歷史中曾經發生不公義的事件﹐如殖民地時代白人移民侵佔土著的土地﹐或者當年八國聯軍搶奪中國文物。當我們說一件歷史事件不公義﹐這其實是一個道德判斷。道德判斷對我們的行為有指引性﹐我們應該防止似類不公義的事件再次發生。對當年不公義事件的受害者作像徵性賠償﹐政府站出來為過去的不公義道歉﹐讓世人不要忘記歷史的教訓。可是有些人認為像徵性的賠償並不足夠﹐應該把歷史撥亂反正﹐要對受害者作出完全足額賠償﹐如白人把土地還給土著﹐侵略國把文物歸還﹐公義才能得到彰顯。可是完全性的賠償有三大問題﹐若不能解決這些問題﹐大規模的重新分配只會帶來更多的不公義。

第一個問題是歷史的應然性。物件和土地的擁有權基於歷史性﹐但是現實中沒有時光機﹐不能把回到過去重新開始。若果不公義事件在昨天去年發生﹐我們可以還可以勉強預測歷史原來發展的方向。可是不公義事件在百幾二百年前發生﹐我們根本不可能知道若果沒有發生不公義事件﹐今天歷史的發展方向會是什麼模樣。或許白人不搶奪土著的土地﹐土著也會自願把土地賣給白人﹐又或者土著在賭桌上把土地輸清光。若果中國文物沒有給運到外國﹐清庭可能自己把文物變賣﹐國民黨可能把文物搬到台灣﹐文化大革命也可能把文物破壞了。再者在不公義事件中﹐除了直接的受害者和侵佔者外﹐間接也會影響市場價格﹐那其他相關買賣也會變得不公義。因為歷史有太多偶然性﹐當中涉及太多未知的變數﹐我們根本不知道什麼才是乎合公義的現狀﹐想重新分配也無從入手。大規模的重新分配會致社會混亂﹐在現實在根本不可行。若果可以克服社會混亂的問題﹐為什麼要拘泥歷史的假設﹐不索性採用更好更平等的分配呢。

第二個問題是擁有權的時效性。根據一般法律和道德的觀念﹐擁有權並非永遠擁有﹐刑事和民事訟訴有追朔期限﹐產權也有逆權侵佔的限制。若果不公義事件發生的年代久遠﹐物件幾經轉手原主人已難以追尋﹐物件的擁有權便屬於持有人。擁有權是建立在擁有人與物件的互動關係之上﹐而非一個恆久不變的外在關係件。一個人對物件最初的擁有權﹐是建立在個人對物件的使用﹐將物件變為個人生命計劃的一部份。當個人失去物件後﹐物件在個人生命中的地位﹐會隨著時間減弱。而同一時間該物件在新擁有人生命中的地位漸漸增加。經過一段很長的時間後﹐原主人會完全失去物件的擁有權﹐擁有權便轉移到新的持有人手上。

第三個問題是擁有權會因為環境轉變而失效。一個人對物件有最初擁有權﹐是基於沒有其他人擁有這件物件﹐而把物件私有化並不會影響他人。可是隨著環境的轉變﹐不再乎合最初擁有權的條件﹐那擁有權隨之亦會失效。例如在某村落中有很多井﹐個人可以擁有某口井的權利﹐禁止其他人在他的井中取水。但當環境轉變﹐村落的井受到污染不能飲用﹐只餘下一口可以使用的井。這時候該井的擁有人﹐並沒有權利禁止他人取水﹐或以天價賣水謀取暴利﹐換一句話說他喪失那口井的擁有權。在土著土地的例子﹐在幾百年前有大量荒野土地﹐在不影響他人的條件下﹐所以土著擁有那片土地。可以現代人口膨脹﹐土地供不應求﹐土著喪失土地的擁有權﹐要把土地拿出來和移民分享。先到先得決定擁有權帶有隨機性﹐亦無視其他人的需要﹐所以不付合公義的原則。

