跟法國哲學家沙特博鬥了六個小時﹐終於完了存在主義哲學的學期終功課。這課上半個學期主力教尼采﹐令我對存在主義留下沒有多少良好印象。幸好下半學期教祈克果﹐沙特﹐卡繆﹐才令我不致認為存在主義是完全的垃圾。我一直以為自己是理性主義者﹐想不到自己很多思法卻與存在主義有淵源。甚至日常生活中很多視為理所當然的慨念﹐特別是在自助心理書藉的基礎觀點﹐原來很多是出於存在主義﹐而非啟蒙時代的理性主義。

原來除了尼采的文章是完全的垃圾外﹐其他存在主義哲學家的文章也有可取之處。祈克果提出神導存在主義﹐主張人與神建立個人關係﹐強調信仰的非理性本質﹐需要信心一躍﹐其實說得頗為中聽。信心一躍的真正意義﹐並不是指像基督教般盲目地相信不可信的事情﹐而是指信仰不應以理性作為根據。那麼基督教常常強調聖經合乎歷史和科學﹐正正就犯了用理性去合理化信仰的毛病。

讀沙特有點像讀柏拉圖的感覺﹐沙特的存在主義哲學自成一個系統﹐一環緊扣一環﹐很難從中間一點切入去推翻。存在主義核心思想是存在先於本質。人的本質並不是先駙性地存在﹐是能通過人的決定去創造出來。人擁有無限的自由﹐而從自由衍生出來的責任﹐則沉重得讓人喘不過氣來。儘管我不認同存在主義推翻客觀真理﹐認為真理只能主觀地存在﹐沙特的哲學卻給我很多啟發﹐讓我從一個嶄新的角度去衡量世界。可能存在主義並不是如嚴緊的傳統哲學般﹐能夠為我們找出世界的終極答案。但我認為存在主義是一個很有用的思考工具箱﹐當不講求價值觀的完整性﹐只求解決眼前問題時﹐拿出來很快捷方便好用。

Critique of Freedom and Responsibility

In this essay, I will discuss Sartre’s idea on freedom and responsibility. I will first outline Sartre’s argument about freedom is a burden. Then I will criticize his thoughts based on his existentialism philosophy and show freedom is not necessary a burden.

Sartre said, “We are condemned to be free carries the weight of the whole world on our shoulder.” (E: P.251) We are entirely responsible for the world created by ourselves; we cannot blame it on others. Every one of us must choose himself; but by that we also mean that in choosing for himself he chooses for all men (E: P.208). We cannot escape from our responsibility by claiming shelter from authority, whether it is in the form of the government or God. Sartre said it is our choice to follow other people’s orders; therefore we are responsible for the consequence of the orders we followed. We cannot escape from our responsibility by claiming we did not do it. Sartre said inaction is also a choice we choose; therefore we should be responsibility for our lack of action. We cannot escape from our responsibility by claiming we did not ask for it. Sartre said we always have an alternative to dessert or commit suicide, therefore we chose this world and we are responsible for it. In the end, Sartre thinks we have no excuses to escape from our responsibility. Once we realize that we are abandonment to choose freely and take up the responsibilities of our choice, we will feel anguish. Most of us will flee anguish in bad faith.

Sartre used the following example to illustrate the burden of freedom. If I am mobilized in a war, this war is my war, it is in my image and I deserve it. (E: P.252) I must take the full responsibility of the war, because I choose to be part of it. It is my choice that I enlisted and fight the enemy, instead of getting out of it by deserting or committing suicide. I may find many excuses for not getting out of it, such as good opinion of my relatives, the honor of my family, etc. I am in fact choosing those values over the value of refusal to join the way. I keep choosing it again and again until the end of the war for not quitting the war half way. Therefore Sartre said, “In war there are no innocent victims”. During the years of war, I choose this life that makes me day after day. The war is mine because by the sole fact that it arises in a situation which I cause to be. (E: P.253) Choosing war does not mean that I can take a recess from my responsibility elsewhere, such as in marriage, family or professional life. I cannot blame anyone but myself if the time I served in the war going to be empty years. No matter what situation I am in, I must be without remorse or regrets as I am without excuse. I carry the weight of the world by myself alone without anything or any other person being able to lighten it. (E: P.254) I cannot flee the anguish by assuming the role of merely being a soldier. This is bad faith according to Sartre. I am a conscious being-for-itself. I am cannot objectify myself into a role of soldier that is being-in-itself. It is my choice to become a soldier and participate in this war; therefore I have the war I deserve.

