Tag Archives: 哲學

Atlas Shrugged – Ayn Rand

人不欠我 我不欠人

Let me give you a tip on a clue to men’s characters: the man who damns money has obtained it dishonorably; the man who respects it has earned it.

若果說社會主義的代表作是馬克思的《資本論》,那資本主義的代表作,Ayn Rand的《Atlas Shrugged》便當之無愧。這本厚千多頁的小說,描述一個架空歷史的美國,社會主義和左翼思想成為政治主流,政府逐步扼殺私人企業和自由市場,國家如何從繁榮走向衰亡。性質有點像George Orwell的《1984》一樣,兩本都是寓言小說,分別是讀Orwell會感到絕望,而讀Ayn Rand則看到希望。她藉著筆下人物反抗政府的爭扎,陳述她的客觀主義哲學思想,高舉理性自私,個人權利和資本主義等價值,以古典自由主義精神,對抗歪曲人性,漠視現實的左派思維。

現今社會,資本主義一詞彷彿帶有貶義。Rand筆下理想的資本主義,接近亞當史密夫的原形。資本家不是金錢遊戲的莊家—不事生產只慬錢搵錢,而是帶領社會進步的工業家和發明家,憑知識去創造財富。資本主義的精神,在於私有產權,財富由誰生產出來,所有權便屬誰。交易必需出於雙方自願,以暴力威嚇手段去強行徵收等同搶劫。社會主義的「各盡所能,各取所需」,聽起來很美好,但實行起上來,卻是無生產力的人在勞役有生產力的人。書中有一段故事講述,車廠老闆受到大愛的感召,決定在車廠推行社會主義。薪金不是論功行賞,而是看誰有需要,要鬥慘才獲分配金錢。除最基本的食飯和生存之外,老闆說你沒有其他需要,你便休想拿取最低以外的工資。結果有能力的員工,不甘受到剝削,辭職另謀高就,車廠挨不了多久便倒閉了。

一間公司推行社會主義,員工可以辭職不幹,但當全國都推行時,工作崗位由政府分派,人民又可以逃往那裏呢。在「人人為我,我為人人」的國度,每個人只問分配不問生產,只講權利不講義務。當你看見別人比你窮,你會對所擁有的感到羞愧,有兩塊麵包不分他人一塊讓你內疚。當你看見別人比你有錢,你會痛恨他生活比你好,憤怒他不與你分享財富,從而想著如何把他的財產搶到手上。書中的主角John Galt,建立高科技的世外桃園,以$標誌為旗幟,帶領資本家反抗政府的苛政。他的武器不是暴力而是信念,他主張「人不欠我,我不欠人」,他以理念感召資本家和有生產力的人一起大罷工,從社會中完全抽離,撤退到世外桃園中,過著自給自足,公平交易的生活。當社會上有生產力的人都走了,剩下來沒有生產力的人,連養活自已也成問題,掠奪者再沒有可供掠奪的對象,社會主義政府最終難逃經濟崩潰。

Ayn Rand的理性自私常被人誤解為冷血無情,其實她的理念正確的解讀,乃為每個人都擁有自身的主權,延申至其生產的財富之上,亦同樣擁有絕對的主權。不論是勞力或金錢,沒有人能要求你無條件幫他。若以暴力手段強迫你去幫他,那就是強盜,若以罪惡感去讓你良心受責而幫他,那就是小偷;兩者之惡,只是程度之別。Ayn Rand並非說我們不應幫助別人,而是幫助別人應是等價的交易,換取的不一定是金錢,可以是親情,愛情,善心等無形財富。若果幫助別人非出於自願,兼且幫助完了並不快樂,那為什麼還要去幫忙呢?我沒有欠他甚麼!反過來若他因為我不幫而怪責我,那樣的人並非可以公平交易的對象,應該索性與他斷絕來往。在人與人之間很顯淺的道理,當提升至政治理念的層面,為何會180度反轉過來。左派財富再分配的政治理念,不正就是有生產力的人,奉旨要幫不事生產的人嗎?

這部書的評價十分兩極,左派固然恨之入骨,從作者的中心思想,到寫作技巧,無一不被批評得體無完膚。反過來對左派思想反感的人,不懂如何反擊左派「無私奉獻,大愛包容」的歪理,從這書能找到完整的道德論述,從此可以理直氣壯向左派說不。美國不乏商界菁英和大企業CEO,公開讚揚此書的思想,對他們人生產生深遠影響,而其中最出名為前聯儲局長格林斯潘。讀者要有心理準備,這本鉅著並不容易讀,我前後花了一年才看完。此書在說故事的外衣之下,迫使你重新檢視自已的值價觀,思考人生和社會的意義。若能閱畢全書,思想頓時啟蒙開竅,明白金錢並非萬惡之源,金錢乃生產之成果,人活著的見證。

何謂自私?在日常用語中,「自私」(selfish)是一項罪名,不顧別人,不是好人。Rand的「自私」並非如此解釋,自私的人一樣會顧及別人,只要前題是基於雙贏的交易。自私的相對是「專門利人,亳不利已」的利他主義(altruism)。利他主義的最大問題,是要不求回報自我牲犧,完全否定自已的權利。當一個人否定自已的人權,那他還算是一個人嗎?是故自私為人,利他非人也。

題外話,Ayn Rand到底是九流的哲學家,還是九流的小說家呢?總不成兩者都是九流吧,果真如此她早應被世人違忘。在哲學學術界的共識是,她的客觀主義基本上不入流,理論粗疏,主流哲學家連回應也費事。偏偏任何一本書哲學入門書藉,介紹二十世絕哲學家時,Ayn Rand必定佔一席位。

以小說評論來說,此書說故事的技巧,可謂完全不合格,描寫嚴重違反常理,故事欠缺主讓讀者追看的情節,不外是流水帳般事情圍繞著女主角發生。故事的主線,若把它極度簡化,就是一個中女的愛情狂想曲。女主角是個家底超級有錢,辨事能力超強的女強人,人到中年依然剩女,但不知何解桃花運極旺,裙下之臣每個都是了不起的人物。他們沒有理由地愛上她,圍著她團團轉,計有:青梅竹馬一號,表面是富二代花花公子,實際是反抗組織的核心幹部;青梅竹馬二號,好打得的下屬兼兵仔,最後為她死埋;情夫有夫之婦鋼鐵大王,大慨在書中等同李嘉誠級數的富豪;最後當然正印男主角John Galt,天材發明家兼反抗組織的領導。

不計書中的科幻「發明」,超級合金和永動發電機,故事中實在太多想理然爾的劇情道具。其他閒角和配角,必定自動配合主角們的需要起舞,他們出場的唯一作用,就是襯托主角們的正確性。例如其中一段情節是在雞尾酒會上,主角之一發表長達半小時的偉論,其他賓客竟然乖乖聽他演說,沒有人把他當瘋子扔他出去。又例如另一主角駭客騎劫總統的電視演講,向全國人民發表三個小時的聲明,竟然沒有人索性熄電視去睡覺。偏偏這兩篇演說,金錢演說和John Galt的話,正是全書最精彩之處。

其實故事本身根本不是重點,故事不過是用來搭建舞台,讓書中角色對話,去辯証客觀主義,並身體力行。不要當這書是小說來看,應把它當做拍拉圖式的對話錄般來讀,才能感受本書的精髓。一場又一場精彩的思辯,沉悶的過場故事算不上什麼。在中國文學傳統之中,以文載道是小說的最高界境,無異Ayn Rand做到了。

作者簡介:Ayn Rand俄裔美藉哲學家,小說家和劇作家,憑著其客觀主義(Objectivism)哲學理論,被譽為二十世紀美國最具影響力的思想家。她的兩部小說Fountainhead和Atlas Shrugged,長據美國暢銷經典小說榜首,更是不少學校的指定課外閱讀。

原文刊於《閱刊》十一月號。

Bullshit and Philosophy – Hardcastle and Reisch 廢話與哲學

你沒有看錯,這本書的名字叫「廢話與哲學」。什麼,癈話也有哲學?當然了,甚至是大學哲學系的一門課,這本書便是那科的課本了。這本書是一列系流行文化與哲學叢書的其中一本,與其他的「星球大戰與哲學」,「蝙蝠俠與哲學」,「披頭四與哲學」不同,這本書的水分較少學術成分較高,收錄了十六篇文章,圍繞哲學界貨真價實的經典Harry G. Frankfurt的On Bullshit提出的癈話定義出發作出討論,其中包括了癈話的定義,分析癈話如何影響我們的生活,社會,教育,政治各方面等。這本書面世也有好幾年,書中文章例舉的一些癈話例子已經過時,如布殊入侵伊拉克的藉口,不過也無損這本書幫助我們認清癈話,對抗癈話,又或者反過來用學習成為癈話大師也可以。

以下是我對書中每章的粗略閱讀筆記:

  1. Scott Kimborugh, On Letting It Slide
    癈話便是對真相不在乎的說話,日常生活中我們很多時會容忍癈話,例如禮貌的客套說話,道歉,公關,或廣告等等,但我們絕不容忍謊話。但有些時候我們卻不能容忍癈話,多是在別人毫不講道理,不能以理由說服他時,那我們只能指出他在說癈話,然後我們才可以心安理得地無視他。對社會最大傷害的癈話,卻是說癈話的人自已也相信了的癈話,然後人們不加思索地把癈話傳開去。也有些癈話是情有可原,儘管說的人已盡最大努力去尋找真相,但能力所限或學不能其法,最後得出來結果也是癈話,例如牛頓的鍊金術研究,說穿了也是癈話。當然也有人說哲學本身全是癈話,就算在哲學家當中,不同學派的人也常說別家是癈話。儘管如此,我們還要認清楚真相和癈話的不同,才能夠判斷何時可以合理地使用癈話。

  2. Consuelo Preti, A Defence of Common Sense
    這篇文章用哲學家G.E.Moore的分析哲學(即是李天命的師祖),去教導我們如何分辨癈話。癈話之所以橫行,是因為聽者不關心真相。如果人人也關心真相,追問理解每句說話的意義,沒有人再相信癈話,那癈話不過是嘈音,對社會不會構成傷害。

  3. George Reisch, The Pragmatics of Bullshit, Intelligently Designed
    這篇文章挑戰Frankfurt對癈話的定義,不是所有癈話也對真相莫不關心,最佳的例子便是基督教的智慧創造論。基督教關心是聖經的真理,不是我們關心科學上客觀的真理。他們的癈話便是將他們的真理,包裝成為我們的真理的樣子。這種將真理偷換慨念的手法,在政治和廣告上也很常見,如扮成新聞的宣傳。這解釋了我們為什麼不能容忍謊話但能夠忍受癈話,因為謊話直接對我們有害,但說癈話的人很多時自已也相信自已癈話,甚至真心認為癈話是為你好。我們不要濫指責別人說癈話,很多時間只是我們不同意他們的說話,與其指責他在說癈話,我們更該應指出他們的錯處。

  4. Kenneth Taylor, Bullshit and the Foibles of the Human Mind, or: What the Masters of the Dark Arts Know
    這篇文章提出一些人腦的思考盲點,讓我們未能清楚看穿癈話,易容被說癈話的人操弄。其一便是人只喜歡聽奉迎的說話,只要合心意那管是癈話也照單全收。其二便是人腦不能理性地評估風險,給人兩組相同數字的選擇,只要用不同的說法包裝,利用人害怕失去擁有的心理,便能易輕左右人的選擇。唯有透過理性思考的教育,我們才能夠跳出別人定下的思想框框,看穿他們的癈話伎倆。然後我們還要反攻傳媒陣地,揭破政客廣告商的癈話。

  5. Sara Bernal, Bullshit and Personality
    癈話可以作分為兩大類,第一類是簡接地暗示虛假的大話,第二類是用盡方法去暪蔽真相。癈話也可以分為存心說或無心說兩類,在心說癈話與說謊言的動機是一樣,分別只在於手法。至於無心說的癈話,則多是出於保護自我,找個藉口推搪過去。癈話也可以分對人說和對自已說兩種,最難解釋是對自已存心說的癈話。文章後半部指出說癈話和不同類型精神病的關係,對自已說癈話的人是因為他們有輕度的精神病傾向。說癈話與患精神病一樣,便破壞人與人之間的社會關係,因為關係是建立在真話和信任之上。

  6. Alan Richardson, Performing Bullshit and the Post-Sincere Condition
    論癈話一文認為癈話沒有好事,但有一種口不對心的癈話卻人人說得理所當然,甚至被接受成為社會溝通必須禮儀的一部份,例如公司的mission statement,出於禮貌的道謝,別有企圖的稱讚,冠冕堂皇的開場白等等,因為直說實話基本上是行不通。口不對心的癈話的用途,正是說了就算逃避實質行動的擋箭牌。顧客投訴服務不好,員工只會指著mission statement說,我們不是已經說過要提供良好的服務了嗎?對付這些癈話的方法,就只有用幽默諷刺,拿出比他們更癈的癈話去挖苦他們。

  7. Cornelis de Waal, The importance of Being Earnest: A Pragmatic Approach to Bullshitting
    有別於Frankfurt和Cohen兩大對癈話的不同定義,這篇文章用實用主義哲學家Peirce的理論來定義癈話,追尋真理的相反便是癈話。有一種癈話是先有慨定結論,然後才篩選支持的證據,如科學創造論。另一種癈話是因為先入為主的利益,讓追尋真理時有意無意忽視某些證據,如煙商做的吸煙會否損害健康的研究。還有一種癈話只是因為懶於去追尋真理,便隨口說個藉口推搪過去。現代社會這麼多癈話的理由,是因為人們太少時間去追尋去與他們沒有直接關係的問題,又或人們根不毫不關心那些問題,但每個人卻被要求對每件事也能發表意見,於是只好說癈話來胡混過去。

  8. G.A. Cohen, Deeper into Bullshit
    這篇文章與Frankfurt的「論癈話」齊名,為癈話哲學的兩大經典論文,文章很學術性,讀者要有點分析哲學底子。我很奇怪這篇文章不放在第一篇,因為之前很多文章也有引用。基本上這Cohen認為Frankfurth的癈話定義有問題,他認為癈話與真偽無關,癈話就是沒有意義不能解讀的說話(unclarifiable unclarity),即李天命常說的空癈言詞。

  9. Gary Hardcastle, The Unity of Bullshit
    另一篇很學術的文章,把Frankfurt和Cohen的兩大癈話理論,用奧地利學派哲學家Carnap的理論來整合。我覺得這篇文章有點離題,主要講Carnap批評形上學是癈話,多過講關於癈話的理論本身。

  10. Andrew Aberdein, Raising the Tone: Definition, Bullshit, and the Definition of Bullshit
    又一篇學術的文章,用語言哲學家Frege的理論,拿來分析Frankfurt的理論。幸好我上學期讀了語言哲學,大慨明白文章說什麼。這篇文章很難翻釋,因為我不懂語言哲學專有名詞Term,Tone,Sense,Reference的中文說法。大意一個說話的語境不同,表達的意思也不同,語境才是決定是否癈話的關鍵。

  11. Hans Maes and Katrien Schaubroeck, Different Kinds and Aspects of Bullshit
    這篇文章基本上撮要Frankfurt和Cohen的癈話定義,然後指出這兩個定義的問題,不能應用在迷信這一類癈話上,如星相,命理,風水,水晶等等。導人迷信的人總是煞有介事地說自已那一套迷信是真,而他們亦十分相信自已那一套迷信,不附合Frankfurst癈話不關心真假的定對。那些迷信之言無知婦孺也能聽懂,不附合Cohen癈話難明難懂的定義。所以作者提出第三個癈話的定義,就不可能被任何證據或邏輯否定的就是癈話。可惜作者未能深入研究這個定義的問題,因為如此一來所有宗教就會被歸入癈話之列。

  12. Mark Evans, The Republic of Bullshit: On the Dumbing-Up of Democracy
    這篇文章探討民主政治和癈話的必然關係,眾所周知政客為求勝出選舉,說癈話是家常便飯,甚至絕大部份政治宣傳也是純萃癈話。民主選舉的程序,選民根本沒有足夠的智識作出政治的決定,無可避免要大幅簡化複雜的議題,讓人民能夠投票作出選擇,於是結果便只剩下內容空洞的癈話。不單只政治層面有很多癈話,生活上也出現很多偽專業知識的癈話,例如所謂的管理學語言。作者認為要對抗癈話風潮,只能透過在社會上建立分折哲學的文化,每個人也懂得如何去柝穿癈話。

  13. Vanessa Neumann, Political Bullshit and the Stoic Self
    這篇文章分析政治中常用的癈話。政治與癈話一不離二是因為癈話很有用,可以令自已在選民心中留下好印像,或令對手在選民心中留下壞印像。人類並不是十分理性的動物,投票到最後憑情感多過講理性。政治癈話設計去觸動選民的感情和身份認同感,只要選民感情蓋過理性便不會去計較真假。

  14. Heather Douglas, Bullshit at the Interface of Science and Policy: Global Warning, Toxic Substances, and the Other Pesky Problems
    政府制定一些政策時,需用運用科學數據和理論,可是很多時政治任務掛帥,科學的真相被扭曲,淪為癈話當粉飾政治的工具。第一種科學癈話是以偏慨全,只抽出對自已有利的數據去解讀,作者在文中舉出全球暖化作為例子。第二種科學癈話是苛求不存在的標準,對於任何不喜歡的結論,一律打上不合乎科學標準的罪名,但又不清楚講明如何釐定標準,更甚的那個漂準可以隨意升降。

  15. David J. Tietge, Rhetoric Is Not Bullshit
    很多人把修辭學等同說癈話的學問,如何包垃圾內容包裝為動聽的言詞。根據阿里士多德對修辭學的定義,修辭學就是說服別人的藝術,是一套增加溝通效率的法則。懂得修辭學的法則可以用來修飾說話外,同一套法則亦可以用來檢視別人的說話,看穿別人的癈話。

