這篇文章是今個學期我讀道德哲學課的第二篇功課。我的教授是素食主義者﹐認為吃肉是不道德的行為﹐功課出這個題目完全是意料中事。我一向反對動物權益﹐上課時自然與教授對著幹﹐不停舉手發問質疑課本的論點。功課更是紋盡腦汁﹐陳述反對素食主義的推論。難得是教授很客觀中立﹐評分不問立場﹐只看推論是否合理﹐給了我A級的成績。

素食主肉者認為吃肉不道德﹐主要分從兩個不同方向的推論入手。第一個推論是Peter Singer的功用主義﹐認為任何導致痛苦的行為也是不道德。殺生吃肉或作動物實驗會令到動物痛苦﹐所以吃肉是不道德的行為。第二個推論是Tom Regan的動物生存權﹐他認為任何有生命的東西也有生存權﹐殺生吃肉等同侵犯動物的生存權利﹐所以吃肉是不道德的行為。

兩個推論乍看好像言之成理﹐但本身有內在問題。Singer的功用主義是一個只問結果﹐不問過程的道德理論。道德就是要令到最多人得到最多快樂﹐功用主義容許為大部份人的利益﹐而犧牲小部份人的權利。我們可以假定每個人能感到的快樂和痛苦大致相同﹐但我們不能說動物能夠感受和人類同樣程度的快樂或痛苦。動物沒有思考的能力﹐不能明白高層次快樂和受苦的抽像慨念﹐只能感受到神經系統中生物學上的痛。當計算功用成本時﹐人類吃肉帶來的快樂﹐用動物做實驗造福社會的快樂﹐遠遠超出動物受到的痛苦﹐所以人類可以犧牲動物的權利不顧。事實上在傳統功用主義者如John Stuart Mills﹐或古典哲學如亞里士多德﹐快樂的定義是指人類思想心靈上的快樂﹐輕視動物般的肉體享受或痛苦。因些在計算功用時﹐只需要考慮人類的高等感受﹐可以不用理會動物的低等感受。

Regan的動物有生存權利這句陳述﹐是句從空氣中冒出來的斷言﹐並沒有任何推論去支持。他的推論犯了乞求論證的邏輯謬誤。人類有生存權﹐所以殺人是不道德。我們不單不可以殺人﹐還有道德責任防止殺人﹐例如設立警察或法院﹐去懲罰殺人的罪犯。若果動物有生存權﹐殺動物就是不道德。可是每天非洲草原上﹐獅子老虎獵殺班馬野鹿﹐豈不是犯下謀殺的罪行。若果要保障動物的生存權﹐人類就要干預大自然的規律﹐令到有肉食動物絕種。當然這做法完全不切實際﹐更會帶來嚴重的生態大災難﹐足以推翻了動物有生存權利的說法。根據道德契約理論﹐人類的生存權是建立於人類的道德契約之上。動物沒有思考能力﹐不能履行道德契約的責任﹐因此並不受到道德契約的保護。道德契約賦與人類擁有本然價值﹐動物則只是人類的共同資源﹐只有功用價值。當然人類有責任善用資源﹐破壞生態最終受害的是人類。但在人類利益的大前題下﹐人類對動物沒有任何道德責任。

Do we have a moral duty to become vegetarians?

The supporters of animal rights often argue that it is wrong for us to eat meat. They claim that we have a moral duty to become vegetarians. There are two major arguments commonly used by advocates of vegetarianism to support their claims. The first approach based on the utilitarian principle proposed by Peter Singer in his paper “All Animals Are Equal”. He claims that it is wrong for us to cause animal suffering. The second is a right-based approach proposed by Tom Regan in his paper “The Case for Animal Rights”. Out of the two arguments, Regan made a much stronger claim than Singer. He says that it is fundamentally wrong for us to view animals as our resources (p.388). It is wrong for us to kill animals for food; therefore it is wrong to eat meat. In this paper, I will examine Regan’s claim and show his argument fails to establish animals have the rights not to be killed by human.