I think Sartre’s argument about freedom is a burden is based on a false premise. He misunderstands the meaning of responsibility. He takes the word “responsibility” in the sense as “consciousness of being the incontestable author of an event or of an object” (E: P.252). However, in ordinary sense, responsibility is a duty we are required to fulfill. Merely causing something to happen is not responsible for that thing in ordinary sense. Responsibility is about something we ought to do. Even we have a free choice to do otherwise; we should still do what is required out of our responsibility. We are only responsible for something if we are liable or accountably for that thing. For example, I can choose to have a vanilla ice-cream or chocolate ice-cream, but I am not responsible for the fact that I have vanilla ice-cream but not chocolate ice-cream since I don’t have any obligation on which favor of ice-cream I should choose. In traditional philosophy, the responsibility of man comes from morality, from God, from authority, or from deduced by our reason. In Sartre’s existentialism philosophy, he rejects any objective truth. He rejects the existence of God, he rejected the logics and reason and he rejects authority. Then we must ask ourselves, where our responsibility comes from if there is no one imposes any duty on us. Responsibility itself is a human value. It does not exist until we choose to create it. In this sense, an object or a being-in-itself is responsible for causing something to happen because it is what happened in the world, it has no choice. A subject or a being-for-itself is not responsible for anything unless he choose to accept the responsibility. There is a gap of nothingness exists between the world and the consciousness. Whatever happen to the world has no relationship to our consciousness unless we choose to allow it affect our consciousness. In short, if we have absolute freedom as Sartre suggested, then we should have the freedom to choose not accepting any responsibility.

Let us use Sartre’s example as an illustration. In his example, say I am mobilized in a war and this is my war and I am responsible for it. I may think I have obligation as a citizen to join the army and defense my country. I may also think I have family responsibility prevent me from joining the army, stay home and take care of my family. However in existentialism, if I reflect on what is my responsibility, I find any ground instruct me to war or not to war. Since I am not obligate to anything, I am free to choose one way or another. Choosing to war does not imply I have to take the responsibility, since the responsibility is not there to begin with. In order to take the responsibility of the war, I must first choose to create it out of nothingness in my consciousness. Since I am absolutely free, I have the choice of not creating the responsibility in the first place. Since I have no responsibility whatsoever to begin with, I no longer have the problem of feeling anguish for continuously choosing to war. Choosing to war or not to war is just like choosing between vanilla ice-cream and chocolate ice-cream. Although I may not like the outcome of the world, I have no duty to dessert or to suicide. Just like it is not my responsibility to war, it is also not my responsibility not to war. Yes, I still have no excuses to escape from my responsibility. However I don’t need any excuses, since I never choose to take on any responsibility. I am innocent in the beginning and I can choose to keep it this way. The problem of Sartre is that he is not aware that he chose to take the responsibilities. He chooses to think he has a duty to his family and he also has a duty to his country. When the two duties are mutually exclusive, it is logically impossible to go to war and not go to war at the same time. He feels the burden of freedom because of contradicting responsibilities. In order to flee the anguish; he has to find a way to escape from the monster named responsibility. Yet he does not release this monster is his own creation. Freedom is only a burden if you choose it to be a burden.

Sartre may argue that making a choice of not taking any responsibility is still a bad faith in disguise in order to flee anguish. According to Sartre, anguish is the realization that there is no necessity in my life. My life is a system of values sustained in being only by my choice of sustaining it. I am the one who give values to everything around me in order to determine my reaction to those things. Once I have the consciousness of my freedom, I will have the sensation of groundlessness and experience the anguish of being the source of my own values. Then Sartre further explains most people flee anguish in bad faith. Bad faith is a form of self-deception, trying to tell lies to myself. However it is impossible because I cannot hide it from myself if I already process it. In the example above, Sartre may say I deny my responsibility of war is a bad faith because I objectify myself as a thing with no responsibility. My response to Sartre is that there is no necessity in my life including anguish. Anguish is not a necessity of my life, it is merely a choice. If my freedom reveals my value is groundlessness, what is the big deal? I am not acting in bad faith either. In order to be in bad faith, first of all you must know it and then lie about it to yourself. What if I don’t even care about the truthfulness of it? I simply create it out of nothingness that fits whatever purpose I desire it to be. There is no true or false in the subject of matters, so no lies involve. I cannot lie about something that I do not know about. Therefore I cannot be in bad faith if I don’t know whether or not the war is my responsibility. Contrary to Sartre’s view, it is in fact a bad faith to take up the responsibility of going to war. By taking up the responsibility, I am role-playing the role of man and unavoidability take up the responsibility of being a man. If I have absolute freedom, I should be free not to be a man. I am free to be just myself with no responsibility or anguish which attached to the role of man. I am what I am.

