In Tom Regan’s “The Case for Animal Rights”, he argues the rights theory is the most satisfactory moral theory to justify the goals of animal rights movements (p.393). In this paper, I will examine Regan’s argument and show the rights theory cannot lead to the conclusion that it is morally wrong for human to kill animals.

Regan begins with claiming all individuals who are the experiencing subjects of a life have inherent values. The inherent value is independent of the usefulness of the individual. Unlike the utilitarianism, this view in principle denies that we can justify good results by using evil means that violate individual rights. Treating others in ways that fail to show respect for the other’s independent value is to act immorally, to violate the individual’s right (p.393). Since we accept the fact that human who lack of intelligence, autonomy or reason has inherent value. To be rational, we have to also accept the view that animals like them has no less inherent value. All who has inherent value have it equally, whether they are human or animal (p.394). Therefore we have to recognize the equal inherent value of animals and their equal right to be treated with respect.

I agree with Regan both human and animal have the same inherit rights. However he is too hastily to equate these inherent rights with human rights. We must first examine what is the content of the inherent rights exactly, only then we can determine how human should treat animals morally.

According to the rules of nature, animals high up in the food chain have the rights to prey on animals low in the food chain. It would be absurd to condemn lions killing gazelles for food being immoral. It would be even more absurd to persecute the lions for committing murders. It would be equally absurd to prevent the lions from killing the gazelles or any other animals, doing so would definitely drive the lions into extinction. It is quite obvious that it is moral for the animals to kill other animals for their own good. Following the same rules of nature, it is moral for animal to honor special relationship within their own species, such as wolf packs. So it must be moral for human to take the welfare of other Homo sapiens more important than members of other species. Since human and animal share the same inherent rights, it is only moral to allow human kill animals as resources and allow human being speciesism.

In response to my objection, Regan may argue that I have confused positive rights with negative rights. My objection is based on human and lions have the same positive rights of killing other animals, but he is suggesting animals have negative rights in the form of a moral protection from harms, since every subject of life have the same inherent negative rights. The lions do not have moral capacity to fulfill their moral duty, so we cannot apply moral judgment on whether it is wrong for the lions to kill the gazelles. On the other hand, human possess rationality or moral autonomy, so it is wrong for human to violate our moral duty by harming the animals.

Regan’s response did not answer my objection at all. I was asking where the inherent rights come from and suggest a reasonable way to determine its scope. Regan merely repeat his conclusion without showing us how to derive the inherent rights equal to moral protection from harm. If human have inherent rights of being speciesism, then human has no moral obligation for not harming the animals. The human rights of infants and retarded can be justified by the inherent right of human speciesism, then the inherent rights of all experiencing subjects do not include protection from harm in all circumstances. Why can’t the inherent rights only give animals some protection that is less than what Regan has claimed? How about animals have inherent rights to survive as a species, so human can kill individual animal but we should not drive them into extinction? How about animal have inherent rights for not being harmed by human if there is no conflict of interest, so we can build animal factories to provide food supplies for us, but we cannot kill birds in the city unless they become environmental hazards? Regan gives no reason why we should draw the line of the inherent rights that animals enjoy the same as human rights.

In conclusion, Regan’s argument for the animal rights is invalid. Giving that all living beings share the same inherent rights, we cannot logically deduce this inherent rights equals to human rights that we are familiar with.

In Don Marquis’ paper “An Argument that Abortion is Wrong”, he argues abortion is morally wrong for the same reason as murder. His argument is different from the standard pro-life argument that stress that the fetus is both human and alive, therefore the fetus has right to life. By using a different approach, Don Marquis’ argument avoids the controversial in the debate of whether fetus is qualified as a human whom process the right to life.

Marquis starts his argument with asking why killing an adult human is wrong. (p.130) Killing is wrong because killing deprives the victim of a future value. The killing victim suffers the misfortune of a premature death which consists of the loss to the victim of the future goods of the consciousness. In general, killing is wrong because it deprives the victim of a future like ours (FLO).

Marquis then further explains the FLO theory is a sufficient reason for killing is wrong. First he argues the nature of misfortune in terminal disease is the loss of FLO, which also the same for premature death. He also argues murder is the worst crime because it deprives the victim all of his future, not merely part of it. Then he argues the FLO theory does not the pit-falls of traditional pro-life arguments. The FLO theory is compatible with euthanasia because those who seek euthanasia have no future. The FLO theory has no implication to animal rights, since animal life is not a life like ours. Therefore why killing is wrong can be explained using the FLO theory alone. At last he applies the FLO theory to abortion. Killing fetuses deprive the FLO of the fetuses, therefore abortion is immoral. (p.133)

The FLO theory seems to provide a sound argument on why abortion is immoral. However under strict scrutiny, the FLO theory actually contradicts to Marquis’ own view on abortion (p.84) [1]. In the beginning of his essay, Marquis stated abortion is not immoral under rare instances. “Such cases include abortion after rape and abortion during the first fourteen days after conception when there is an argument that the fetus is not definitely an individual.” (p.126). If the morality of abortion is judged by the FLO theory alone, there should be no exceptional cases for fetuses from rapes and fetuses under fourteen days old. The fetuses from rapes have the same FLO as other fetuses, so their abortion should also be immoral. In the case of the first two weeks post conception, twinning is possible; abortion may cause the loss of FLO for two individuals instead of one. Killing those fetuses deprives their FLO(s); therefore abortion is also wrong in these cases.

Marquis did not explain the criteria to make abortion moral for the rare cases in his paper. It is obvious that using FLO theory cannot grant him the morality of abortion in the rare cases he stated.s In order to defense his view, he may attempt to use traditional moral theories, such as Unitarianism, Categorical Imperatives or Social Contract Theory, to overrule the FLO theory in the rare cases. Regardless of which moral theory he chooses to defense the exceptions, once he introduces a moral theory other than the FLO theory into his argument, he opens the flood gate allow us to re-evaluate the morality for the not so rare cases. Is kill fetuses from rape ok because the mother does not want the baby? Why not extend the fourteen days limit to the 3rd trimester? If there are fundamental moral principles that can overrule the FLO theory, according to the Occam’s razor, why can’t we simply use the fundamental moral principle and get rid of the FLO theory?

Until Marquis come up with satisfying explanation for morality of abortion in the rare cases or he can explain away the future good of those fetuses. He must either withhold the application of FLO theory to abortion for not contradicting himself or he must revise his view to accept abortion is wrong even in those rare cases.

[1] P.84 In addition, Marquis mentions as exceptions cases of rapes, when the fetus is anencephalic (partially or completely lacking a brain), and when the abortion is performed during the first fourteen days after conception. Given the number of these exceptions he allows himself at the outset, it tempting to say that Marquis is really a moderate rather than strictly pro-life, but because his emphasis is on the claim that abortion is seriously wrong, I will put him in the pro-life camp.