Hong Kong is so behind in the progress of democracy. While we are still asking for basic democracy, the Americans is already dealing with the problem of having too much democracy. I wonder are there any pro-China politicians in HK would smart enough to quote the problems in California as an argument against the pro-democracy movement.

Dec 17th 2009, The Economist print edition
The fourth branch of government has run amok in parts of America

AS 2009 draws to a close, the voter-initiative industry is already frantically busy. In two dozen states new propositions are being readied to go before voters in 2010. Soon “bounty hunters”, paid by the sponsors, will appear on the streets to gather signatures in order to place initiatives on ballots. In states such as California voters will probably have to consider more than a dozen next year.

The lofty term for these initiatives, along with referendums and recalls (most famously of Gray Davis, California’s then-governor, in 2003), is “direct democracy”. They play the biggest and most excessive role in California, where voters have directly amended the state’s constitution or statutes in matters big and small, from how to spend to how to tax, from regulating how fowl should be kept in coops to banning gays from marrying.

The latter two initiatives happened to pass on the same ballot in 2008. Thus “chickens gained valuable rights in California on the same day that gay men and lesbians lost them,” as Ronald George, the chief justice of California’s Supreme Court, remarked recently. The court had previously ruled gay marriage legal, but was obliged to uphold the voters’ wishes.

This odd pairing illustrates the problem that direct democracy poses today. First, by circumventing legislatures in the minutiae of governance (chicken coops, for instance), direct democracy overrules, and often undermines, representative democracy. Second, by letting majorities of those voting—who are often a minority of the state’s residents—circumscribe the rights of minorities (gays, in this case), direct democracy can threaten individual freedom.

Put differently, it is the “tyranny of the majority” that James Madison, a Founding Father, warned about. His reading of ancient history was that the direct democracy of Athens was erratic and short-lived, whereas republican Rome remained stable for much longer. He even worried about using the word “democracy” at all, lest citizens confuse its representative (ie, republican) form with its direct one. “Democracy never lasts long,” wrote John Adams, another Founding Father. Asked what government the federal constitution of 1787 had established, Benjamin Franklin responded: “A republic, if you can keep it.”

But republican governance, even with its competing branches of government and elected representatives, did not perform well as America expanded westward. In California, according to a famous account from 1896, there was “only one kind of politics and that was corrupt politics. It didn’t matter whether a man was a Republican or Democrat. The Southern Pacific Railroad controlled both parties.” Enraged, the Progressive movement grew and took a new look at direct democracy as it was practised in Switzerland, where its use was—and is—sparing and effective (even if occasionally controversial, like last month’s vote to ban minarets).

In 1898 South Dakota became the first state to allow voter initiatives, and others followed, including California in 1911. For many years direct democracy worked as a safety valve, if and when legislatures proved corrupt or unresponsive. But starting with California’s infamous Proposition 13 of 1978, which not only capped property taxes but required (thanks to a vote by a simple majority of those voting) a supermajority of legislators for any future tax increase, direct democracy changed.

It became a fourth branch of government, an industry and a circus. In the 1980s and 1990s the number of ballot initiatives soared, as tycoons from Silicon Valley and Hollywood, or special interests such as public-sector unions, threw millions of dollars into campaigns, paying college students a dollar or more for each signature they collected, blanketing the airwaves with demagogic attack ads and pestering residents with robo-calls at suppertime. The initiatives became longer—the longest rambled on for 15,633 words—and, with double negatives and impenetrable legalese, less comprehensible.

Ironically enough, Southern Pacific, now itself just another interest group, bankrolled an initiative in 1990 to issue billions in bonds to support rail transport. Even elected representatives, such as Arnold Schwarzenegger, the governor of California, often make use of initiatives nowadays instead of working with the legislature. Mr George wonders whether the voter initiative has now “become the tool of the very types of special interests it was intended to control, and an impediment to the effective functioning of a true democratic process.”
The bringer of gridlock

Direct democracy in this form contributes to dysfunction. California currently has America’s worst budget problems, but other states with extensive direct democracy, such as its neighbours Arizona and Oregon (which has had more initiatives than even California), are close behind. In Oregon it will be voters who decide, in January, for or against a tax increase to help plug the latest budget hole.