In conclusion, Sartre underestimated the true meaning of freedom. He did not question what is anguish? What is bad faith? What is responsibility? He thinks he all the guardrails of his system of value collapse, there is no necessity in this system. He forgot that he is still bounded by his system of existentialism, so he is not truly free. In the state of absolute freedom, man can choose not to accept anguish, not to accept any responsibility, not to know about anything that may lead to bad faith. Freedom is not a burden, because man is free to choose not having any burden.

今個學期讀存在主義﹐作為一個受現代主義啟蒙的理性人﹐對於這個哲學門派沒有什麼好感﹐甚至對其哲學思想也沒有多大興趣。只是讀哲學不同讀其他學科﹐就算不喜歡某哲學思想﹐也先要理解明白它的內容﹐才可以合理地否定其價值。

這門課的教授從事尼采的研究﹐尼采又是存在主義四大巨頭之一﹐所以課程前半部偏重尼采的思想。尼采最出位的言論﹐莫過於他高呼「上帝己死」﹐其他主要思想還包括超人慨念﹐無限復活﹐道德的起源等。他的文章寫得極含糊難明﹐與其他力求思想精練的哲學家不同。尼采的思想偶然也有值得參考的新觀點﹐不過大部份讀起來似是瘋言瘋語多點。其實尼采可能只是隨便亂寫﹐後世學者把自己的主觀意念讀入他的文章中﹐合力構建一代存在主義巨人。他的原文只有聊聊數語﹐那些學者卻可以寫出洋洋數萬字的論文﹐吹水唔抹嘴的順手拈來尼采補完計劃。

這篇功課是分析尼采的無限復活理論﹐因為尼采原本的理論沒有什麼合理根據﹐只不過是提倡某一種做處世的態度﹐基本上整篇功課水分極重﹐分別的只是有些觀點是前輩尼采學者亂吹出來﹐有些則是我昨夜趕功課臨時興起亂吹。題外話﹐李天命的機遇再生論﹐其實是抄尼采的無限復活論。

Nietzsche and Eternal Recurrence

In this essay, I am going to discuss Nietzsche’s idea of Eternal Recurrence and its implication in the meaning of life. Nietzsche proposed the idea of Eternal Recurrence that “This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more.” (GS 341) In some of his writing, Nietzsche asserted that Eternal Recurrence is “the most scientific of all possible hypotheses.” (GS p. 17) He assumed that time is infinite and our life is finite, according to the law of probability, the combinations of atoms that will recreate our life must recurrence again and again. As the latest development in cosmos science and quantum physics show that the space and time of universe is bounded and particles could have infinite number of quantum states, Nietzsche’s hypothesis is unsound. However this essay is not an inquiry into the scientific proof of Eternal Recurrence, we should treat Eternal Recurrence as a thought experiment to help us understand our life.

In the Christianity view of the world, life is linear in time. Man lived his time on earth, and then after he died, he will be judged by God. God will assign the man’s place in heaven or hell to have eternal happiness or eternal pain. In Nietzsche metaphysical system, God is dead; therefore there is no longer a God to judge the action of man. Many people are looking forward to the life after death. They endure the suffering in life and looking forward to the reward in the heaven. Taking away their God would render their life without purpose. They may think that the time on earth is finite and short, no matter what they do will not matter anymore after they die. As a result, they will suffer from the despair in a form of nihilism. In order to give some meaning to their lives, he proposed Eternal Recurrence as an alternative to fill the void left behind by God’s death.

According to Nietzsche, man should take the responsibility of morality into his own hand after God is dead. With an eternal recurrence of life, we must bear the result of every choice we make in our life. No matter the end result is happy or painful; we have to live through it again and again forever. Nietzsche thinks the idea of eternal recurrence would emphasis the importance of our decision and causes us “the greatest stress”, since we have to discern carefully about all our decisions and make sure the end result is the one we truly desire. For those people who enjoy every moment of life, who live with no regret, the eternal recurrence is a supreme elation. Their life is all they want. They do not need an external God to fulfill their life. In eternal recurrence, they would life to “crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal.” (GS 341) Nietzsche hoped this thought experiment would force us to examine our life, ask ourselves the question that “are we willing to live the same life again?” By answering this question, we will be able to internalize our desire and enjoy what life offers and become a “superman”. Once we achieve the state of “superman” by removing the concept of God, we can live our life in a new sea of possibilities, to explore all the new options and experience new growth potential.