  16. Steve Fuller, Just Bullshit
    全書最後一篇文章,以不同年代的哲學家如何看癈話作總結,由柏拉圖,阿里士多德開始,到尼采,Thomas Kuhn,維根斯坦,最後以Francis Bacon的科學方法結束。

PHIL201 Epistemology 認知論(上)

認知論是哲學的基礎必修課,差不多任何高年級的哲學課,也要求對認知論有所認識。認知論涉及任何有關知識的課題,例如,何謂知識?人如何獲的知識?如何判定知識的真偽?這科的上半部主要教古典認知論,用Bertrand Russell的The Problems of Philosophy為課本,輔以其他古典哲學家的原文作為參考。下半部教二十世紀認知論的重大發展,課本是那些文集式的磚頭書,不過其實可省錢不用買課本,因為那些近代重要哲學的論文也可在網上找到。

在未探討知識的構成和分類,第一課先要確定最基礎的一點,知識存在並且人類可以獲取。絕對懷疑論者,認為人只能憑五官感覺,獲取思想以外的資訊,但感覺並不是真實,所以外在世界亦不是真實的存在,那亦沒有所謂的知識,人不可能知道任何東西。正常人大慨會認為他們的瘋子,不過讀哲學可不能馬虎,先要解決外在世界如何存在的問題。至於用什麼理論去解釋世界的存在,可直接影響上層不同認知理論的架構,從要發展出關於知識的不同觀念。

「我思故我在」是笛卡兒Descrates的名句,便是其中一個回應懷疑論者的途徑。縱使我可以懷疑世界的存在,但我不可能懷疑我自已的存在。從這個可以肯定的最基礎點出發,笛卡兒一層層地推演,讓新的知識建立在已確定的知識上,從而構成一個完整的知識系統。基礎論的知識系統中,知識是線性推論,所有知識向上推論,最終歸向最核心的無誤真理。在核心的基礎知識是不證自明,不需要亦不能問其何解。Russell亦是一個基礎論者,他認為最核心的知識便是理性本能。人藉著理性本能,把不協調的知識修正,令知識合乎現實的觀測。Moore用另外一個方法去證明外在世界是存在,他認為感覺存在於思想之外,那有感覺存在便足以論實外在世界存在,而每個人也一定感覺到自已的雙手,存在於思想之外的雙手便是外在世界存在的證明了。

外在世界的存在證明了,但外在世界的本質又是什麼呢。我們對物件的感覺,與物件本身的本質,並不一定有任何關連。傳統的科學現實主義,認為物件本質產生我們對物件的感覺,知識便是兩者關係的理論。反現實主義認為知識局限於人對物件的感覺,人並不可能物件的本質的任何東西。結構現實主義,則認為知識並不是關於物件本身,而是關於物件與物件間的關係。Russell認為知識可以分為兩類,第一類是直接從感覺獲取的知識,第二類是從描述中獲取的知識,通過描述把已知的知識,組合申延成為新的知識。

觀測現實能產生理論,理論構成知識,可是休謨Hume指出了用歸納法的問題,便是不論有多少個觀測結果,在邏輯上還是不能推論出理論,在事實與理論兩者之間,有一道深不可越鴻溝。牛頓從蘋果掉下來推論出地心吸力,我們可以用地心吸力的理論,去推論出蘋果會掉下來,但邏輯上並不能保證下一個蘋果一定會掉下來。若出現一個浮空的蘋果,便足以改寫地心吸力的理論。Russell解決歸納問題的方法,便是認為世界是有規律並有一至性,而這些最基礎的定律,是不證自明的基礎知識。接受普世規律也是人類的理性本能之一,因為若不接受定律存在的話,人根本不可能生存。

康德Kant整合了Descrates和Hume的理論,提出理性為先驗性知識的說法,人類的想思受與生俱來的理性笵疇的規畫,人要通過理性,才能把經驗轉化為知識。Russell認為數學和邏輯屬於先驗性知識,不論在任何可能存在的世界,先驗性知識也是必然為真,而其他後驗性知識,則基於我們這個世界的觀測。他認為抽像的物件也是真實,儘管它們並不存在於任何時空之內,先驗性知識便是所有存在與不存在之物的關係。

參考資料:
1. The Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell
2. Human Knowledge Classical and Contemporary Approaches 3rd Edition, Paul K. Moser and Arnold Vander Nat.

Godel, Escher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid – Douglas Hofstadter

最初遇上這本書是大學一年級時,從電腦學會師兄的極力推介,他們把這本書捧為人生必頭的神作。可惜當年我程度不夠,翻了幾頁便給這本磚頭書嚇跑了。畢業至今十多年,我偶然也會聽見這本書的大名,久不久身邊便有人說此書乃非看不可的經典,對他曾有多深的影響,甚至改變了他對世界的看法。事隔十六年,我終於與此書再續當年在大學書店結下的前緣,前後花了三個月時間,慢慢把這本七百多頁的鉅著啃完。今年原本計畫看二十本書,為看這本只好重質不重量,這本書一本大慨抵得上十本書吧。

這本書一般簡稱為GEB,作者花了十年時間才寫成,亦是他的第一本書,結果讓他舉成名,此書還奪得普立茲獎。Godel是數學家,發現不完全定律。Escher是畫家,以超現實的素描聞名,書中有大量他的畫作插圖。最後Bach是古典音樂家,他的樂章很複雜工整,把音符玩得出神入化。書中想想提及他的作品,可惜這本不是電子音沒有聲音,要自已上去Youtube聽。對於音樂的門外漢,只是聽也不易明白Bach音樂的美妙,Youtube上附上樂譜動畫,看音階不斷的位置重覆交錯,才看得出Bach作曲的鬼斧神工。數學,畫,音樂,作者從三種看似無關係的東西出發,慢慢地解釋教授各關的知識,用畫和音樂去輔助講解數學理論,交織出一個人類的自我意識是從何而來的答案。

這本書的篇排很有心思,每一章之前有一段對話錄,幾個作者創造的角色在對話,大玩文字遊戲並發問啟導性的問題,可以視為接下來嚴肅內容的引言。這本書的上半部,從零開始便是去解釋歌德爾的不完全定律,由最基本的formal language,到number theory,到propositional calculus,一路由淺入深帶領讀者推論出Godel’s incomplete theorems,數學理論中必定不完全或內有矛盾。最重要是同時帶出strange loop異圈這個慨念,任何有自我指向特性的系統便是一個異圈。

下半部涉獵的知識甚廣,包括人工智能電腦程式,基因和蛋白質的構造,人腦神經系統的構造等等。透過很多不同的科學中也隱含的異圈,作者嘗試解答心靈哲學中最重要的課題,到底什麼是智慧,什麼是思考,人類的自我意識是什麼。在低階組織的物理層面,腦部只是機械性化學反應,並沒有任何意識。可是當高階組織有了自我修改,自我指向的異圈結構,並不再限於機械式反射作用,意識便會從異圈中產生出來。

我買那本書的二十周年紀念版,在書首作者加入了一篇導讀,因為實在太多讀者誤解了此書。好處是讓我已經知道書本的主旨說什麼,某程度上幫助我不至半途而癈。可是同時卻剝奪了我閱讀的樂趣,失去了當作者把書本中所有說過的所有知識,總結整合申引出自我意識理論時,讓我妨然大悟解謎的感覺。另外作者有偷懶之嫌,書中有些資料已經過時,例如電腦下棋,電腦翻釋等等,作者應該趁二十周年紀念版的機會,更新書中的內容與時並進。不過這些小問題,並不影響此書跨越時間的經典地位。

哲學功課: Locutionary Acts and Illocutionary Acts

通常我們批評別人只說不做,但在語言哲學當中,說話也是一個行為,說話也是在做事。當然捲動舌頭發出聲音本身已經是一個行為,但這只是語言行為當中最表面的一層。深入一層的內語言行為是說出一句說話時,在表達出那句說話本身的意思。再深入一層的外語言行為,是那句說話起的實際的作用,如法官宣讀判詞,在婚禮上答我願意,向別人許下一個承諾,這些語言行為與一般可以分辨真偽的陳述說話,有著本質上的不同,因為說話本身就有一個力量。最深入一層的後語言行為,便是透過說話去達到某些目的,例如婚禮上答我願意目的只是為了嫁入豪門。這篇功課探討如何劃分內語言行為和外語言行為的界線。

In “How to do Things with Words”, J.L.Austin challenges the traditional view of philosophy language that the meaning of utterances concerns about its truth value. He proposed the concept of speech act, instead passively describe what is being said, he bring froth a new idea that identify a critical feature of speaking, which is “saying is doing”. He classify utterance into two categories, performative utterance and costative utterance. Costative utterance is more or less the traditional account of sentence, in which it concerns about how to interpret the meaning of statement in the sentence. A statement is stating some fact and some reference which can be denotated and resolved its sense and then determine the truth value of the statement. For example, the sentence “My school is on top of Burnaby Mountain” is a statement stating some fact about the school of the speaker which can be verified by the listener once “my school” is deference to “Simon Fraser University” and “Burnaby Mountain” is denotated to a particular place that the listener knows about. On the other hand, performative utterance has no truth value attached, rather the speaker is trying to archive something with the utterance. The major concern of the sentence, for example a command or an instruction, is about what the speaker intended to archive. For example, when the speaker says “Get me a cup of tea”, there is no true of false regarding the sentence, he is instructing the listener to fetch him a cup of tea.