Those budget holes often result from the cumulative consequences of voter initiatives as much as from economic slowdown. Since the 1970s voters have tended to like initiatives that promise better schools, new hospitals or tougher prison terms, but they are oblivious to the costs involved. At the same time, they loathe taxes and in many states they have insisted, by voter initiative, that two-thirds majorities are needed to raise them.

Robert Stern, the president of the non-partisan Centre for Governmental Studies in Los Angeles (and a drafter of initiatives since the 1970s), believes that direct democracy cannot and should not be ditched wholesale. Despite everything, “most Californians have more confidence in the initiative process than in the legislative process,” he says. That is a result of increasing polarisation between the two big parties, which has led to blocked and unresponsive legislatures and so bred a yearning to circumvent them.

But Mr Stern, like Mr George, believes that the process must be improved and supports the idea of a constitutional convention in California for that purpose. There are far too many initiatives because the signature-collection process is trivially easy for those with money (though daunting for those without it). There must be clearer and more accessible information for voters. And in California the legislature should be allowed at least to amend all initiatives, which it currently cannot. Its citizens should remember that they have a republic, if they can keep it.

從前有一條小鄉村﹐村民日出而作日入而息﹐生活很樸素善良。與其他鄉村有點不同﹐這條村的居民天生善忘﹐昨天的事今天己記不起﹐今天的事明天就忘記了。若村民甲得了罪村民乙﹐到了第二天大家都忘記了。正因為村民善忘﹐他們之間沒有什麼爭拗﹐所以大家能夠和諧共處。

有天早上一頭村民從未見過的野獸闖進村子﹐﹐村民們都很好奇﹐便走出來看過究竟。他們議論紛紛﹐討論著這頭野獸是什麼動物。有人問這頭讓牠進入村子會不會危險。另一人立即回答說﹕看牠毛聳聳樣子多麼可愛﹐當然不會有危險了。村民圍觀了好一陣見子﹐見野獸沒有什麼動靜﹐便各自散去做自己的事﹐由得野獸在村子四處走動。

到了旁晚吃飯的時候﹐村民各自回家開飯。住在村口的王婆發現孫兒不見了﹐動員村民四出搜索。最後村長終於在村子的井旁﹐發現王婆孫兒的屍體。屍體上有很明顯被野獸襲擊的痕跡﹐大家一致認為王婆孫兒是被今天早上的野獸咬死的。在屍體有很多野獸的糞便﹐猜想野獸在吃飽後拉屎。奇怪的是糞便竟然在火光下閃閃生煇﹐原來野獸的糞便中混集了黃金。這時天色己晚﹐村長留下幫助王婆埋葬孫兒﹐著村民先行回家明天才商量對付野獸的辨法。

到了第二天早上﹐因村民天性善忘的關係﹐大部份人已忘記昨天發生的慘劇﹐除了失去孫兒的王婆和發現屍體的村長。他們二人因接觸過孫兒的屍體﹐對昨天發生的事情還記憶猶新。這時那頭野獸再次闖進村子﹐村民忘記昨天曾見過這頭野獸﹐於是又走出來看過究竟議論紛紛。王婆見狀馬上告訴眾人﹐說這頭野獸很危險會吃人﹐大家應該合力打死牠。可是村民並不相信她的說話﹐有人說野獸毛聳聳樣子多麼可愛﹐當然不會有危險了。王婆反問村民﹐難道你們忘記我孫兒被野獸咬死的事情嗎﹖有人說王婆孫兒昨天不是跌入河中淹死嗎。有人說王婆孫兒昨天不是病死的嗎。更有人說王婆記錯了﹐她根本沒有孫兒。