Indeed the eternal recurrence may give us “the greatest weight” in choosing how to live our life, it seems that Nietzsche is too optimist about the human psychology and how a decision is make. In Nietzsche’s ideal scenario, the eternal recurrence would free the mind of man and let man live boldly and dangerously to have an exciting life. If man is rational and taking eternal recurrence very seriously, he may take every small detail into consideration before making the decision, then the outcome is very likely the exact opposite of what Nietzsche had suggested. On one hand, the eternal recurrence encourage man to pursuit his dreams by removing limitation imposed by Christian morality. On the other hand, the eternal recurrence also discourage man to take risk, since if he failed, he may have to live with the undesired outcome forever. Human mind tends to weight loses more than gains. If given a free choice, most people would pay safe and choose conservatively instead of roll the dice bravely and hope to win the jacket pot in life. When a man examines his life using eternal recurrence, it is very likely to find himself didn’t indulge enough in his desires or passions. He may regret not living his life to its fullest and “throw himself down and gnash his teeth” on the missed opportunities. However at the same time, he would also be glad that he had restrained himself or otherwise he could have failed miserably.

Nietzsche thinks those who affirm life would “jump in joy” for eternal recurrence, so they can repeat everything in their life eternally. Yet, Nietzsche did not foresee those who really affirm life would fill with the darkest despair for repeating the same routine life after life. According to the law of diminish return, more of the same life would bring less happiness and gradually lost its meaning after repeating itself too many times. A man may have lived a colorful and positive life, but he may not want to repeat the life again. For better or for worse, it is more fun to try something new in the next life. Nietzsche praises those who bravely sail in the new sea of possibility, yet eternal recurrence put a boundary on this new sea. The real “superman” would seek new adventure, sail in uncharted water like a voyager instead of going back and forth in same water body like a passenger ferry. The “superman” cannot bear the boredom of eternal recurrence, just like they cannot bear the boring life preparing for Christian’s judgment day. They escape from the cage of God, but they fall into another cage called eternal recurrence. The “strong” man need not seek the purpose of his life from a higher deity; he can create the meaning of his life by using eternal recurrence as a mental apparatus. The “stronger” man has no need to rely on such a mental apparatus; he could still assert the will of power even he can only live this life once. He would not look forward to more of the same life, which would eventually become boring. He would rather have an eternal resurrection than an eternal recurrence, so that he can come back to the world to experience a difference life by exploring the new possibilities. The meaning of life does not require an eternal repetition. If a life is meaningful, living it once already fulfill the purpose. If a life is meaningless at the first time, no matter how many times you repeat it, you cannot generate meaning from a void. There is nothing in eternal recurrence can’t be fulfill by living through it once and only once. The meaning of the second recurrence of the first life is redundant and hence meaningless.

In conclusion, Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence provides a new perspective to evaluate our life from traditional Christian life view. However Nietzsche failed to anticipate challenge from post-Christian morality. Eternal recurrence maybe a very powerful mental tool back in Nietzsche’s time, but today it looks pale in comparison and could not provide a satisfying answer to those who follow “the way of the stronger man”.

這篇文章是今個學期我讀道德哲學課的第二篇功課。我的教授是素食主義者﹐認為吃肉是不道德的行為﹐功課出這個題目完全是意料中事。我一向反對動物權益﹐上課時自然與教授對著幹﹐不停舉手發問質疑課本的論點。功課更是紋盡腦汁﹐陳述反對素食主義的推論。難得是教授很客觀中立﹐評分不問立場﹐只看推論是否合理﹐給了我A級的成績。

素食主肉者認為吃肉不道德﹐主要分從兩個不同方向的推論入手。第一個推論是Peter Singer的功用主義﹐認為任何導致痛苦的行為也是不道德。殺生吃肉或作動物實驗會令到動物痛苦﹐所以吃肉是不道德的行為。第二個推論是Tom Regan的動物生存權﹐他認為任何有生命的東西也有生存權﹐殺生吃肉等同侵犯動物的生存權利﹐所以吃肉是不道德的行為。