Regan begins his argument with an obvious moral claim: human has rights; individual human has rights regardless of their usefulness to others. It is wrong to kill human for food. Then he queries into the justification of human rights. He rejected the explanation to justify the origin of human rights from contractarianism and utilitarianism theory. He says contractarianism denies the moral tolerability of racial, sexual and social discrimination and utilitarianism in principle violate individual’s rights by allowing evil means that lead to good result (p.393). He claims that it is only rational to explain the foundation of human rights from the inherent value of human. Using the examples of marginal human, such as infants and mental retarded people, Regan established that human possess inherent value not because of our rational capacity. Human have inherent value because we are subjects of lives. In other word, all subjects of live have inherent value. Animals are subjects of lives. All who have inherent value have it equally, whether they are human or animals (p.394). We have to recognize the equal inherent value of animals and their equal right to be treated with respect. It is wrong to kill human for food, so it is wrong to kill animal for food. Therefore we are morally required to be vegetarians. Here I summarize Regan’s argument in standard form:

1. Human have rights not to be killed for food.
2. Human rights are justified by the inherent value of human.
3. All subjects of lives have inherent value and have it equally.
4. Animals are subjectsof lives.
5. Animals haveinherent value which justify animal rights
6. Therefore, animals have rights not be killed for food.

In Regan’s argument, the center of his claim is premise 3 that all subjects of lives, including animals, have equal inherent value. I am going to reject this premise by scrutinizing Regan’s objections against other moral theories that justify only rational being, which includes human but exclude animals, possess inherent value. Premise 3 is false if a moral theory can successfully explain why only rational being have inherent value. If premise 3 is false, then Regan’s argument on animal rights is unsound and we have be no moral reason to become vegetarians.

I agree with Regan that utilitarianism has a hard time explaining why human have rights. Utilitarianism is a situational moral theory, so in principle it allows violations of individual’s rights in the name of common good. However I think Regan’s objection to contractarianism is very weak. In contractarianism, the nature of morality is based on contracts agreed by people for their own benefits. People agree to form moral community that defines the rights and the duties of its members. This basic form contractarianism indeed fails to explain why racial or sexual discrimination is immoral. It permits the majorities to form a moral community that violate the human rights of the minorities. To fix this obvious problem, John Rawls sets forth a version of contractarianism that begins with the original position. He maintains the basic feature of contractarianism that individuals are rational and self-interested, who want to choose a moral principle that benefits them most. He puts the contractors behind a veil of ignorance in the original position so that they do not know the arbitrary factors of being a human, such as whether one is black or white, male or female, genius or dumb. By ignoring those factors, we can ensure the moral principles agree upon are not based on bias or prejudice, thus condemn any form of discrimination. Regan uses the examples from marginal human to reject the crudest form of contractarianism. However he failed to consider the more refined and subtle form of contractarianism proposed by Rawls, since morality determine behind the veil of ignorance protects the human rights of marginal human.

Regan replies that Rawls ‘contractarianism theory remains deficient: it systematically denies that we have direct duties to those human beings who do not have a sense of justice – young children, for instance, and many mentally retarded humans (p.391). I think Regan is being unfair in his reply by misrepresenting Rawls. It is hard to believe Rawls would allow his moral theory to justify the torturing of young children or retarded humans. Rawls is one of the most influential political philosophers in the 20^th century. His theory of justice helped to shape the policies of many liberal governments. It would be absurd to say his theory systematically denies human rights of some human in the society. According to Rawls, the contractors behind the veil of ignorance not only care the interest for themselves, but also care the interest of their loved ones – be they infants or mentally retarded. In order to have good a life, the contractors would choose a moral principle that protects the human rights for the margin humans, since they would not know whether their loved one fall into that unfortunate category. The inherent value of marginal human can be perfectly explained by Rawls contractarianism; therefore Regan cannot claim inherent value is a feature of all subject of lives.

Regan may object to Rawls’ theory on the basis that the veil of ignorance cannot explain our moral intuition on why torturing animals for fun is wrong. I think Regan’s objection from moral intuition is also very weak. Intuitionism is rejected by Rawls as being both theoretically and practically unhelpful. There are many conflicting moral intuitions.It is wrong to torture animals for fun is one moral principle.Human has the rights to kill animals for food or scientific experiment is another moral principle. Intuitionism provides no system for ranking these competing principles. We have to use our considered judgment and determine which principle is more important in the situation. Rawls’ theory of justice provides a concrete guidance to decide which moral principles are most important. Under contractarianism, rational beings agree on the rights and duties of each member in the moral communities out of self interest. The rational beings gain no interest for granting any rights to the animals. Therefore, out of self interest, it is only rational to treat animals as merely resources.