王婆見大家不相信她﹐心裏著急便向村長求救﹐希望他可以幫忙說出真相。村長記得王婆孫兒的死法﹐可是他更記得野獸拉出的黃金。他心想今天真幸運﹐野獸今再來村子﹐入黑後獨自去收集野獸糞便﹐撿出糞便中的黃金就發達了。於是他沒有說出真相﹐更說是王婆孫兒頑皮在先﹐挑潑野獸才被牠咬死。大家只要不去招惹野獸﹐便不會有危險了。雖然王婆竭力遊說村民﹐奈何沒有人相信王婆的說話。村長更說王婆在浪費大家的時間﹐著大家去幹活耕作。村民看見野獸沒有什麼動靜﹐便各自散去做自己的事﹐由得野獸在村子四處走動。

到了旁晚吃飯的時候﹐村民各自回家開飯。村民的老婆發現村長不見了﹐動員村民四出搜索﹐可是完全找不到村長的蹤影﹐只是在村尾的大樹旁找到村長的布鞋﹐而布鞋旁些有閃閃發光的黃金。村民不明白村長為什麼會失蹤﹐只有王婆心裏明白﹐村長肯定是給野獸吃掉了﹐還吃得一乾二淨連骨頭也吞下肚。村民聽見村長被野獸吃掉﹐大家也人心惶惶﹐死怕下一個輪到自己被吃。不過大家不用怕只要到了明天早上﹐﹐村民又會忘記吃人的野獸﹐更加不會記得有過這樣的一個村長啦。

California is a textbook case when democracy falls flat on its face, yet it is still considerably better than places with no democracy.

May 14th 2009 | LOS ANGELES, SACRAMENTO AND SAN FRANCISCO
From The Economist print edition
As California ceases to function like a sensible state, a new constitution looks both necessary and likely

ON MAY 19th Californians will go to the polls to vote on six ballot measures that are as important as they are confusing. If these measures fail, America’s biggest state will enter a full-blown financial crisis that will require excruciating cuts in public services. If the measures succeed, the crisis will be only a little less acute. Recent polls suggest that voters are planning to vote most of them down.

The occasion has thus become an ugly summary of all that is wrong with California’s governance, and that list is long. This special election, the sixth in 36 years, came about because the state’s elected politicians once again—for the system virtually assures as much—could not agree on a budget in time and had to cobble together a compromise in February to fill a $42 billion gap between revenue and spending. But that compromise required extending some temporary taxes, shifting spending around and borrowing against future lottery profits. These are among the steps that voters must now approve, thanks to California’s brand of direct democracy, which is unique in extent, complexity and misuse.

A good outcome is no longer possible. California now has the worst bond rating among the 50 states. Income-tax receipts are coming in far below expectations. On May 11th Arnold Schwarzenegger, the governor, sent a letter to the legislature warning it that, by his latest estimates, the state will face a budget gap of $15.4 billion if the ballot measures pass, $21.3 billion if they fail. Prisoners will have to be released, firefighters fired, and other services cut or eliminated. One way or the other, on May 20th Californians will have to begin discussing how to fix their broken state.

California has a unique combination of features which, individually, are shared by other states but collectively cause dysfunction. These begin with the requirement that any budget pass both houses of the legislature with a two-thirds majority. Two other states, Rhode Island and Arkansas, have such a law. But California, where taxation and budgets are determined separately, also requires two-thirds majorities for any tax increase. Twelve other states demand this. Only California, however, has both requirements.

If its representative democracy functioned well, that might not be so debilitating. But it does not. Only a minority of Californians bother to vote, and those voters tend to be older, whiter and richer than the state’s younger, browner and poorer population, says Steven Hill at the New America Foundation, a think-tank that is analysing the options for reform.

Those voters, moreover, have over time “self-sorted” themselves into highly partisan districts: loony left in Berkeley or Santa Monica, for instance; rabid right in Orange County or parts of the Central Valley. Politicians have done the rest by gerrymandering bizarre boundaries around their supporters. The result is that elections are won during the Republican or Democratic primaries, rather than in run-offs between the two parties. This makes for a state legislature full of mad-eyed extremists in a state that otherwise has surprising numbers of reasonable citizens.