Reference:
Superseding Historic Injustice – Jeremy Waldron

John Rawls在他的公義論中﹐提出公義的原則是公平。理性的人在無知之幕下﹐會選擇公平的財富分配方法﹐在保障個人自由的大前題下﹐財富應該要盡量平均分配。Robert Zoick則提出一個截然不同公義理論﹐他認為公義應該要有歷史性﹐不應該以財富的分佈作衡量是否公義的標準。以財富分佈去決定是否公義的說法有盲點﹐因為財富並不是從天上掉下來﹐不屬於任何人擁有等著政府去分配。財富從創造出來的那一刻﹐便己經屬於創造者所擁有﹐政府不能隨意重新分配財富。他的公義理論是擁有權理論﹐主要有三大原則﹕

1. 每個人可以擁有他從合法和公義途徑得來的財富。
2. 每個人也有權從合法和公義的途徑自由轉讓財富。
3. 從不公義途徑得來的財富並不屬於掛有人﹐歷史上的不公義必須要修正。

根據擁有權理論的公義原則﹐若果從一個公義的財富分佈﹐經過自由轉讓產生新的財富分佈﹐必定同樣乎合公義。如果要把財富分佈維持某個特定的分佈﹐政府必須對財富進行重新分配﹐這就侵犯了個人對財富的擁有權﹐亦侵犯了個人選擇的自由。Zoick不反對政府徵稅用來負擔公共開支﹐但他反對徵稅用作劫富濟貧的財富轉移。向一個人的勞動成果抽稅﹐與強迫一個勞動沒有分別。若果政府不能強迫人民義務勞動﹐把勞動成果轉移給有需要的人﹐那政府同樣不應抽稅強奪勞動成果﹐用來轉移給有需要的人。每個人有選擇額外工作或休閒的自由﹐若果政府只對工作的人抽稅﹐但沒有抽取休閒的人的時間﹐那便是不尊重人民的自由。若政府可以強迫人民勞動或強奪人民勞動的成果﹐便違背自由主義每個人擁對身體主權的原則﹐讓人異化達到其他目的工具﹐正正犯了自由主義批評功用主義的毛病。

Rawls認為每個人與生俱來的天賦材能和承繼的財富有異﹐而這些因素帶有隨機性﹐好運氣的人不應獲得更多的財富﹐所以財富要盡可能地均分才是公平。Zoick用擁有論的公義原則回應﹐指出父母有權自由轉讓財富給子女﹐因此子女承繼的財富合乎公義原則。其次是天賦材能與財富分佈沒有直接因果關係.財富份佈與利他服務有必然關係﹐只是天賦材能恰好與利他服務有相互關係。事實上任何財富分佈也有隨機性﹐包括均分的財富分佈﹐所以均分財富不能解決隨機性的問題。當然Rawls可以說均分財富是公義﹐所以不容許人憑天賦獲得額多的財富﹐要均分財富才公平﹐不過這一來就犯了乞求論點的謬誤了。最重要是跟據擁有權理論的公義原則﹐若某人擁有一樣東西﹐而他取得這東西的途徑沒有侵犯別人的擁有樣﹐他就可以公義的擁有這東西﹐他那可以擁有從這東西生產出來的財富。竟然人擁有的天賦材能沒有侵犯其他的擁有權﹐順理成章地人應該擁有從他材能生產出的財富。

雖然Zoick原則上反對以財產的分佈決定是否公義﹐但他指出歷史遺留很多不公義的包伏﹐足以作為在現在制度上重新分配財產的理據。所有重新分配也是過渡性質﹐當修正歷史上的不公義後﹐盲目追求均分並不合乎公義原則。

Reference:
Distributive Justince – Robert Nozick

西方現代民主制度強調個人自主﹐反對家長式統治﹐政府必需要尊重民眾的選擇。政府應該是價值中立﹐選民透過民主程序﹐決定政府的施政方向。民主選舉是一個討價還價的過程﹐選民憑著手上的選票﹐去選出乎合自己意願和照顧自己利益的政府。可是這樣的民主制度並不完善﹐尊重選民的意願並不等於照顧他們的利益。