Under contractarianism, animals do enjoy some indirect protection serving as resources to human, which provide explanations to the moral intuitions regarding animals. It is wrong to torture animals own by other people, because it violates the property rights of others. It is wrong to over exploit wild animals and drive them into extinction, because it destroys the ecosystem and brings harm to every human. Back to the question on why it is wrong to torture animal for fun. Contractarianism can explain this moral intuition with a general moral principle; it is wrong to destroy useful resource without bringing any benefit. Since resources are limited, out of self interest, rational beings would agree it is wrong to waste any valuable resources. Take an example; it is wrong to blow up your car for fun, because cars are valuable resources. If you no longer wish to own your car, you can sell it or give it away so that someone can put it into better use. Animals are valuable resources to human; torturing those for fun does not fully utilizes the value of the animals, so it is wrong to torture animals for fun.On the other hand, harvesting animals for food or use those in experiments serve the interests of human, therefore it is morally right according to contractarianism.

In conclusion, Regan fails to reject contractarianism as an explanation for human rights. Rawls’ theory of justice solves the problem of marginal human having inherent value. We have no reasonable ground to accept Regan’s claim that all subjects of lives have inherent value. Since animals have no inherent value, they have no rights. In fact, according to contractarianism, rational beings are morally required to do whatever benefits us most and ignore the conflicting interests of those outside the moral community. It is morally right to killing animals for food if eating meat serves the interest of mankind. Therefore it is morally acceptable to kill animals for food and we have no moral obligation to become vegetarians.

這個學期我修讀了道德哲學。這科除了講解道德理論外﹐還會從道德哲學的角度﹐去討論現今社會常見的道德問題。這篇功課是探討墮胎是否合乎道德。在一般有關墮胎的道德爭議中﹐爭論的問題是胎兒是否算是人﹐擁有人類的基本生存權。毫無疑問新生嬰兒一定是人﹐但正如我們不會說雞蛋等於雞﹐同樣道理受精卵不可能算是人。那從受精卵至出生的十月懷胎裏﹐胎兒那一刻起才可以算是人﹐才可以受到人權的保護呢﹖

法律定義上一般把胎兒分為三個時期。第一個時期是出生到二十個星期左右。這個時期的胎兒還未成形﹐沒有心跳也沒有腦波活動﹐在法律上第一時期的胎兒不能算是人。第二個時期大約到六至七個月﹐這個時期的胎兒還不能在母體外獨立生存﹐胎兒是否算是人具爭議性。第三個時期是六七個月直至嬰兒至出﹐這時期的胎兒已可以憑醫學儀器幫助﹐在母體外獨立生存。基本上第三個時期的胎兒與早產嬰兒沒有分別﹐所以除非母親生命健康受到威脅﹐法律禁止在懷孕後期進行墮胎。

胎兒從那一刻開始是人的問題﹐只是墮胎爭議中最粗淺的一環。哲學家Judith Thomson提出著名的小提琴家思想實驗﹐說明就算胎兒當是人﹐母親依然擁有墮胎的權利。假設有個小提琴家患了一個很奇怪的病﹐昏睡不起需要另一個人身體去提供養份去繼續生存。那個小提琴家的支持者把你綁架了﹐用管道把你的身體和小提琴家連接起來﹐用你的身體來當他的維生儀器。小提琴家自然是人也擁有生存的權利﹐但他沒有權利使用你的身體當他的維生儀器。儘管沒有你的身體小提琴家會死亡﹐你也絕對有權把管道拔掉。在道德上你沒有責任去救小提琴家﹐而要整天陪他睡在病床上。當然若果你自願救人犧牲自由是一件值得稱讚的善行﹐但你要選擇自由也沒有人可以指責你做錯。同樣道理胎兒有生存的權利﹐但胎兒沒有權利用母親的身體當維生儀器﹐墮胎正是母親行使她的身體主權。

哲學家Don Marquis則從另外一個角度去反對墮胎﹐避開了胎兒有沒有人權的爭議﹐亦間接地繞過Thomson提出母親有墮胎的權利。他先解釋為什麼殺人不合道德﹐是因為殺人剝奪了受害人的所有未來。墮胎就是剝奪了胎兒的所有未來﹐因此墮胎等同殺人一樣的不道德。我這篇文章就是探討Marquis的立論是否充份﹐檢視他能否合理地推論出墮胎等同殺人的結論。這篇是我修讀哲學幾年以來﹐破天荒第一次拿到A級成績的功課﹐努力總算沒有白費。

Is Abortion Morally Permissible or Wrong?

In Don Marquis’ paper “An Argument that Abortion is Wrong”, he argues abortion is morally wrong for the same reason as murder. Marquis criticizes the classic anti-abortion argument and the pro-choice arguments both face problems that are mirror image of one another, hence a stand-off results. (p.129) By using a different approach, Don Marqui claims his argument can avoid the stand-off results in the debate of whether the fetus is qualified as a human whom process the right to life. In this paper, I am going to show Marquis’s argument will also end up having a stand-off result.

