairly accessible to everyone. The collective property marked for public use is common property that includes parks, streets, sidewalks, subways, wilderness area, etc. No private person has the power to determine the usage of common property. The usage is usually determined by the government, acts in the name of the society.

By definition, homeless people are those who have no access to private property, whether the property is owned or rented. Property owners may invite homeless people to their home, but the homeless people are on the mercy of the property owners. Homeless people do not have a place called home that they have the exclusive rights to do whatever they want whenever they like. People with private property perform fundamental human activities like urinating, washing, sleeping or cooking in their own private place. However, since homeless people are excluded by all private property, they have no where to perform those primal human tasks except on common properties. If the government restricts what kind of activities is allowed in common prosperities, it would be disastrous to the homeless people who have no where to go. They will have no place to sleep and no place to urinating without breaking the law.

In the traditional notation of freedom, it usually applies to actions rather than locations. A person is free to perform a certain action or not free to perform another action. This notation neglects the fact that man is a three dimensional being that occupies space. If a person is free do something, he ought to do that thing at some place. If a person is not allowed to be in a place, he is not free to be there and not free to do anything there. If a person is not free to be in any place, he is not free to do anything, hence he is comprehensively without any freedom [1:435]. The freedom of homeless people depends on their use of the common properties since they have no where else to perform their actions freely.

Waldron criticize our society is willing to tolerate an economy system in which a large numbers of people are homeless and at the same time not willing to allow those who are in this predicament to act as free agent, looking after their own needs, in public places [1:436]. He further argues that the freedom to perform those basic human needs is a very important freedom in our society. Unlike traffic laws or commercial regulation that limits the freedom of certain actions, the freedom of sleeping and urinating is the pre-condition of living, which is a freedom on par with the freedom of speech or freedom of religion. In order to preserve the freedom of homeless people, Waldron suggests the government should either provides public facilities, such as public washroom or shelter to the homeless people to attend their basic needs or allow them to perform those actions in common properties by taking care of themselves. The problem of homeless is not just a welfare problem; it is also a problem require us seeing homeless people as agents with freedom and dignity.

Waldron has considered many objections in his article. He examined the objections from positive freedom, general prohibitions, intention and responsibility and refuted all of them successfully. I am not going to repeat the same arguments in the essay. However, Waldron failed to consider one of the strongest objections. He argues that if an action X is prohibited (to everyone) in public places and if a person A has no access to a private place wherein to perform it, then action X is effectively prohibited to A everywhere, and so A is comprehensively unfree to do X. [1:441]. Indeed if X is prohibited to do every where, the unintended cumulative effect restraint A from doing X universally. How about A has access to one and only one public place to perform action X. In this case, A is no longer comprehensively unfree to do X. If we deliberately leave an exit, set aside a place that everyone can do X, then A is still free to do X, although he is not free to do X anywhere he likes.

Let us revisit the two questions posed by Waldron in [1:436]. He claims that most people with a home and a job are willing to tolerate an economic system with a large number of homeless people. I am afraid he is making a false assumption in answering this question. It is possible for us to answer NO to both questions. What if it is not that we are willing to tolerate the homeless people in our society; it is rather we are not willing to spend extra tax money to serve the homeless people? Operating and maintaining a public washroom or homeless shelter is expensive. If the homeless people who use those facilities could not pay for their cost, then who is going to foot the bill? What if we actually do not tolerate any homeless people at all? Giving the above loop hole in Waldron’s argument, forbidding homeless people to look after their own needs in public places, could very well means we simply want to drive them away, so we don’t have to tolerate them anymore.

I do agree with Waldron that posing restriction on what activities are allowed in common property will limit the freedom of homeless people given that the same restriction is imposed on all common properties. I also agree with Waldron that as long as there exists some common property allow the homeless to perform their basic human necessity, it will not violate their freedom. If we set limitation on common property by eliminating all the possibilities that contradict to the two requirements one by one, we will soon realize there exists a case fits neatly in the middle. In this special scenario, we do not have to tolerate the homeless people hanging out in public places; we do not have to spend our tax dollars building new public facilities for the homeless; and most important, their freedom is not violated at all. The solution is surprisingly straight forward. The government can impose restrictions on all common properties except a patch of designated area on the outskirt of the city or maybe even in the wilderness. The homeless people are free to perform whatever activities they like in the middle of nowhere without interfering with the rest of us in the society.