Austin further divide the performative utterance into three sub-categories. When a person speaks, he is actually performing three acts at the same time. On the surface level, he is preformance a locutionary act, that he is making some sound, speaking some words and uttering a sentence that means a certain thing literally. In short it is the act that he is speaking. On the second level, there is the illocutionary act, what the speaking is doing when he is speaking. He could be promising something, ordering someone or stating some facts through his speech. In short it is the act in his speaking. The last level is prelocutionary act, it is the intention of the speaker through the act of speaking, he could be trying to draw someone’s attention, pleasing someone or insulting someone. In short it is the act behind his speaking. Austin points out that costative utterance is a special kind of performative utterance where the act performed is to state something. He also points out that a sentence with illocutionary verbs will make the sentence a illocutionary act, but some sentence without any illocutionary verbs can also be a performative utterance under the right context. For example, the sentence “I will be there tomorrow” has an implicit meaning that I promise I will be there tomorrow.

Searle disagrees with Austin distinction on locutionary act and illocutionary act in the article “Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts” [2]. His paper is divided into two major sections. In the first half of the paper he try to show that Austin account on the boundary between locutionary act and illocutionary act is wrong, “reduces the locutionary-illocutionary distinction to trying and succeeding in performing an illocutionary act” [2, p409]. In the second half of the paper, he propose his own boundary between locutionary act and illocutionary act by introducing the concept of propositional acts. In the following sections, I will examine Searle’s argument in details and point out how he failed to show that Austin is wrong about louctionary act and illocutionary act.

Searle agrees with Austin on the first two level of locutionary act, the phonetic act that is the act of making some sound, the phatic act that is the act of uttering some words, but he disagree on the rhetic act that constitute the sense and reference of the sentence in the utterance. On the rhetic act level, he thinks that the meaning of the utterance is the same as the illocutionary, “there are not two difference acts but two different labels for the same act” [2, p407]. He argue that if someone says “Get out”, the rhetic act is he told me to get out, which is essentially the same as the illocutionary act. In short, “the verb phrases in the reports of rhetic acts invariably contain illocutionary verbs” [2, p411]. There is no way to give an indirect speech report of a rhetic act which does not turn the report into the report of an ilocutionary act.

Let me show Searle is wrong by employing two counter examples. In the simple examples used in Searle’s article, it is indeed very hard to distinguish the the rhetic act and illocutionary. However when we consider a more complex example, we can clearly mark distinction between locutionary act and illocutionary. Under many circumstance, the surface meaning of the speech can be very difference from the illocutionary act. Imagine that there is a secret agent who is is contacting his undercover spy to exchange some information and issue further instructions in a coffee shop. They both agreed on using some secret code word, let’s say for example on surface they are talking about NHL games, but in reality they use the score of the games and the number on the hockey player’s jersey to encode secret messages. In this case, on the surface the locutionary act are just talking about hockey, but the illocutionary act has totally different meaning, maybe they are talking about their next assassination plan. Here we have a clear cut distinction between locutionary act and illocutionary act that the two are not the same.

Searle also made a wrong assumption that locutionary act must always has three parts. In fact a locutionary act can only consist of the first two parts or even just the first part, but there can still be an illocutionary act associated with the same utterance. For example, a brain injury patient lost his function in speaking, so he can only make isolated words or he is even only capable of making incomprehensible noise, although his can still think clearly inside his mind. Imagine a scenario that the patient want to get the attention of the nurse, he would try to speak something or make some noise to get the attention of the nurse. The illocutionary act of his utterance is very clear, but yet the rhetic act or the pahtic act is totally missing, only the phonetic act of the loctionary act remains. This example also demostrate that locutionary act is very different form illoctionary act. Even the utternace is totally meaningless on the surface, under some context the meaningless utterance could actually mean something that the speaker is trying to do.

In the second half of the paper, Searle attempt to reconstruct the boundary of locutionary and illocutionary by introducing a new layer, propositional act, above the phatic act in the place of rhetic act used to be. He started with stating three linguistic principles. Then he try to point out Austin neglects those three principles in his original theory in spech act to explain why Austin is wrong. His first argument (point 3) is less controversal, Austin’s attempt to identify specific illocutionary verbs and the endless distinction of different types of illouctionary acts is futile. The cataglory of illocutionary force of utternace is not precise, there can be more than one way to distinguish different types of illocutionary acts.

Searle’s next argument on Principle of Expressiblity (point 1 and 2) tries to point out that “for every illocutionary act one intends to performs, It is possible to utter a sentence the literal meaning of which is such as to determine that its serious literal utterance in an appropriate context” [2, p418]. He thinks that given proper translation and detail description, the meaning of an illocutionary act can be expressed by a sentence literally, so that the Austin’s separation between the said-meaning and the meant-force does not exist. Searle assume “the meaning of a sentence is determined by the meanings of all its meaningful components” [2, p415] which is not always true. The meaning of a sentence can sometimes determined by what is missing from its meaningful components, so that the listener can deduce the true meaning of the sentence from what is omitted from the sentences when it is compare against the normal components of that type of sentences. In a situation that a person has to say one sentence to two listeners but at the same time convey two different meanings to the two listeners with the prerequisite that one of the listener cannot know the meaning that is intended for the other listener. For example, a businessman introduce a customer to his long time business partner. The businessman praise the customer such and such during the introduction in front of the customer. To the customer, the illocutionary act is about using the praises to say something good about the customer. But to the business partner, the illocutionary act is about using what is not praised to indicate something bad about the customer. If the omission in the locutionary act is the true intend of the illocutionary act, then it is impossible to express the illocutionary act in a plain literal sentence, no matter how many details you put into the sentences.

Searle introduce propositional act, the act of expression the proposition, which is a specific type of illocutionary act that the intend of the sentence is merely stating the content of the sentences. Austin thinks that this type of performative utterance act bears the truth value of the content of the sentences just like traditional costative utterance. Searle argues that a propositional act has two components, the statement act itself which is the act of stating, and the statement object which is the content of what is stated. The statement act is like any other act that it does not have true or false. A statement object is a proposition that we can evaluate its truthfuliness. I think Searle are force to introduce this arkward layer of the proposition act in order to complete his speech act theory because he get rid of the rhetic act layer of locutionary act. Let’s recall Austin’s definition of locutionary act, especially the definition of rhetic act, is that the speaker is saying the literal meaning of the sentence. Statement act is actually a special kind of illocutionary act that the meaning of illocutionary act overlap with the meaning of rhetic act. Let me use the same technique employed by Searles earlier in the article but flip it, there is no way to give a report of an illocutionary act which does not turn into giving an indirect speech report of a rhetic. For example, he said “Simon Fraser University is in Burnaby”, the illocutionary act is that he is stating Simon Fraser University is in Burnaby which is exactly the same as the rhetic act.

In conclusion, I successfully defence Austin’s account on the locutionary act and illocutionary act from Searle’s attack by showing counter examples that clearly mark the boundary between locutionary and illocutionary acts. In addition, I also refute his claim that illocutionary act can be express in a literal sentence that in his account makes locutionary act no longer necessary. At last, I demostrated that the introduction of propositional act is redundant if we keep the distinction of locutionary act and illocutionary act. Propositional act is just a special case of illocutionary act that actually overlap with locutionary.

References:
[1] J.L. Austin, “Performative Utterances”
[2] J.R.Searle, “Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts”

The Big Questions – Steven E. Landsburg

經濟學家轉行寫哲學,會寫出什麼樣的東西出來呢?「大問題」是經濟學家Steven Landsburg,娛人娛已的著作。勉強可以歸類哲學通識,但說到底只不過是他發牢騷的散文。他用經濟學的理性思考方法,配合數學理論和邏輯推理作基礎,像萬用刀般用同一招,去解決所有有關人生意義,世界如何存在,道德善惡抉擇,宗教信仰,等等一切哲學難題。他的思想很另類新奇,有些想法連我讀哲學時也沒聽過。只不過推理卻不甚緊嚴緊,觀點看似成理,但論點有待嚴格檢定。始終這書玩票意味甚濃,寫得太學術性便會悶人趕客,現在讀起輕鬆有趣剛剛好。

世界存在的本質是什麼?作者認為世界的本質是數學,數學上可能存在所有的訊息,便構成物理上所有可能存在的世界。這個見解十分獨特有見地,讀者要自已看推論才能領會。

作者特別厭惡反智群體,他用了很多篇幅去挖苦宗教狂熱份子,用行為經濟學去分析他們的信仰。結論是他們口中所說的信仰,與通過行為表現出來的心中不乎。很多教徙視為真理的教義也全無意義,死後會怎樣怎樣是空口說白話,說到底不能影響教徙行為的信仰,只不過是蒼白無力一堆的語言文字。不過他並不是一面倒地反宗教,他也批評無神論者不合理的理點。先不問立場,只看推論是否合理,也研究哲學的正道。他對於生命和靈魂的看法很特別,把靈魂定性為訊息,而訊息是不生不滅,也可以算是永生一種。他作了一個的很好的比喻,假如我有一幅獨一無異的窗簾布,在星期日失火燒了,那窗簾布的圖案在星期一還存不存在呢?