首先很多情況下選民的意願﹐很大程度受政府政策影響。若果政策影響人民意願﹐人民意願又全過來決定政策﹐那人民何來自主的權利呢。其次人民的意願並不是一成不變﹐滿足了人民今天的意願﹐不等於能夠滿充他們明天的意願。民眾甚至可以不滿意昨天作出的選擇﹐儘管現狀是昨天選擇的必然的結果。有時候人民所作出的選擇並不真正的意願﹐特別是在資訊不足的情況下所作的決定。人民的意願會也受到環境的影響﹐如酸葡萄心態或困難時降低要求。民主制度守護的是人民自主﹐所以在某些情況下﹐政府有需要凌駕人民的意願﹐以保障人民的福利和自主性。

政府在三個情況下﹐政策應該凌駕人民的個人意願。第一個情況是集體意願的決定﹐人民的高階意願不乎合人民的低階意願。高階意願是指對自己意願的意願﹐例如人民的意願是要社會更加環保﹐但不願意獨自承擔環保的額外開支﹐這時候就需要政府介入﹐以立法手段去改變人民的低階意願。第二個情況是人民在不公義的背景下作出的選擇﹐有時候他們會選擇接默默受了不公義的現狀﹐認為那是自身或際遇的問題。第三個情況是人民的選擇﹐將會嚴重影響自身福利﹐以及鎖死自己在未來的選擇。這包括所有會上癮的行為如食煙吸毒賭錢﹐因此政府為人民福利著想﹐應該防止人民對作出對自己有害的選擇。

在現行民主制度中﹐選民以不記名投票的方式去作出選擇﹐政府根據選民表達的意願﹐去制定政策和決定﹐可是不記名投票的選舉制度本身也有問題。選民表達的意願很多時候不能反影他們真正的意願﹐他們防止最壞選擇出現會進行策略性投﹐把選票投給不是最好但可以接受的選擇。民主選舉是假設人民能夠透過選票去整合社會中不同的利益﹐但當每個選民以自己利益作出選擇時﹐他們基於自私的選擇卻不一定對社會有益處。除了以不記名投票的方式外﹐民主還能以公開討論的實行。人民透過理性討論達成共識﹐正如古代希臘城邦的民主一樣。公開討論的好處﹐是人民不單要考慮自己的利益﹐還要考慮社會整體的利益﹐才能說服別人支持自己的決定。公開討論以理性和大眾福利為基礎﹐藉此可以培養人民的理性和同理心。

雖然公開討論看似比投票制度優勝﹐但是本身也不是沒有問題。投票才不過每幾年一次花﹐人民的投票率也偏低。公開討論比投票更花時間﹐並不是每個市民也願意或能夠付出這樣多的時間﹐最終民意共識可能會被少數人騎劫。其次是共識可膩根本不存在﹐理性討論並不能夠解決價值觀取向的不同。在公開討論中某些人可能有隱藏議題﹐他們以公眾利益為名個人利益為實。公開討論得出共識並不一定是最好﹐可能發生集體盲目的羊群效益。由於公開討論參與者的身份是公開﹐有些人會因為其他人的壓力而選擇妥協﹐所以公開討論不能保障所有人的自主意願。

Reference:
Perference and Politics – Cass Sunstein
The Market and the Forum – Jon Elster

七十年代John Rawls提出自由主義對左翼政治思想有很大影響﹐當中以他用無知之幕作為起點的推論﹐更常被引用作支持重新分配資源的社會公義。他師承康德道德哲學﹐認為先驗理性能推論出社會公義。他認為公義就是公平﹐是每個人理性地自願參社會契約﹐並履行社會契約的義務他同時認為與每個人生俱來的地位或天賦帶有隨機性﹐所以在道德上並不屬於持有者所擁有。因此使用地位和天賦得來好處和財富﹐應該要與社會上的其他人分享。

Michael Sandel則提出相反意見﹐運用康德的道德哲學﹐推翻Rawls的正義論中的內在矛盾。他指出就算地位和天賦的好處並不屬於持有者擁有﹐也不能把那些好處自動申延為社會共同所擁有。若果把地位和天賦的好處從個人強行剝奪﹐重新分配給社會上其他人﹐ 則犯下與功用主義相同﹐不遵重個人自主權的道德問題。他認為重新分配資源應要建立在社群身份認同的基礎上。每個人對社會其他人的責任﹐僅限於推己及人的原則之下。你沒有責任去資助你不認同的生活方式。舉個例子說明。在Rawls原本的理論中﹐天生聰明兼工作努力收入高的人﹐應該要把他們的工作成果﹐與其他收入低的人分享。不論那些收入低的人是因為天生能力所限﹐還是他們選擇懶散地過活。Sandel的理論便指出﹐勤力的人資助懶散的人有違公平﹐因為他們間並沒有共同的價值觀﹐久缺一個共通的身份。