Marquis starts his argument with asking why killing an adult human is wrong. (p.130) Killing is wrong because killing deprives the victim of a future value. The killing victim suffers the misfortune of a premature death which consists of the loss to the victim of the future goods of the consciousness. In general, killing is wrong because it deprives the victim of a future like ours (FLO).

Marquis then further explains the FLO theory is a sufficient reason for killing is wrong. First he argues the nature of misfortune in terminal disease is the loss of FLO, which also the same for premature death. He also argues murder is the worst crime because it deprives the victim all of his future, not merely part of it. Then he argues the FLO theory does not the pit-falls of traditional pro-life arguments. The FLO theory is compatible with euthanasia because those who seek euthanasia have no future. The FLO theory has no implication to animal rights, since animal life is not a life like ours. Therefore why killing is wrong can be explained using the FLO theory alone. At last he applies the FLO theory to abortion. Killing fetuses deprive the FLO of the fetuses, therefore abortion is immoral. (p.133) Here I summarize Marquis’ argument in standard form:

1. It is wrong to cause loss of FLO
   2. Abortion cause loss of FLO of the fetus
   3. Therefore abortion is wrong

In premises 1, Marquis did not take every case of FLO into consideration. He did not consider the cases when FLO is contradictory to our moral intuition. Let me illustrate the problem of FLO using a thought experiment. Assume a patient has a very rare disease that requires a very expensive medicine to keep him alive. With the help of the medicine, the patient can live pretty much a normal life without any suffering. Take away the medicine will definitely cause a loss of FLO to the patient. Are we morally required to pay for the medicine of the patient? Without doubt, it is a very charitable act if someone chooses to pay the medication bill for the patient. However, there is nothing morally wrong if we choose to spend the money on our personal enjoyment instead of keeping the patient alive. On the other hand, it is patently wrong if the patient purchases the medicine from us and we fail to deliver the medicine and cause a loss of FLO. It is not always wrong to cause a loss of FLO, unless doing so neglect our duty. Therefore premise 1 is not true.

The obvious reflective reply to my objection is to insist that always our duty to preserve any FLO. We should donate every dime we have to keep the patient alive. We are only allowed to keep the minimal living standard so that we will not starving to death, which generate more loss of FLO. All the extra money we spend on personal enjoyment should go to pay for the medication bill of others. Obviously this claim is absurd. No reasonable man will agree he has no right to decide how to spend his money. No one will agree he is morally obligate to give everything he has to preserve the FLO of others. Those who make this claim without taking a vow of poverty like the Catholic priests does are hypocrites. Hypocrites’ moral arguments do not carry much weight. I highly doubt Marquis, as a university professor, not a Catholic priest, would reply this objective by saying every man is morally required to take the vow of poverty in order to avoid loss of FLO.

Marquis may attempt to reply my objection by refining his premise: It is morally wrong only when someone take away the FLO of others; it is not morally wrong if someone chooses to do nothing and let the FLO of others perish. In another word, killing is morally wrong but letting die is morally acceptable. He could apply Philippa Foot’s argument that there is an important moral difference between killing and letting die. This distinction is best captured by saying that one person may or may not be the agent of harm that befalls another (p.174). Since abortion is an active act that takes away the FLO of the fetus, abortion is still morally wrong.

I don’t think Marquis can revise his premise by separating active killing and passive letting die without contradicting himself. Marquis says premature death is misfortune. Premature death is a misfortune, in general, because it deprives an individual of a future of value. We know that killing us is wrong. What makes killing us wrong, in general, is that it deprives us a future of value. Thus, killing someone is wrong, in general, when it deprives him a FLO (p.131). According to his claim on why killing is wrong, there should not be any difference in the case of letting die. Letting us die also deprives us a future of value. Thus, letting someone die is wrong, in general, when it deprives him a FLO. Marquis cannot reject my objection using FLO alone; therefore premise 1 is still false. Granted, he could use the agent of harm principle to save premise 1. However do so would nullify his claim that FLO theory alone is sufficient to justify why killing is wrong, thus nullify his claim that the FLO theory alone is sufficient to show that abortion is seriously wrong.