And that is why sensible and timely budgets have become almost impossible, says Jim Wunderman, president of the Bay Area Council, an association of corporate bosses. Because the Republicans are in a minority in the legislature, they have no sway until budget time, when they suddenly hold veto power thanks to the two-thirds requirement. Because in the primaries they have run on extremist platforms against other Republicans, they have no incentive to be pragmatic or moderate, and tend simply to balk.

What was unusual about this year’s deadlock was only its “record lateness”, says Mr Wunderman, which amounted to an “anti-stimulus” that negated much of the economic-recovery plan coming from Washington, DC. “No real conversation is possible on anything that matters,” he says, whether it be California’s fraught water supply, its barbaric prison conditions or its teetering public education.

Representative democracy is only one half of California’s peculiar governance system. The other half, direct democracy, fails just as badly. California is one of 24 states that allow referendums, recalls and voter initiatives. But it is the only state that does not allow its legislature to override successful initiatives (called “propositions”) and has no sunset clauses that let them expire. It also uses initiatives far more, and more irresponsibly, than any other state.

Direct democracy in America originated, largely in the Western states, during the Populist and then Progressive eras of the late 19th and early 20th century. It came to California in 1911, when Governor Hiram Johnson introduced it. At first, it made sense. The Southern Pacific Railroad dominated politics, society and the courts in the young frontier state, and direct democracy would be a welcome check and balance. The state in 1910 had only 2.4m residents, and 95% of them were white. (Today it has about 37m residents, and less than half are white.) A small, homogenous and informed electorate was to make sparing and disciplined use of the ballot to keep the legislature honest, rather as in Switzerland.
Citizen-power gone mad

Sparing and disciplined it stayed until the 1970s. But then came a decade of polarisation and voter mistrust. In 1978 Californians sparked a nationwide “tax revolt” by passing Proposition 13, which drastically limited property taxes and placed a permanent straitjacket on state revenues. That launched an entire industry of signature-gatherers and marketing strategists that now puts an average of ten initiatives a year on the ballot, as Mark Baldassare, the boss of the non-partisan Public Policy Institute of California, has calculated. In 2003 direct democracy reached a new zenith—or nadir, some might say—when Californians “recalled” their elected and sitting governor, Gray Davis, and replaced him with Mr Schwarzenegger.

The minority of eligible Californians who vote not only send extremists to Sacramento, but also circumscribe what those representatives can do by deciding many policies directly. It is the voters who decide, for instance, to limit legislators’ terms in office, to mandate prison terms for criminals, to withdraw benefits from undocumented immigrants, to spend money on trains or sewers, or to let Indian tribes run casinos.

Through such “ballot-box budgeting”, a large share of the state’s revenues is spoken for before budget negotiations even begin. “The voters get mad when they vote to spend a ton of money and the legislature can’t then find the money,” says Jean Ross of the California Budget Project, a research outfit in Sacramento. Indeed, voters being mad is the one constant; the only proposition that appears certain to pass on May 19th would punish legislators with pay freezes in budget-deficit years.

More than half of the initiatives don’t pass, and some that do are sensible. But much of the system has been perverted into the opposite of what Hiram Johnson intended. It is not ordinary citizens but rich tycoons from Hollywood or Silicon Valley, or special interests such as unions for prison guards, teachers or nurses, that bankroll most initiatives onto the ballots.

Then comes a barrage of television commercials, junk mail and robo-calls that leave no Californian home unmolested and the great majority confused. Propositions tend to be badly worded, with double negatives that leave some voters thinking they voted for something when they really voted against. One eloquent English teacher in Los Angeles recently called a radio show complaining that, after extensive study, she could not understand the ballot measures on grounds of syntax.

The broken budget mechanism and the twin failures in California’s representative and direct democracy are enough to guarantee dysfunction. The sheer complexity of the state exacerbates it. Peter Schrag, the author of “California: America’s High-Stakes Experiment”, has counted about 7,000 overlapping jurisdictions, from counties and cities to school and water districts, fire and park commissions, utility and mosquito-abatement boards, many with their own elected officials. The surprise is that anything works at all.

As a result, there is now a consensus among the political elite that California’s governance is “fundamentally broken” and that the state is “ungovernable, unless we make tough choices”, as Antonio Villaraigosa, the mayor of Los Angeles and a likely candidate for governor next year, puts it. What are those choices?