這篇文章分析討論Sandel對Rawls的批判﹐源用康德的道德哲學作推論﹐嘗試提出一套新的修正公義論﹐來回應的原本理論的質疑。

Modified Principles of Justice

In this essay, I am going to evaluate Michael Sandel’s constitutive ties antithesis on John Rawls’ Theory of Justice. First, I will lay out the argument of the antithesis, then I will consider its objection and at last I will provide a synthesis to resolve the inconsistence in the two theories.

In [1], Sandel argues that Rawl’s two principles of justice suffer from the same problem as the utilitarianism, which “fails to take seriously distinctness of persons” [1:243]. Sandel agrees with Rawls on the presumption of the liberal vision. Both of them are disciples of Kant. They take the deontological view on rights, maintain that moral laws require a categorical foundation, oppose to a contingent one as in utilitarianism. A just society should not promote a particular version of good. It should allow its citizens to pursuit their own concept of good, given that each citizen has similar liberty. Both of them agree rights precede goods, such that individual rights cannot be sacrificed for a general good and these rights cannot be premised on any particular vision of a good life.

In Rawl’s original position, every person is assume to be a rational agent and is assume to stay behind a veil of ignorance. Everyone does not know any social attribute or natural talent about himself nor his own concept of good. Sandel criticizes Rawl’s original position rules out the possibility of constitutive ends of self. According to Kant’s metaphysics, there is always a distinction between the value I have and the person I am. An unencumbered self must first has a prior existence to provide the standing ground for the social attribute, natural talent or concepts of good that tie to the person. “What matters to the unencumbered self is not the ends that we choose, but our capacity to choose them” [1:242]. In order to establish the rights are prior to the good using Kantian ethics, the self has to be prior to it ends. A free and independent agent is capable of free choice only if the self’s identity is never tie to any aims or interest of the encumbered self. The free choice of the unencumbered self on the concept of good should be honored as long as they are not unjust. Our concept of good carries weight simply because in the virtue of our choice.

Sandel then goes on to criticize Rawls’s difference principle runs into serious problem. The difference principle states that “inequality are permissible only when they are to the benefit of everyone affected by the inequality, in particular to the least well off; must be attached to offices and positions open to all” [2:637]. According to Rawls, man does not deserve to profit from his innate social status or natural talent because those good fortune are arbitrary. Those benefits should be shared by everyone since it is only fair and hence just. Sandel points out there are logical gaps between the assets I have are only accidentally mine to the conclusion that these assets are common assets that everyone has a claim of their benefits. From moral point of view, if my claims on my innate assets are arbitrary, then other people’s claims on my innate assets are equally arbitrary. Unless there is a constitute tie between my unencumbered self and the unencumbered self of those who lay claims on my assets, the different principle is simply a formula for using some as means to others’ ends. It makes the second principle falls prey to the same objection of Rawls used against utilitarianism.

Sandel points out an inconsistency in Rawls’ two principle of justice. On one hand, Rawls insist everyone has the liberty to choose his concept of good life; on other hand, Rawls fails to acknowledge the free choice of an unencumbered rational agent. Sandel thinks that it is an unfair burden for me to share the benefits of my innate assets with other people whom I have no constituted tie with. There are two ways to create the constitute tie bonding different people together. The first way is via the common identify of the unencumbered self, such as a community or family. The common identify is more than the values or attributes I have, it defines who I am. The second way is via moral attachment to a common aim, interest or way of life that I choose to bound my identity. Without a constitute tie, we are not morally indebt to share my assets with other people. Therefore without a constitute tie, we cannot deduce a logical conclusion of the difference principle from the original position.