兩個推論乍看好像言之成理﹐但本身有內在問題。Singer的功用主義是一個只問結果﹐不問過程的道德理論。道德就是要令到最多人得到最多快樂﹐功用主義容許為大部份人的利益﹐而犧牲小部份人的權利。我們可以假定每個人能感到的快樂和痛苦大致相同﹐但我們不能說動物能夠感受和人類同樣程度的快樂或痛苦。動物沒有思考的能力﹐不能明白高層次快樂和受苦的抽像慨念﹐只能感受到神經系統中生物學上的痛。當計算功用成本時﹐人類吃肉帶來的快樂﹐用動物做實驗造福社會的快樂﹐遠遠超出動物受到的痛苦﹐所以人類可以犧牲動物的權利不顧。事實上在傳統功用主義者如John Stuart Mills﹐或古典哲學如亞里士多德﹐快樂的定義是指人類思想心靈上的快樂﹐輕視動物般的肉體享受或痛苦。因些在計算功用時﹐只需要考慮人類的高等感受﹐可以不用理會動物的低等感受。

Regan的動物有生存權利這句陳述﹐是句從空氣中冒出來的斷言﹐並沒有任何推論去支持。他的推論犯了乞求論證的邏輯謬誤。人類有生存權﹐所以殺人是不道德。我們不單不可以殺人﹐還有道德責任防止殺人﹐例如設立警察或法院﹐去懲罰殺人的罪犯。若果動物有生存權﹐殺動物就是不道德。可是每天非洲草原上﹐獅子老虎獵殺班馬野鹿﹐豈不是犯下謀殺的罪行。若果要保障動物的生存權﹐人類就要干預大自然的規律﹐令到有肉食動物絕種。當然這做法完全不切實際﹐更會帶來嚴重的生態大災難﹐足以推翻了動物有生存權利的說法。根據道德契約理論﹐人類的生存權是建立於人類的道德契約之上。動物沒有思考能力﹐不能履行道德契約的責任﹐因此並不受到道德契約的保護。道德契約賦與人類擁有本然價值﹐動物則只是人類的共同資源﹐只有功用價值。當然人類有責任善用資源﹐破壞生態最終受害的是人類。但在人類利益的大前題下﹐人類對動物沒有任何道德責任。

Do we have a moral duty to become vegetarians?

The supporters of animal rights often argue that it is wrong for us to eat meat. They claim that we have a moral duty to become vegetarians. There are two major arguments commonly used by advocates of vegetarianism to support their claims. The first approach based on the utilitarian principle proposed by Peter Singer in his paper “All Animals Are Equal”. He claims that it is wrong for us to cause animal suffering. The second is a right-based approach proposed by Tom Regan in his paper “The Case for Animal Rights”. Out of the two arguments, Regan made a much stronger claim than Singer. He says that it is fundamentally wrong for us to view animals as our resources (p.388). It is wrong for us to kill animals for food; therefore it is wrong to eat meat. In this paper, I will examine Regan’s claim and show his argument fails to establish animals have the rights not to be killed by human.

Regan begins his argument with an obvious moral claim: human has rights; individual human has rights regardless of their usefulness to others. It is wrong to kill human for food. Then he queries into the justification of human rights. He rejected the explanation to justify the origin of human rights from contractarianism and utilitarianism theory. He says contractarianism denies the moral tolerability of racial, sexual and social discrimination and utilitarianism in principle violate individual’s rights by allowing evil means that lead to good result (p.393). He claims that it is only rational to explain the foundation of human rights from the inherent value of human. Using the examples of marginal human, such as infants and mental retarded people, Regan established that human possess inherent value not because of our rational capacity. Human have inherent value because we are subjects of lives. In other word, all subjects of live have inherent value. Animals are subjects of lives. All who have inherent value have it equally, whether they are human or animals (p.394). We have to recognize the equal inherent value of animals and their equal right to be treated with respect. It is wrong to kill human for food, so it is wrong to kill animal for food. Therefore we are morally required to be vegetarians. Here I summarize Regan’s argument in standard form:

1. Human have rights not to be killed for food.
2. Human rights are justified by the inherent value of human.
3. All subjects of lives have inherent value and have it equally.
4. Animals are subjectsof lives.
5. Animals haveinherent value which justify animal rights
6. Therefore, animals have rights not be killed for food.

In Regan’s argument, the center of his claim is premise 3 that all subjects of lives, including animals, have equal inherent value. I am going to reject this premise by scrutinizing Regan’s objections against other moral theories that justify only rational being, which includes human but exclude animals, possess inherent value. Premise 3 is false if a moral theory can successfully explain why only rational being have inherent value. If premise 3 is false, then Regan’s argument on animal rights is unsound and we have be no moral reason to become vegetarians.