Incremental reform, says one set of analysts. Darrell Steinberg, a thoughtful Democrat who is the current leader of the state Senate, says that the dysfunction is often overstated, since the system was deliberately designed “to ensure that change occurs slowly”. He believes that several piecemeal reforms already slated will fix most of the problem.

So does California Forward, a bipartisan think-tank supported by several of the state’s éminences grises. A change to districting rules should end gerrymandering, starting next year. And there is talk of open primaries in which people vote irrespective of their party affiliation, and then elect a candidate in a run-off between the top two vote-getters, whether from the same party or not. Together, these two steps would make the state’s representative politics more moderate, says James Mayer, California Forward’s director. Representatives should also have longer terms in office, he thinks, to reduce the permanent turnover that pits greenhorn legislators against savvy and entrenched lobbyists.
Founding fathers wanted

Many others, however, now believe that California needs to start from scratch, with a fully-fledged constitutional convention. California’s current constitution rivals India’s and Alabama’s for being the longest and most convoluted in the world, and is several times longer than America’s. It has been amended or revised more than 500 times and now, with the cumulative dross of past voter initiatives incorporated, is a document that assures chaos.

Calls for a new constitution have resurfaced throughout the past century, but never went far. That changed last August, as the budget negotiations were once again going off the rails, when Mr Wunderman of the Bay Area Council renewed the call for a convention and received an astonishing outpouring of support. Mr Schwarzenegger has called a constitutional convention “a brilliant idea” and thinks it is “the right way to go”. (The new constitution would take effect well after he leaves office.) Most encouragingly, says Mr Wunderman, nobody, not even the so-called special interests, has yet come out against a convention.

To the extent that there is scepticism at all, it is not about the idea of a new and cleaner constitution but about the process that might lead to it. If a convention set out to rewrite the entire constitution, it would end in the usual war over hot-button social issues such as gay marriage or the perennial Californian fight over water. And there is concern that “the nutwings are the ones who will show up, not the soccer moms,” as Ms Ross of the California Budget Project puts it. The same partisan extremists bickering about the same controversies would lead nowhere.

To address these concerns, the Bay Area Council, which has become the driving force behind the scheme, has put forth two ideas. First, delegates to the convention should be chosen through the general jury pool to ensure that the whole population, as opposed to partisans or voters, is represented. Second, the scope of the constitutional convention would be explicitly limited to governance issues and the budget mechanism and would exclude all others.

This should enable reform in the most vital and interconnected areas. These are: reducing the two-thirds requirement for budgets and taxes; mandating two-year as opposed to annual budgets; giving local governments more access to local revenues; creating less partisan districts and primary elections; disciplining the process of direct democracy with new rules about signature collection; and introducing a “sunset” commission, as Texas has, that would gradually retire overlapping jurisdictions and offices to achieve something more manageable.

The plan is to introduce voter initiatives in next year’s ballot calling for a constitutional convention, to have the convention the following year, and to put the new constitution on a ballot in 2012, when it would take effect. In the meantime both the incrementalists, such as California Forward, and the wholesale reformers, such as the Bay Area Council, are backing the propositions on next week’s ballot. Even if they succeed, this would only temporarily reduce the urgency for radical reform; failure would cause intolerable pain.

首先很多情況下選民的意願﹐很大程度受政府政策影響。若果政策影響人民意願﹐人民意願又全過來決定政策﹐那人民何來自主的權利呢。其次人民的意願並不是一成不變﹐滿足了人民今天的意願﹐不等於能夠滿充他們明天的意願。民眾甚至可以不滿意昨天作出的選擇﹐儘管現狀是昨天選擇的必然的結果。有時候人民所作出的選擇並不真正的意願﹐特別是在資訊不足的情況下所作的決定。人民的意願會也受到環境的影響﹐如酸葡萄心態或困難時降低要求。民主制度守護的是人民自主﹐所以在某些情況下﹐政府有需要凌駕人民的意願﹐以保障人民的福利和自主性。