Rawls may response that the difference principle does not require an underline assumption of constitute tie. The two principle of justice is justified by the duty of fair play. In the original position, every rational agent seeks to maximize his interest. However since he is behind the veil of ignorance, he has no knowledge about his position in reality. It is to his advantage to agree on a set of principles that he is willing to accept in the reality regardless of his position. Once a free agent accepted a principle they acknowledge to be fair, they can enjoy the benefits arise from the rules, but at the same time they are also bound by the duty of fair play to follow the rules even it is to their disadvantage. In Kantian ethics, it is a prima facie duty to comply the commitment agreed by the ration agents in advance. The principles of justice are categorical imperatives that arise from reason alone in the original position.

The duty of fair play can explain why other people have a claim on my innate assets, only if the difference principle is consider fair by the unencumbered self. The logical gap in Rawl’s argument still exists, it just moves from its place at the redistribution of benefit from innate assets to somewhere between the original position and the difference principle. It is still unclear why free rational agents would agree upon the rules of the difference principle in the lack of constitute tie. “A principle will strike the parties as fair if none feel that, by participating in it, they or any of the others are taken advantage of, or forced to give in to claims which they do not regard as legitimate” [3:190]. According to the first principle of justify, everyone has the liberty to choose their concept of good life. People have the liberty to choose between working hard or become relaxing workless hobble. But according to the second principle, the hobble has a claim on the fruit of the labor of the worker, so the least well off will benefit from the inequality. It is quite obvious the unencumbered self would see it is unfair and it will not participate in principle that considers the burden of people with incompatible life style. If Rawl’s two principles of justice are unfair, then we are no longer obligated to comply with its rules.

Rawl’s two principles of justice do not compatible with constitute ties, but we can reformulate the principles to fix the problem. We can keep the original position as the starting point of the theory of justice. We can also keep the duty of fair play as the justification of the modified principles of justice. When deciding the principle of justice, the rational agents are still masked by the veil of ignorance. However the rational agents are not only mutually self interested, they also seek to prompt their concept of good that fosters a common identify with others. If the difference principle gives any person a claim on the benefit of natural endowments of any other person, then any person should also has a claim on the liberty of choosing a different concept of good life of any other person. Under these conditions, a modified version of the two principles will be chosen:

1. Each person has an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all, as long as the liberty does not put the least well off in worse situation.
2. Inequalities are permissible only when they are to the benefit every affected by the inequality, in particular to those with constitute ties; must be attached to offices and positions open to all.

Although the ration agents do not know their concept of good in the reality, but if one of their goals is to maximize their social benefits in term of income and wealth, it would make sense to encourage the concept of good that procedure more social benefits. It would also make sense to limit the liberty that will destroy social benefits, such as choosing a life style of drug addicts or workless hobbles. The new second principle acknowledges the arbitrariness in natural asset, but it stops making an individual’s natural asset from being a common asset. It limits the claim of the natural asset to those who share the same community identity. In another word, the benefit of my natural asset is put in use to promote my concept of good live.

The modified principles still nullify the arbitrary in social status or natural talent, which is outside the control of the unencumbered self. Those who are in disadvantage can freely choose to adopt a concept of good of those who are in advantage. Doing so would create a constitute ties between the two parties and yields a legitimate claim on the shared benefit. The unencumbered self have the liberty to choose his purpose and end. Choose a particular concept of good in exchange for some certain benefit does not undermine the autonomy of the unencumbered self, because the self does not lose his capacity to choose his own concept of good.

The proposed modified principles of justice are as fair as Rawl’s original version, thus it is equally just. On top of that, it also addressed Sandel’s objections from the argument of constitute ties. Therefore the modified principles of justice provide a better set of rules for the rational agent in Rawls’ theory of justice.

References:

[1] M. J. Sandel, “The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self,” in Contemporary Political Philosophy, R.E. Goodin and P. Pettit, Ed., MA: Blackwell, 2006, pp. 239-247

[2] J. Rawls, “A Theory of Justice,” in Ethical Theory: An Anthology, R. Sahfer-Landau, Ed., MA: Blackwell, 2007, pp. 631-643

[3] J. Rawls, “Justice as Fairness,” in Contemporary Political Philosophy, R.E. Goodin and P. Pettit, Ed., MA: Blackwell, 2006, pp. 185-200