I agree with Regan that utilitarianism has a hard time explaining why human have rights. Utilitarianism is a situational moral theory, so in principle it allows violations of individual’s rights in the name of common good. However I think Regan’s objection to contractarianism is very weak. In contractarianism, the nature of morality is based on contracts agreed by people for their own benefits. People agree to form moral community that defines the rights and the duties of its members. This basic form contractarianism indeed fails to explain why racial or sexual discrimination is immoral. It permits the majorities to form a moral community that violate the human rights of the minorities. To fix this obvious problem, John Rawls sets forth a version of contractarianism that begins with the original position. He maintains the basic feature of contractarianism that individuals are rational and self-interested, who want to choose a moral principle that benefits them most. He puts the contractors behind a veil of ignorance in the original position so that they do not know the arbitrary factors of being a human, such as whether one is black or white, male or female, genius or dumb. By ignoring those factors, we can ensure the moral principles agree upon are not based on bias or prejudice, thus condemn any form of discrimination. Regan uses the examples from marginal human to reject the crudest form of contractarianism. However he failed to consider the more refined and subtle form of contractarianism proposed by Rawls, since morality determine behind the veil of ignorance protects the human rights of marginal human.

Regan replies that Rawls ‘contractarianism theory remains deficient: it systematically denies that we have direct duties to those human beings who do not have a sense of justice – young children, for instance, and many mentally retarded humans (p.391). I think Regan is being unfair in his reply by misrepresenting Rawls. It is hard to believe Rawls would allow his moral theory to justify the torturing of young children or retarded humans. Rawls is one of the most influential political philosophers in the 20^th century. His theory of justice helped to shape the policies of many liberal governments. It would be absurd to say his theory systematically denies human rights of some human in the society. According to Rawls, the contractors behind the veil of ignorance not only care the interest for themselves, but also care the interest of their loved ones – be they infants or mentally retarded. In order to have good a life, the contractors would choose a moral principle that protects the human rights for the margin humans, since they would not know whether their loved one fall into that unfortunate category. The inherent value of marginal human can be perfectly explained by Rawls contractarianism; therefore Regan cannot claim inherent value is a feature of all subject of lives.

Regan may object to Rawls’ theory on the basis that the veil of ignorance cannot explain our moral intuition on why torturing animals for fun is wrong. I think Regan’s objection from moral intuition is also very weak. Intuitionism is rejected by Rawls as being both theoretically and practically unhelpful. There are many conflicting moral intuitions.It is wrong to torture animals for fun is one moral principle.Human has the rights to kill animals for food or scientific experiment is another moral principle. Intuitionism provides no system for ranking these competing principles. We have to use our considered judgment and determine which principle is more important in the situation. Rawls’ theory of justice provides a concrete guidance to decide which moral principles are most important. Under contractarianism, rational beings agree on the rights and duties of each member in the moral communities out of self interest. The rational beings gain no interest for granting any rights to the animals. Therefore, out of self interest, it is only rational to treat animals as merely resources.

Under contractarianism, animals do enjoy some indirect protection serving as resources to human, which provide explanations to the moral intuitions regarding animals. It is wrong to torture animals own by other people, because it violates the property rights of others. It is wrong to over exploit wild animals and drive them into extinction, because it destroys the ecosystem and brings harm to every human. Back to the question on why it is wrong to torture animal for fun. Contractarianism can explain this moral intuition with a general moral principle; it is wrong to destroy useful resource without bringing any benefit. Since resources are limited, out of self interest, rational beings would agree it is wrong to waste any valuable resources. Take an example; it is wrong to blow up your car for fun, because cars are valuable resources. If you no longer wish to own your car, you can sell it or give it away so that someone can put it into better use. Animals are valuable resources to human; torturing those for fun does not fully utilizes the value of the animals, so it is wrong to torture animals for fun.On the other hand, harvesting animals for food or use those in experiments serve the interests of human, therefore it is morally right according to contractarianism.

In conclusion, Regan fails to reject contractarianism as an explanation for human rights. Rawls’ theory of justice solves the problem of marginal human having inherent value. We have no reasonable ground to accept Regan’s claim that all subjects of lives have inherent value. Since animals have no inherent value, they have no rights. In fact, according to contractarianism, rational beings are morally required to do whatever benefits us most and ignore the conflicting interests of those outside the moral community. It is morally right to killing animals for food if eating meat serves the interest of mankind. Therefore it is morally acceptable to kill animals for food and we have no moral obligation to become vegetarians.