作者提出的道德理論很有創意,是後果論的加強版,借用統計學和市場自由選擇,用成本效益計算,對世界有何益處或壞處。以人願意付出什麼來換取什麼,作為道德行為的指引。用這個純計數的方法,倒可以輕易解決一些千古道德悖論,儘管結論未必容易讓人接受,但其推論可無懈可擊。例如後果論的其中一個悖論,是說有五個需要器官移植的病人,若殺無辜第六個人去救他們合乎道德。作者提出的解決辨法,是五個只能活四個,只要抽生死簽公平公正,五分四的存活機會,總好過比一定死亡,經濟學上純理性人會如何選擇,答案十分明顯。

他還寫很多古靈精怪的題目。作者是經濟學家,對反智的左派保護主義者,很自然會冷嘲熱諷一番。從知識論,量子物理學,到希臘神話,作者也可以用數學去分析一論。環保份子口口聲聲為後代著想,自已卻不去生育,讓後代不能來到世上,豈不是更大罪。作者的政治觀很有說服力,管理國家如管理幼兒園。如果我們教小朋友那些事是不對,為什麼大人卻放大幾千幾萬倍去做,還宣揚自已是在正確必要的事呢?作者對大學選科也有意見,他主張讀文學無用,文章寫得不好是因為思想混亂,學得再多文學也不會有幫助。只要對題目有充份了解和思路清晰,自自然然便會寫得一手好文章。文學應該和打球一樣只是嗜好,不應浪費精神時間在大學主修。

我自已是工程師出身,與經濟學家一樣,也是用習慣純理性思考的人。這本書用數學這把尚步寶劍,砍開一切難題的解決方法,正合我心意。如何任何問題也可以套入算式,計出一個客觀的答案,世界便會簡單美妙得多了。

Ecological Ethics, An Introduction – Patrick Curry

近年潮流興環保,我一直對這個議題很有興趣。剛好大學開辨環境道德哲學的課,很可惜上課時間不適合,我沒有機會修讀。只好把課本買回來自已看,這本書是便是該課的課本。這是本環保理論的入門書藉,書中總括介紹由淺綠至深綠,各種不同的環境倫理的理論。全書只有短短一百五十頁,但內容十分豐富,要閱讀大量資料也不容易。由於只是入門的關係,書中盡量中肯地的介紹各個理論,至於對各個理論的批評和討論,這課還有另外一本巨形磚頭書。

這本書最初幾章先介紹道德理論的基礎,客觀道德觀與相對道德觀的不同,解釋道德上訴諸自然的謬誤,宗教道德觀和現代世俗道德觀的分別。接著簡介傳統三大道德理論,亞里士多德的德行論,康德的責任論和功用主對的後果論。傳統道德觀一直以來也是人本思想為中心價值,環境道德觀則主張人類不再是價值的中心,提倡以動物,所有生物,或整個地球的生態為價值的中心。道德中心價值取向的不同,必然會有要在人類和環境作出取捨的情況,這亦是環保議題中最具爭議的課題。書中舉出殺蟲藥作為例子,殺蟲藥會損害環境,但卻是滅蚊控制瘧疾的有效手段,在環境和人命之間,該如何選擇才合乎那種道德呢。

淺綠的環保理論是以人本道德為主,只有人類才有本然價值,其他動物和環境只有功用價傎。淺綠理論以資源管理為出發點,環保是人類可持續性發展必需要克服的難題。其中最有名的淺綠理論是救生船論(Lifeboat Ethic),地球就像一艘太空船,其維生系統有物理性的限制,人類不能無限制地使用資源。淺綠理論最為大眾接受,但反對者認為只考慮人類利益並不能真保護環境。

中綠環保理論仇舊是以人類為主心,但把本然價值擴大到包括動物或其他生物。其中最出名的有三個理論。Peter Singer以後果論為基礎的動物解放運動(Animal Liberation),把動物的快樂也納入計算功用內。Tom Regan以責任論為基礎的動物權利主義(Animal Rights),認為每一隻動物也有與人類同等的生存權。Paul Taylor的生物中心論(Biocentrism),把人類與其他動植生命置於相同的任置,人類對其他生命也有相同的道德責任。

深綠環保理論與淺綠和中綠的最大分別,是價值的取向從個體層面跳升到全部的層面,包括一切生物和死物。當環境和人類的利益相違時,容許否定人類利益的必然取向。書中介紹以下幾個主要的深綠理論:

土地倫理(Land Ethic)把土壤,水,動植物,統統給舉本然價值,把人類視為生態環境的一份子。它認為合乎道德的事情,必需能夠保存生態環境的一致性,隱定性和美麗,反之便是錯誤的事情。反對者認為土地倫理大大限制人類的自由,並妨礙人類使用天然資源的權利。

蓋亞理論(Gaia Theory)認為地球是一個超級生命體,人類是地球身上的害蟲,當地球受夠人類時,它便會作出反擊,讓生態回覆正常。反對者認為蓋亞理論沒有科學根據,事實上蓋亞便是希臘神話中大地之神的名字。另外蓋亞理論和土地倫理內容太過空泛,很容易被指為綠色法西斯主義,以地球為名義侵犯個人的自由和權利。

深環境論(Deep Ecology)認為非人類生物有本然價值,不應只要對人類的功用去衡量,人類沒有權利去減少物種的豐富性。因此人類必需要改變生活模式,並逐漸少人口數目,讓其他生物有生存的空間。深環境論還是一個新紀元運動,要從思想上去改變人類中心的思考,讓人們明白環境也是人的一部份,讓人的心靈連接到環境上。

深綠理論(Deep Green Theory)否定人類中心主義,認為人類並沒有特別的道德位置,大自然的本然價值,可以凌駕人類的利益。他們認為除了每個人自願性的轉變外,社會結構也要作出改變。

左翼生態中心主義(Left Biocentrism)同時否定資本主義和社會主義,認為兩者皆是工業主義的一體兩面。他們把馬克思的階級理論,推展到全部生物的層面,認為人類在剝削其他生物。他們認為地球並不屬於任何人,人類有責任過簡單的生活,以減少對環境的傷害。他們反對經濟發展和全球化,但認為馬克思理論還是人本思想,仍然會傷害環境。其他物種的利益,比任何個人,家庭,社區或國家的利益更加重要。簡單而言,儘管人們認為救謢車救人是好,坦克車殺人是壞。但在環境的角度,坦克車和救謢車是沒有分別,都會帶來環境破壞。

地球宣言(The Earth Manifesto)是個大雜燴,把前面提及的種種理論,寫下來成為行動宣言,還順手加入滅貧,民主,和平等宣言。地球宣言好聽是好聽,可是流於不切實際,特別是宣言中的理念有衝突時,宣言並沒有說明解決的方向。

環境女性主義(Ecofeminsim)和傳統女性主義的理論,應用在環境問題上,把男性對女性的不平等,申延至人類對自然的不平等上。女性主義反對理性爭辯,認為人應該用感情去感受大自然。不談責任或權利的問題,人類要像母親般把大自然好好的照顧。

有些深綠支持者,更把環保提升到宗教的層面,他們認為人類的主要宗教,皆無法滿足環保問題的訴求。他們想回到土著的精神生活,放棄人類現代文化的生活,重回原始人與大地共存的生活模式。

最後一章引用書中的環境理論,討論地球環境面對的最大難題,就是地球上的人口太多。根據科學家的計算,若果人類要有歐洲發展國家舒適的生活質素,就算把可以提高能源效率的新科技計算在內,地球只能夠支持大約二十億人口,可是現在地球人口超標三倍。綠色科技發展追不上人口增長,要人們大幅減少物質生活則不受歡迎,這個問題正是深綠環境理論的試金石,看看如何把環境放在人類的利益之上,限制人類無節制地生育。其實把地球視為支持人口的資源,去計算二十億人這個數目,便已經違反深綠的理念。若要把人類對環境的影嚮減到最少,人類必需更加大量地減少人口,才能夠讓人類和其他物種和平共存。

哲學功課﹕The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge

在傳統認知論中,知識等於真實的信念加上合理相信的理由。在尋找合理的理由時,我們采用歸納法,從已經被肯定的知識中,推論相信新知識的合理理由。可是這裹有一個問題,若每一項知識也是從先前的知識推論出來,那層層遞進地推論追溯上去,那最初的知識如何肯定呢。傳統上基礎主義認為在知識的最底層,是一些不需論證自我肯定的基礎知識,作為所有知識推論的基礎。調和主羲則否定有基礎知識的存在,所有知論的推論是個巨大的循環,只能檢視整個知識系統的一至性,有沒有內部矛盾或對世界觀測的不協調。這篇功課討論調和主義理論本身的問題,探討調和主義能否成立。

The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge

In this essay, I am evaluating Bonjour’s coherence theory of empirical knowledge (CTEK) against foundational theory of empirical knowledge (FTEK). First, I will outline what is the regress problem and compare the responses from FTEK and CTEK. Then I will examine the objection against CTEK regarding its relationship with external world. I will further extend the objection by arguing CTEK is asserting a fundamental assumption that the external world itself has to be coherent for CTEK to be justified. At last I am going to conclude CTEK is unsuccessful in overcome the objection in strictly epistemological sense but it is successful in practical sense.