政府在三個情況下﹐政策應該凌駕人民的個人意願。第一個情況是集體意願的決定﹐人民的高階意願不乎合人民的低階意願。高階意願是指對自己意願的意願﹐例如人民的意願是要社會更加環保﹐但不願意獨自承擔環保的額外開支﹐這時候就需要政府介入﹐以立法手段去改變人民的低階意願。第二個情況是人民在不公義的背景下作出的選擇﹐有時候他們會選擇接默默受了不公義的現狀﹐認為那是自身或際遇的問題。第三個情況是人民的選擇﹐將會嚴重影響自身福利﹐以及鎖死自己在未來的選擇。這包括所有會上癮的行為如食煙吸毒賭錢﹐因此政府為人民福利著想﹐應該防止人民對作出對自己有害的選擇。

在現行民主制度中﹐選民以不記名投票的方式去作出選擇﹐政府根據選民表達的意願﹐去制定政策和決定﹐可是不記名投票的選舉制度本身也有問題。選民表達的意願很多時候不能反影他們真正的意願﹐他們防止最壞選擇出現會進行策略性投﹐把選票投給不是最好但可以接受的選擇。民主選舉是假設人民能夠透過選票去整合社會中不同的利益﹐但當每個選民以自己利益作出選擇時﹐他們基於自私的選擇卻不一定對社會有益處。除了以不記名投票的方式外﹐民主還能以公開討論的實行。人民透過理性討論達成共識﹐正如古代希臘城邦的民主一樣。公開討論的好處﹐是人民不單要考慮自己的利益﹐還要考慮社會整體的利益﹐才能說服別人支持自己的決定。公開討論以理性和大眾福利為基礎﹐藉此可以培養人民的理性和同理心。

雖然公開討論看似比投票制度優勝﹐但是本身也不是沒有問題。投票才不過每幾年一次花﹐人民的投票率也偏低。公開討論比投票更花時間﹐並不是每個市民也願意或能夠付出這樣多的時間﹐最終民意共識可能會被少數人騎劫。其次是共識可膩根本不存在﹐理性討論並不能夠解決價值觀取向的不同。在公開討論中某些人可能有隱藏議題﹐他們以公眾利益為名個人利益為實。公開討論得出共識並不一定是最好﹐可能發生集體盲目的羊群效益。由於公開討論參與者的身份是公開﹐有些人會因為其他人的壓力而選擇妥協﹐所以公開討論不能保障所有人的自主意願。

Reference:
Perference and Politics – Cass Sunstein
The Market and the Forum – Jon Elster

跟據聯合國以往的慣例﹐ 遣責接下來的行動就是經濟制裁。可是跟據以往的經驗﹐經濟制裁基本上沒有用﹐反而國家經濟蕭條﹐最終受苦的是緬甸人民。獨裁者才不會因為人民受苦而自動放棄政權﹐看看古巴﹐北韓﹐利比克等專制國家﹐給聯合國制裁了幾十年﹐獨裁者還是好端端地享受富貴特權。經濟制裁並不會影響獨專者的生活質素﹐反正有走私販子提供所需的奢移品。沒有與外國通商貿易﹐國民接觸外國思想的機會少﹐更加易於實行專制統治。遺責沒有用﹐制裁沒有用﹐還有沒有其他辨法呢﹖

辨法也不是全完沒有﹐聯合國可以派維和部隊進駐﹐推翻軍方政權成立民主政府。先不論這方案負上干預別國內政的罪名﹐這個方案也並非萬試萬靈的妙方。雖然維和部隊在南斯拉夫和岡果有點成績﹐但緬甸軍方並非泛泛之輩﹐有一定程度的軍力實力﹐聯合國的軍隊可能會陷入苦戰。看看美國在伊拉克泥足深陷的反面教材﹐就算成功打敗獨裁者﹐國家局勢還是十分動蕩﹐距離民主和平政府還有很遠的路。現實中干預別國內政的爭論﹐只是地緣政治權力鬥爭的潛台詞﹐決定如何分配外國對新政權的影響力。可是在理論的層面上﹐干預別國的內政涉及國家主權與普世價值的悖論。基於人道理由﹐我們不能無視專制政府屠殺人民。可是揮軍進佔別國﹐以武力阻止屠殺﹐又會變成了帝國主義。我雖然支持殖民主義﹐認為文明國家有啟蒙開發落後國家的責任﹐也不會輕率地支持出兵。若果出兵對文明國家沒有利益﹐總不能叫文明國家的國民﹐白白去落後國家送死吧。有利益會被指動機不純正﹐沒有利益而出兵又不划算﹐如果有足夠的軍事力量和國民支持度﹐出兵他國推翻暴政在理論上可行。可是基於現實上限制的考慮﹐出兵也不是可行的解決辨法。