The obvious objection to my argument is by doing so we forcing them to move out of the city which seriously violates their freedom. Let us take a closer look at this objection and examine this scenario using the criteria of freedom proposed by Waldron himself. When Waldron talks about the homeless are excluded from all of the places governed by private property, he is not puzzled by the fact that most people are excluded from all but one of those places [1:434]. From this statement, we can deduce that if we are excluded from all but one place together does not violate our freedom even we are subjected to the restrictions on common property. If homeless people are allowed to sleep or urinate in a given place, they should be as free as the rest of us who are also allowed to sleep or urinate in one place, our home. Assign a piece of land to homeless people is essentially the same giving homeless people a home. Although their home is far away from the city, a home is still a home. Once a homeless person is not homeless anymore, he is subjected to the same rule as the rest of us. If restricting private activities on common property does not violate our freedom, it does not violate any homeless (now homed) person’s freedom.

Another line of objection is sometimes taken is this: if the society restricts the homeless from all of the private and common property in the city; we are confining them into a ghetto and deprive their freedom of living in the city. We have to be very careful about the conception of freedom used in this objection. In Waldron’s paper, he is arguing the along the line of traditional liberal idea of negative freedom [1:436] instead of the controversial, question-begging conception of positive freedom. The homeless people are not banned from entering the city. They are free to enter the city as long as they follow the same rules that apply to everyone. The homeless people are free to own or rent a place in the city if they can afford it. After a person secure the property rights of a place, he has the exclusive use of that place and it is his negative freedom to do whatever he likes in his place. Trespassers into private properties violate the negative freedom of the owner because they obstruct the owner from doing something in his place, such as excluding unwelcome trespassers.

It would be absurd if we allow trespasses on the ground of negative freedom as it directly contradicts with the negative freedom of the property owners. It makes more sense if owning a property is a positive freedom because it requires money to purchase or rent a place and not everyone is able to afford the price to live anywhere he wants. Even within the same city, the property price varies in different districts. For example, not everyone can afford to live in West Vancouver; they have to live in a less expensive area like Coquitlam. For those who cannot even afford a place in Coquitlam, they may have to settle in more remote areas like Abbotsford or Langley. At last for those who cannot afford any place in the city, namely the homeless, they have no choice but accept a free home in the ghetto. We would not grant the negative freedom for those who live Coquitlam to trespass the home of those living in West Vancovuer; why would we grant the same negative freedom to the homeless living in the ghetto?

Unlike the freedom of religion or freedom of speech, the freedom of sleeping and urinating is not a pure negative freedom. A society can grant freedom of speech and freedom of religion to everyone without anyone’s freedom being violated. However, space is a scare resource. If someone is using a space for one thing, it implicitly limits the freedom of another person using the same space for another thing. If some one is sleeping in the park, it violates the freedom of other people using the park for recreational purpose. Even if the park has open access to homeless people, there are only a fix number of benches in a park. When one homeless person occupies a bench to sleep overnight, he displaces other homeless people from using the same bench to sleep. Urinating in public places create hygiene problem, if the government allows people to urinate in a park, it won’t be long before the park become unusable to all. According to Waldron, there are three types of rules governing the usage of common property. The second rules maintains that if public places are to be available for everyone’s use, then we must make sure that their use by some people does not preclude or obstruct their use by others [1:439]. When homeless people using common property for activities other than the designed purpose of the places, they violated the second rules and interfere with another people who want to enjoy the common property.

At last, Waldron may try to object the idea of sending the homeless to live in ghetto on other moral reasons such as injustice, being cruel to them or violate their basic human rights. If he argues along this line of thoughts, he will fall prey on his own accusation of the “moralization” of freedom [1:438]. It will not only transform our concept of freedom into a moralized definition of positive liberty, but also excludes the concept of freedom altogether from the debate about the homeless. The insistence that the enforcement of the ghetto rules is anything but a restriction of freedom is a serious strategic mistake, since freedom is the core of Waldron’s argument. In the end, Waldron is trapped in a self-created dilemma. On one hand, he cannot give up the freedom argument or his efforts in the paper would be lost in vain; on the other hand, he cannot dispute driving the homeless people to a ghetto would not violate their freedom according to his earlier arguments in the paper. Either way he loses.

References:
[1] Jeremy Waldron, “Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom,” in Contemporary Political Philosophy, R.E. Goodin and P. Pettit, Ed., MA: Blackwell, 2006, pp. 432-448