Since Plato, traditional view of knowledge is justified true belief. A piece of belief is only qualified as knowledge if it is justified. A belief is justified based on the validity and soundness of its argument, which is implicitly depends on the premises used in the argument are also justified. Each premise on its own is also a piece of belief which required the justification of the premise’s premises. As a result, we have a regression of justifications for premises that keep tracing back, which is known as “the regression problem”. FTEK deals with the regression problem by stating there are some foundation beliefs at the very bottom of chains of premises and the regression terminates when the basic beliefs are reached. There are two version of FTEK. The strong version stated that the basic beliefs are self-justified without the need of further premises. The weak version stated that the basic beliefs are initially credible that are likely to be true. The CTEK rejects the notation of basic beliefs, instead of having the regression of premises go on infinite linearly, the inference is circular. An epistemic system is justified by its internal coherence.

However, the circular nature of CTEK runs into the problem of begging the question, which a belief cannot be justified unless it is already justified. The solution is to reject the linear conception of inferential justification and uses a holistic or systematic conception of inferential justification instead. CTEK separate the justification into two categories, justification of a particular belief and the global justification of the entire cognitive system. The justification of a particular belief appears linear, since the premises regression will soon reached some acceptable beliefs in the context. If no acceptable belief is reached, the premises regression will continue moving in a circle. In this case, the justification of the overall knowledge system comes under questions. In CTEK, the justification of the entire system is based on its degree of coherence. A coherent system must be internally consistence, which means there is no internal conflict, but it has more than just consistency. Coherent is the systemic connection between the components of the system, how observable facts can be explained and predicted. The justified knowledge system is the one with the highest degree of coherences out of all the alternative consistence systems.

In the paper, Bonjour lists three objections to CTEK on questioning the fundamental questions of the connection between coherence and justification. Out of the three objections, Bonjour spends most of the paper in defending against objection number two, the relationship of CTEK and external world. I think this is the strongest objection against CTEK and I also think Bonjour successfully defends CTEK against this objection. However, Bonjour omitted an underlining assumption in his defence that the external world has to be coherent in order to justify his argument. In the following paragraphs, I will first out the objection, go over Bonjour’s response to the objection and illustrate his hidden assumption with a counter example.

The strongest objection to CTEK is that since CTEK is justified only in terms the internal coherence of the beliefs in the system, it does not have any relationship with the external world. A self-enclosed system of beliefs cannot constitute empirical knowledge. Bonjour’s defense is pretty straight forward, it simply link the coherent belief system in CTEK to observable facts from external world. He argues that in CTEK, the coherent system of beliefs must also coherent with reliable observation of the external world in long run. When a particular observation does not coherent with the belief system, CTEK can either neglect the particular observation as an incoherent exception to the belief system or refine the belief system to include the new observation. If there are too many incoherent exception observations accumulated in the belief system, the belief system will become less coherent with the world and eventually it will be replaced by a more coherent belief system. The belief system is continuously updating itself upon new observation to maintain its degree of coherence. The input from external world has causal relationship with the CTEK belief system where the belief system is justified by its coherence with observable facts of the external world. One of the key pieces in Bonjour’s argument is to establish what can be constituted as reliable observations yet at the same time is not a basic belief. He argues that spontaneous introspective beliefs on spontaneous sensa beliefs are very likely to be true. The reliability of cognitively spontaneous beliefs is part of the coherence system along with the observation of the external world. Therefore it is not a prior truth in the sense that it is required as the foundation for justification of the knowledge.

Bonjour based CTEK’s justification on the coherence of the belief system and the reliable observation of external world in long run. Let’s granted that the belief system and the observations are reliable, however Bonjour failed to address the underlining assumption that the external world is coherence in long run. If the external world is not coherence, then no belief system can stay coherent due to CTEK has a causal relationship with the external world. Bonjour uses the spontaneous visual belief a red book and the lack of spontaneous visual of a blue book to illustrate how the belief system is linked to the external world. What if there is a chance that the book randomly change colour every time I observe it? How can I conclude there is a red book on my desk but not a blue book on my desk? Even though I can trust my spontaneous beliefs from my sensa of the book, I cannot trust the object under my observation stays the same between my two observations. It is possible that the cover of the book is made of the latest colour changing e-paper technology, which in the case we can provide a coherent account for the observable fact. However, it is also possible that there is no scientific theory can possible explain why the book change its color. It could be the act of God and it is simply a miracle that the book changed from red to blue for no apparent reason. The CTEK justification adopt an objective clock work world view that rule out the existence of any supernatural power, such as an omnipotent God who defies all laws of physics.
In theory, we cannot epistemological justify the CTEK because we cannot epistemological justify the world is coherent. Hume argues that “Uniformity of Nature”, which is essentially the same as coherence of the world, cannot be justified, yet it is rational and non-optional for us to accept the habit of inductive inference. Practically, we can assume the world is coherent almost all of the time and take it as a weak foundation that it is probably initially true until shown otherwise. CTEK is actually a very weak FTEK in disguise; the base belief of CTEK is that the world is coherence to provide the foundation to build coherent belief systems.

However, it would be totally absurd to argue the world is not coherent. If the world is not coherent, then even FTEK is not possible to have any knowledge system. Just like FTEK cannot convince the ultimate skeptic, CTEK also fail to convince the ultimate skeptic that there is justification on any knowledge. Given the fact that assumption of the world is coherent must dialectically acceptable in the context of any knowledge theory to have any meaning, we can grant this assumption a priori status outside of any epistemic dialog. With this particular exception, I conclude that CTEK is successful in overcoming the objection regarding the relationship of coherent belief system and the external world.

Reference:
[1] Laurence Bonjour, The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge, Philosophical Studies 30 (1976) p281-312

Philosophy of History – Mark Day

近幾年香港重建舊區舊建築物時﹐常常聽到有關保育的訴求。當年清拆舊天星碼頭時﹐我曾花很多時間參與網上討論﹐辯論天星頭碼的歷史價值﹐同時亦感到自己知識上的不足﹐對於什麼是歷史意義這個核心問題﹐也只有從閱讀網上和報章評論而來一知半解的認識。雖然清拆天星已時隔多年﹐我還是對於自己在這方面知識的貧乏很介懷。最近終於立下決心﹐花了三個月時間潛心學習﹐讀畢大學歷史哲學入門的課本。這本書與我預期的答案有點不同﹐與其說這科是講述歷史哲學﹐不若說是講述歷史學的哲學。這本書從淺入深﹐介紹所有重要的歷史理論。歷史並不止是過去發生的事情﹐而是從人怎樣去看待歷史﹐去認識歷史與人的關係。

書本的第一章介紹歷史學之父Ranke的歷史理論﹐他認為歷史是從檔案中重組昔日的精神。由於人類的記憶不可靠﹐歷史學者對於歷史文本抱有懷疑精神﹐不能盡信任何一手或二手的記錄﹐對比現存的所有資料去找出答案。歷史學者不可能知道發生的所有細節﹐所以閱讀歷史時要分辨清楚什麼是原本的記錄﹐什麼是歷史學家後來加上去的自己演譯。他認為解釋歷史現像比分析歷史系統重要﹐他把歷史論述和歷史證據放在第一位。歷史把現在與過去聯繫起來﹐透過歷史保存和歷史對話﹐讓歷史得以應用來明白現在。歷史的記錄不單只是文字﹐古董﹐遺跡﹐影像也是重要的歷史素材﹐也必需要通過歷史學的批判﹐研究它們為現在帶來的影響。

第二章介紹Collingwood的歷史學的方法論﹐他批評歷史不應只把歷史資料剪貼拼湊而成﹐因為歷史資料的表像記錄不能盡信﹐會被記錄者的自身利益扭曲。歷史學者的責任﹐便用歷史學的思考法則﹐像偵探一樣抽絲剝繭﹐從文字風格推斷資料的真確性﹐從記錄者的身份推斷其可信性﹐研究現存文本和失存文本的關係﹐從而看穿第一手資料的表像﹐重組事情發生的真相。嚴守歷史學思考法則的重要性﹐便是防止任人隨便解釋扭曲歷史﹐無視歷史證據的連貫性﹐破壞現在與過去之間的因果關係。