制裁沒有用出兵又不切實際﹐那麼我們是否只能眼白白看著專制政權欺壓人民﹐什麼事也不能幹呢﹖一個國家的命運﹐應該由那個國家的人民決定﹐旁人不能亦難以代勞。若果人民不夠忍受專制政府的統治﹐人民有權發動革命去推翻獨裁政權。手無寸鐵的平民沒有能力反抗迫壓﹐我們應該做的事情是緬甸人民一個機會﹐讓他們可以主宰自己的將來。既然人民和平示威完全沒有效用﹐兼會被暴政屠殺﹐武裝起義是迫不得爾的最後選擇。我們不能夠代替緬甸人民去打仗﹐我們只能提供資金和武器﹐讓他們有能力自己作出決定。他們可以選擇在專制統治下苟且偷生﹐他們亦可以選擇冒生命危險英勇地反抗暴政。若果每個緬甸人民也擁有槍械﹐軍隊不敢輕易地開槍屠殺人民﹐人民就有力量站起來推翻軍政府。只有人民和政府的權力得到平衝﹐才不會產生殘暴的獨裁政權﹐人民擁有槍械是自由的基石﹐所以請支持槍械合法化。

過去十八年的六四這天﹐我也是與其他平凡日子般度過﹐除了電視多了每年給我溫故知新的新聞外。今年的六四有點不平凡﹐我沒有參加任何晚會﹐只是在一間上海店中﹐邊吃水煮牛肉﹐邊聽著我同事細說當年。這兩個星期我給公司派了去開會﹐同行的還有一位同事﹐是九一年北大畢業的博士生。八九那年﹐他就在北京見證了歷史。本來同事間很少會說這些政治話題﹐兩個男人有朝到晚對足幾日﹐可以說的話題也說過了﹐我心血來潮央他說故事給我聽﹐其實那也不是什麼驚險的故事﹐不過與看新聞片段不同﹐聽著同事淡淡然說住事﹐別有一番感受。

我那位同事在民運期間﹐人家在天安門絕食抗議﹐他就趁不用上課﹐整正躲在宿舍打麻雀。六月三日他原本也打算去天安門趁熱鬧﹐不過朋友回來說天安門有人扔石﹐場面混亂於是就打消念頭。要不然﹐他今天也不可能和我吃鱔餬說故事。於對北京的人來說﹐六三才是屠城的日子﹐六四已經是事件結束。他如其他好奇的民眾一樣﹐六月四日往天安門看看﹐離遠只見兩排坦克﹐除了解放軍外什麼也看不到。

他自己沒有到天安門﹐他的朋友倒吃了軍隊的子彈﹐一槍兩洞前面入後面出。他說他的朋友很好彩﹐不是因為吃了子彈死不掉﹐而是混亂中沒然遺失北大的學生證。那晚很多人受傷﹐醫院沒有足夠資源救治所有傷者。醫生必須要作出取捨﹐救了一個人就有另一個會失救。他的朋友有機會及時得到治療﹐多得他是北大博士生的身份﹐性命比甚他閒人矜貴。我問同事﹐那天到底死了多少人。他說沒人知道﹐但他可以確定北大死了兩個同學﹐大慨校園內的消息比較靈通。我再問他後來怎樣﹐他說北京很快就回覆正常﹐人民照常上班上學﹐政府也扮作沒有事發生不再追究。只要沒有吃子彈沒有受傷﹐又不是上電視出風頭的學生﹐大部份學生都回校上課。吃了彈但沒死的學生﹐就畢業找工作出國扮簽證就麻煩些﹐要交代那個槍傷從何而來﹐當日身在何處。不過要過關也不太難﹐撒個小謊﹐找些有頭有面的人作擔保﹐總不會被當成民運份子關入監牢。他說現在沒有人會說六四﹐但北京每個人也記得當年發生的事情。他說著說著有點感嘆﹐說現在中國的貪污比八九那年更嚴重。他認識些有背景的舊同學﹐憑著政治關係營商已是億萬富翁。