第三章介紹分辨歷史證據可信性的方法﹐最基本是採用貝氐統計邏輯(Bayesianism)﹐接下來便要為證據提出解釋﹐推論和檢定歷史假設中的因果關係。歷史證據可能出現不同的解釋﹐好解釋要對不同證據有前後連貫性﹐歷史假設中不能有太多發想當然耳的空白﹐與所有證據都吻合的解釋﹐便是最簡潔有力的解釋。

第四章指出歷史學與科學是分別﹐兩者同樣是講求證據﹐但科學的本質是實證學(Positivism)﹐可以把證據數字化和通遍化﹐歸納出科學法則﹐再從法則推論出結論。但歷史並非科學﹐歷史不能做科學重覆實驗﹐沒有足夠的數據去歸納通則。研究歷史只能分析每件事的因果關係﹐再從中推論中事件與事件之間的規律﹐再按情況判斷每個規律應用的優先次序和輕重。

第五章確立歷史學中的因果關係﹐這章先指出其他否定因果歷史學家的謬誤﹐如果歷史事件間沒有因果關係﹐那事件與事件只是獨立的偶然發生﹐那便談不上任何的歷史解釋。比較不同的歷史事件﹐可以讓我們明白因果關係﹐讓我們從歷史的不同條件去﹐去推論不同條件下原因和影響。歷史理論幫助我們認清歷史﹐其中有三個必需條件。第一歷史理論必需具功用解釋﹐輸入歷史事件輸出事件的結果和關係。第二歷史理論解釋社會層面﹐因為個人層面涉及太多不可知的變數﹐不可能以理論去解讀。第三歷史理論提供一個模型﹐去說明各種因果連結的關係。通過比較不同歷史事件相同與相異之處﹐來證明歷史理論的解釋是否站得住腳。歷史理論解釋事件為何發生﹐與及在缺乏類似條件的情況下﹐事件為何沒有發生。可是歷史理論的最大挑戰﹐是如何分辨什麼是合理解釋﹐什麼是順口開河胡扯的歷史故事。

第六章提出自然史觀歷史理論的問題﹐歷史理論建主在綜合法則的重覆性﹐但每一件歷史事件都是獨一無異﹐已經發生的歷史不會再重覆﹐如果兩者之間毫無關連﹐那前者如何可以解釋後者的發生呢。歷史事件肯定歷史理論的正確﹐同時歷史理論也被用來解釋歷史事件﹐可是當歷史事件與已知的理論不乎﹐便會出現需要修改歷史理論﹐還是把歷史視為特例的選擇。歷史學家可以揉合不同的歷史理論﹐去解釋歷史事件如何發生﹐但對於預測未發生的事件卻完全沒有頭緒。當然在歷史事件發生後﹐歷史學家還是可輕易地解釋事件如何發生。至於該引用那一個歷史理論﹐則每一個歷史事件也要作不同考慮﹐不能憑空只從歷史理論作出推論﹐否則可能會與現實相差千里。研究歷史除了從歷史理論出發外﹐也可以從歷史論述的角度﹐把歷史以比喻形式演譯﹐重組歷史人物的想法和行動。

第七章探討如何從演譯歷史去找出歷史的意義﹐可是歷史學家面對一個悖論﹐歷史本身對處身其中人﹐不需要歷史學定的演譯已有其意義。歷史學家的演譯是另外一層的歷史意義﹐是歷史對現代人或歷史學家的意義。通過演譯歷史﹐讓人感受到當時發生的感情﹐去想像體驗其他人的經驗﹐並且對自身的體驗有意識。體驗必需通過歷史證據﹐而歷史證據可以分為兩種﹐一是外在行為的描述﹐二是內心文字的記錄﹐不論採用那種證據﹐也會遇上心靈哲學中﹐既然兩個人不可完全一樣﹐那如何去感受別人思想的難題。Collingwood認為歷史學家在寫歷史時﹐必需要把歷史在腦內重新演出﹐從外在發生的事件記錄﹐去剖析當事人的想法。他更進一步認為所有的歷也都是思想的歷史﹐不過這個說法有一大漏洞﹐便是需然歷史人物會有想法﹐但事件並不一定按其所想地發生。

第八章提出歷史學要為過去人物的思想和行為﹐找出合理的歷史解釋。通過合理的解釋﹐把思想與思想﹐思想與行為連結起來。要理解去生的行為﹐可以把行為本身視為對另一個問題的答案﹐而追問這個行為到底為當事人決解了什麼問題。當然人類行為並非科學法則﹐也會有違反理性的情況出現。要明白行為的理由﹐先要代入過去的角色中﹐用他們的視野去思考﹐在理論上不合理的事情﹐在他們信念和動機的前題下﹐可能在實際上變為合理。一個人的想法和行為﹐受當到他當時身處的社會的影響﹐所以歷史學家亦要考慮當時的社會背景。

第九章提出歷史的客觀性和主觀性的問題﹐到底歷史知識是普世性並超越時間﹐還是必須在當時的默絡裏解讀。歷史相對論者(historicism)認為人類的想法不停在改變﹐歷史學家不應用現代人的眼光去看過去的歷史﹐要追溯至原本事件的記錄和起源﹐不要被多年來堆積起來的解讀誤導。由於歷史學家也受制他們的時代﹐不論如何去解讀過去的歷史﹐總會帶有其處身時代的偏差﹐那客觀的歷史根本不可能存在。Max Weber認為每個人皆有其價值觀﹐只要歷史學者記錄的歷史不受其價值觀影響﹐那就乎合客觀歷史的條件。歷史中可以如實記錄其他人的價值和意見﹐只要沒有作者自身的意見便可以。可是選擇記錄什麼或不記錄什麼﹐也是一種價值取向亦會影響歷史的客觀性。Gadamer認為解讀歷史是與過去的對話﹐歷史學者不能對過去任意詮譯﹐必需要回答過去其他歷史學者的解讀﹐並要在對話中保持開放的心態﹐自己的意見可以隨著對話而改變。

第十章深入討論第六章中提過的歷史論述﹐以說故事的方式來記錄歷史。在二十世紀中歷史論述被分類為文學多於歷史﹐但作者認為歷史論述在歷史學中﹐佔有重要的位置﹐能夠讓讀者抽離現在的時空﹐跳進歷史當中感受當時的經驗。歷史故事有角色人物﹐亦有故事主線結局﹐說故事的人介入的多少﹐決定了歷史論述深淺厚度。歷史論述像說故事一樣要有起承轉合﹐主線可以在意料之外﹐但必需要在情理之中﹐故事前後穩含因果關係﹐有主旨貫通整個故事。Hayden White把不同歷史學家的歷史論述綜合總結﹐發展出超歷史學(Metahistory)﹐從歷史學家說故事修辭手法的異同﹐去重組歷史的知識和解釋。歷史論述與歷史小說的分別﹐在乎論述中的真實性。可是歷史學家為讓論述看起來更加真實﹐在論述中加插一些後世歷史學家不可能得知的瑣事。歷史論述可分為微觀和宏觀兩種﹐前者是把不同歷史人物的自我論述結合﹐從不同角度去觀察同一件事情。微觀歷史論述是集體回憶﹐但集體回憶並不是共同回憶﹐因為每個人的記憶也有不同。宏觀論述整合集體回憶中的分歧﹐把故事中所有觀點整合為統一的﹐超越事件中每個個體或組織的超論述。

第十一章解答歷史與歷史真相的問題﹐到底歷史與過去發生的事情之間﹐有著什麼的關係呢。無可否認過去曾經發生﹐歷史真實論者認為﹐多少程度上歷史能夠反映真實的過去。反真實論者認為形而上並沒有真實﹐一切只是取決於人的思想和言語﹐那歷史亦沒有所謂真實與不真實之分。反代表論者不否認真實的存在﹐但他們認為語言不能代表真實。除了歷史陳述是否真實外﹐綜合所有歷史陳述後的歷史系統也要被檢定是否真實。就算每一句歷史陳述為真﹐但如果只是選擇性地節錄某些陳述﹐結論給人的印像可以與事實相反。歷史真相會隨著時間而變得模糊﹐第一手資料也因為記錄者的個人利益不可以盡信﹐歷史學家只能盡量對比不同的歷史證據﹐與現存和新發現的證據互相印證﹐從中推論中比較可信的版本。歷史真相的一個難題﹐是如何連接過去的真相與現在的真相﹐歷史學家不可能對過去作出直接觀察﹐過去能印證真相的證據也可能隨時間而消失﹐能夠把歷史知讓流傳下來只有歷史論述。