六四這個很遙遠的名詞﹐今夜在小籠包與菜飯之間﹐與我的距離拉近了。

P.S. 貼了篇講六四的文章﹐希望我的網址不會給The Great Firewall of China過濾掉吧。

今晚的菜式很豐富美味﹐用料雖然不是十分名貴﹐但可以看出廚房十分用心炮製。猜想是城中名人難得聚在一起﹐酒樓自不免會打醒十二分精神﹐做好口碑不要自壞招牌﹐三十元的票價絕對是物超所值。很多的賓客也是中年以上的人﹐還有一些帶同小孩子全家出席﹐大慨我這樣單獨前來的年輕人少之又少。不知承蒙師兄關照還是純萃好運氣﹐我被編了坐在二號桌﹐在政要名人坐的一號桌隔鄰﹐距離講台也十分近。同桌的還有溫哥華支聯會的前主席﹐李柱鉐過來和他打招呼時﹐我還有機會和李柱鉐握手哦。

李柱鉐的演講在用餐後開始﹐他的確是位很有魅力政治明星。他的演講沒有悶場﹐其中在適當的地方還能引人發笑。他從去年第廿三條立法開始說起﹐講述兩年七一遊行的盛狀﹐當年起草基本法的原意和人大釋法﹐一直說到剛剛舉行立法會選舉﹐以及爭取零七零八雙普選。其實演講內的觀點我在報章雜誌上也看過了﹐但親耳聽到由當事人口中說出來的感覺是完全不同。我體會到有切身關係的真實感﹐而不只是發生於某年某日的一些事情。

他就香港的民主前途發表了一些的意見﹐也回答在場聽眾的問題。雖然中央近幾年對香港管制收緊了﹐但情況也不是如想像中那像的壞。一國兩制在某程度上是成功的﹐香港的法律精神和一般市民的自由﹐還是受到很好的保障﹐不比港英政府統治時為差。市民普遍支持民主選舉制度﹐工商界的自由黨和親共的民建聯﹐在今次直選中嘗到了甜頭﹐也對直選的態度有明顯的轉變。中央也展開了和民主派的對話﹐只不過還未認清楚是統戰的手段﹐還是有誠意的接納不同意見的聲音。民主黨本身存有一些隱憂﹐在今次選舉中由第一大黨跌為第三大黨﹐而泛民主派的議席則增加了﹐有不少獨立參選人士從民主黨中奪走了選票。李柱鉐認為作為爭取香港民主發展是一件好事﹐余若微﹐大班﹐長毛等是他們的朋友而非敵人。雖然民主黨的確是有不爭氣的地方﹐但他認為政黨政治是大勢所趨﹐若舉行全面直選會對民主黨有利﹐畢竟他們的地區工作比起獨立議員強。

有一個聽眾問他對范徐麗泰的意見﹐李柱鉐始終是有經驗的政治家﹐從他口氣可以聽很出他不屑范婦人的所為﹐但說話上的批評也不失風度。可惜的是他以不平干涉內政為由﹐拒絕回答有關中國大陸政治的提問。身為議員的在公開場合有難言的苦衷﹐我倒想知道他在私底下的想法。

晚餐演講會在十時半左右完結﹐在駕車回家的途中﹐我已在收音機聽到了有關這次演講的新聞﹐溫哥華中文電台的效率真的十分高。我不知這個演講會不會為我帶來什麼改變﹐畢竟我這個年紀的人對政治不感興趣才是正常嘛。