第十二章探討歷史證據與歷史理論的關係﹐到底歷史學家的背景信念﹐會否預先決定他所得出的歷史結論。當歷史證據與歷史理論不乎時﹐歷史學者可以選擇把證據視為特列﹐亦可以選擇修改理論去包含新的證據﹐兩個選擇也可以保持理論內部的一致性﹐但卻是互不相容又同等同質的理論。兩個不同的歷史說法﹐兩者皆與現存的證據相容﹐必定一個是對一個是錯﹐只是我們沒有辨法分出來。很多事候不同的說法對基本事實也一致認同﹐分歧在論述﹐解釋﹐詮釋歷史意義上。社會解構論者認為﹐歷史也是權力關係下的產物﹐歷史說法可以從歷史學者的社會背景去分析。探討歷史知識本質的問題﹐很自然會追朔知識的本筆認知論的問題﹐到底先驗性的知識存不存在﹐會否隨時間而轉變﹐語言對知識有什麼限制﹐何謂知識的合理解釋等等。歷史知識除了知道什麼的問題外﹐還要問知道了該如何用的問題﹐作者認為要通過開放歷史論述﹐才能把過去的歷史連結到未來。

雖然不用交功課不用考試﹐但看這本書和寫這篇讀書筆記的時間﹐不比正式修讀該課為少。這篇讀書筆記花了三個週末才寫成﹐把課本前前後後讀了至少三篇。我對歷史是什麼這個問題﹐仍然沒有一個答案﹐但在閱讀過程當中﹐倒學懂很多不同的答案。我自己讀理科出身﹐比較接受科學觀式的歷史理論﹐可是歷史學始終是人文學科﹐歷史學主流對歷史的意義的見解﹐並不是描述客觀的歷史真理﹐而是透過論述和詮釋﹐連接過去的人與現在的人的思想。

哲學功課﹕Proofing the Existence of External World

苖卡兒(Descartes)說﹕我思故我在。雖然我們可以肯定自己的存在﹐但如何可以證明在我們思想以外的世界也是存在呢﹖如何去證明人生不是一場夢﹐不是只有獨自一個人的意識漂浮在虛無之中。這篇哲學功課的題目﹐大慨正好對號入座哲學給一般人的印象﹐怎麼哲學問這個無聊的問題。其實這個問題只是大問題的其中一環﹐問世界存在的本質是什麼。這篇功課對比了Moore和Russell兩位哲學家的論證﹐前者從康德(Kant)以理論為起點﹐推論出在人與人的意識以外﹐必然存在一個外在的世界。後者則把問題反過來﹐質疑為什麼不接受世界存在﹐畢竟認為世界不存在的人精神有問題。最搞笑是話說某次Russell講學﹐其中有一個聽眾相信世界不存在﹐那當然除他以外的其他人也不會存在。可是他聽得半桶以為Russell在認同他的觀點﹐演講完畢走上台對Russell說﹐他很高興聽到有人認同他認為其他人不存在的觀點﹐一個多麼的自相多盾的說法。我證明世界存在的論証很簡單﹐如果世界不存在的話﹐我就不需要寫這篇文章交功課﹐教授也不需要花時間去改功課。既然我寫了這篇文章出來﹐教授又要花間去改﹐那就證明了世界是存在的了。

In this essay, I am going to evaluate Moore’s and Russell’s proof of the existence of external world. I will first outline Moore’s argument and Russell’s argument respectively. Then I will point out the difference in the scope of claim in the two arguments. Moore’s argument asserts a smaller scope of claim than Russell’s, thus it is more defendable. Furthermore, I will propose counter examples to nullify Russell’s argument. At last, I am going to propose my proof to the existence of external world to address the shortcomings in both Russell and Moore’s argument.

On the surface, Moore’s argument is surprise simple. It is so simple that it does not seem to be very convincing. His argument can be illustrated as the following. By holding out two hands, here is one hand and here is another hand. There are two hands exists in front of you. If those hands exist, which is something you cannot deny, there must be external world. [1-p451]

Let’s us understand Moore’s claim a little bit more. Moore’s claim is actually an argument to convince a skeptic who does not believes there is an external world but maintain the belief that there is still an external mind outside of his own mind. In another word, to begin with he has to at least believe that there is other mind, who is trying to convince him that there is an external world, already exists outside of him. Moore’s claim will not work on soloist who does not even believe there is anything outside of his own mind. Moreover, Moore’s claim is based on Kant’s early doubt that “the existence of things outside of us … must be accepted merely on faith, and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their (here, their refer to the external world, not those people) existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof.” [1- p439]. Most important of all, Moore’s claim does not survive Descartes style of self-meditation scrutiny. Moore believe there exists an external world and convince the other minds he experience in his external world to believe there really is an external world, but he can never proof to himself that he is not a sole existence that all the external world he experience are merely a product of his own mind.

Moore’s argument is pretty straight forward. He is playing word games on Kant’s argument by separating the definition of the terms use by Kant. He redefines “things outside of us”, “external things” and “things external to our mind” as three separate terms. (Notice that that he uses the term “things outside of US” instead of “things outside of ME”.) He excluded transcendent things from his argument, since that belongs to the department of metaphysics. Then he flipped the argument to equate “external things” to “things not internal to our mind”. Notice this slight change of term is the slate of hand he played to separate “things that can meet in space” from “physical objects” and here is he introduced the term “present in space” which supposed to have a lesser definition than “things that can meet in space”. He used a few examples like shadows, after image to illustrate his points, but I am not going to repeat the arguments here due to the limitation of space. Now, here he plays the finally trick, he used the “two hands” as a common experience shared between two different minds, which the skeptic cannot deny. Since there is a gap between the two minds and now there is a common experience come form that gap, there must be something existence between the two minds originate that experience, so the external world must exist.

Let’s move on to Russell’s argument, if that is qualified an argument. First of all, Russell’s claim is more ambitious than Moorse’s. Russell actually goes one step more to define the nature of external world, which is the existence of matter. Moorse is smart to leave the external world remains undefined which gives him more room to play with his definition tricks. Instead of arguing for the existence of matter, Russell simply makes the instinctive belief assertions without even bother to argue for it. To begin with, one cannot doubt his own existence and the existence of the sense data he experienced. Russell is quite frank to admit that “we can never prove the existence of things other than ourselves and our experience” [2-p.14], then he immediate follow by asserting that “although this is no logically impossible, there is no reason whatever to suppose that it is true.” and appeal to the common sense hypothesis to assert there are external objects that cause our sensations. Here he had commit the two fallacies. First, the appeal to common sense is begging of question. Second, even given that we can indeed somehow rule out the soloist possibility, his so-call argument still suffered from the false dilemma fallacy. He assumes that if we can rule out the soloist hypothesis, our sense data must come from physical objects, but he forgot the origin of experience can skipped the existence layer and come from the transcendent layer directly. For practical reason, we may operate on the “external object exists” instinctive belief proposed by Russell, but he should at least compare and evaluate all alternatives instincts before concluding his particular version of instinct is most simple thus should be the most possible solution.

In [2-p15] and chapter 3, Russell uses more examples to illustrate his instinctive belief of the existence of external object. In [2-p15], he uses the existence of a cat that is independent of his perception as an example. He thinks it is quite natural to think that a cat will continue to exists and feel hungry regardless of his sense-data. There is a famous counter example which is also a cat, Schrodinger’s cat. According to Quantum theory, the wave equation is only collapse at the moment of observation. Strictly speaking, Schrodinger’s cat are free to seize its existence when there is no observer, except that once when it is being observed, its state variable collapse to a known state and catch up with what supposed to happen during the unobservable moments. The Schrodinger’s cat does not sound nature to most people, but it conforms to the laws of quantum physics. Therefore whether something sounds nature or not cannot be used to justify the intrinsic belief. In chapter 3, Russell uses the common between public space and private space to argument for his existence of matter. I can nullify his arguments with two terms, “Virtual Reality” and “Augmented Reality”. In virtual reality, there is no public space and each one’s private space is truly private to him. In augment reality, although there still a public space, but the sense data of the public space can be augmented and altered before it arrive at the private space. In addition, Russell argues that a blind man cannot experience light. With the latest technology, the vision chip, a blind can actually experience light more or less like a seeing person although he never experience lights. The vision chips implanted in his retina stimulate the visual nerve to send image to the brain. In theory the whole visual process can stay digital and electrical without anything related to light. Therefore light must be something that can be reduced and transformed into a set of computer equations and can be recreated using digital processors.

Both Moore and Russell did not give a satisfying proof of the existence of external world to a soloist. I am going to propose my solution in the last paragraph in an attempt to bridge the gap left open in Moore and Russell’s argument. My proof that I am not a lone existence in this world is very simple. If I am alone in this world, no one is going to mark my philosophy paper and I will have no reason to write it. The very fact that I am writing this philosophy paper is the proof that I am not alone in this world, which imply there must exists an external world. Now, assume that there is a philosophy professor who is marking this philosophy paper. The very fact that he is marking this paper also is a proof of the existence of an external world; otherwise he has no reason to mark this paper. In fact, if there is no external world, why would anyone bother to read a paper trying to proof the existence of the external world? Therefore the mere existence of this philosophical paper on its own is the proof of the existence of the external world. Q.E.D.

Reference:
[1] Paul K. Moser and Arnold Vander Nat, Human Knowledge Classical and Contemporary Approaches, 2003, Oxford Press
[2] Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, 1912, Feedbacks