Marquis may try to revise his premises to render the thought experiment in my objection irrelevant to the debate of abortion. He can agree that we are not morally required to pay the expensive medicine for the patient. Sometimes a loss of FLO is morally acceptable because it is not our duty to perverse that FLO. He may revise his premises to the following standard form:

1. It is wrong to cause loss of FLO that is our duty to preserve
   2. Abortion neglects our duty to preserve the FLO of the fetus
2. Therefore abortion is wrong

My expensive medicine thought experiment may no longer irrelevant under the new premises, since it is quite clear that we don’t have any duty to pay the medicine bill for the patient. Yet, I can modify Judith Thomson’s violinist thought experiment so that Marquis cannot resolve the stand-off using the FLO theory alone. Assume there is a patient having a rare disease that requires expensive medicine to keep him alive. Your bank has a bug in the computer system. They setup an auto transfer to deposit every one of your pay check to the bank account of the patient. The patient needs the money to buy the medicine to stay alive. If you stop the transfer, the patient cannot afford the medicine and he will die. Fixing the problem will cause a loss of FLO. Is it moral for you to ask the bank to stop the transfer? What if the patient needs the medicine only for nine months and then he will fully recover? What if you want to setup an auto transfer to your own account, but entered the account number of the patient by mistake? The patient’s right of a FLO does not automatically translate into your duty to preserve his FLO. The supporter of abortion might say a fetus’s right to life does not entail its right to use someone else’s body to preserve its life (p.127). This implies the woman has no duty to preserve the FLO of the fetus. However, an opponent of abortion might point out that a woman’s right to use her own body does not entail her right to end someone else’ life in order to do what she wants with her body (p.127). This implies the woman has the duty over the loss of FLO of the fetus. Therefore, there is a missing link between the fetus’s right of FLO and the woman’s duty to preserve the fetus’ FLO.

In conclusion, the duty to preserve other’s FLO is in conflict with the rights to control one’s own body in the case of abortion. The FLO theory could not resolve the question on it is whose duty to preserve other’s FLO. The FLO theory leads right back to the stand-off result Marquis attempted to solve in the first place. Therefore Marquis failed to solve the stand-off result in the abortion debate.

In Tom Regan’s “The Case for Animal Rights”, he argues the rights theory is the most satisfactory moral theory to justify the goals of animal rights movements (p.393). In this paper, I will examine Regan’s argument and show the rights theory cannot lead to the conclusion that it is morally wrong for human to kill animals.

Regan begins with claiming all individuals who are the experiencing subjects of a life have inherent values. The inherent value is independent of the usefulness of the individual. Unlike the utilitarianism, this view in principle denies that we can justify good results by using evil means that violate individual rights. Treating others in ways that fail to show respect for the other’s independent value is to act immorally, to violate the individual’s right (p.393). Since we accept the fact that human who lack of intelligence, autonomy or reason has inherent value. To be rational, we have to also accept the view that animals like them has no less inherent value. All who has inherent value have it equally, whether they are human or animal (p.394). Therefore we have to recognize the equal inherent value of animals and their equal right to be treated with respect.

I agree with Regan both human and animal have the same inherit rights. However he is too hastily to equate these inherent rights with human rights. We must first examine what is the content of the inherent rights exactly, only then we can determine how human should treat animals morally.

According to the rules of nature, animals high up in the food chain have the rights to prey on animals low in the food chain. It would be absurd to condemn lions killing gazelles for food being immoral. It would be even more absurd to persecute the lions for committing murders. It would be equally absurd to prevent the lions from killing the gazelles or any other animals, doing so would definitely drive the lions into extinction. It is quite obvious that it is moral for the animals to kill other animals for their own good. Following the same rules of nature, it is moral for animal to honor special relationship within their own species, such as wolf packs. So it must be moral for human to take the welfare of other Homo sapiens more important than members of other species. Since human and animal share the same inherent rights, it is only moral to allow human kill animals as resources and allow human being speciesism.

In response to my objection, Regan may argue that I have confused positive rights with negative rights. My objection is based on human and lions have the same positive rights of killing other animals, but he is suggesting animals have negative rights in the form of a moral protection from harms, since every subject of life have the same inherent negative rights. The lions do not have moral capacity to fulfill their moral duty, so we cannot apply moral judgment on whether it is wrong for the lions to kill the gazelles. On the other hand, human possess rationality or moral autonomy, so it is wrong for human to violate our moral duty by harming the animals.

Regan’s response did not answer my objection at all. I was asking where the inherent rights come from and suggest a reasonable way to determine its scope. Regan merely repeat his conclusion without showing us how to derive the inherent rights equal to moral protection from harm. If human have inherent rights of being speciesism, then human has no moral obligation for not harming the animals. The human rights of infants and retarded can be justified by the inherent right of human speciesism, then the inherent rights of all experiencing subjects do not include protection from harm in all circumstances. Why can’t the inherent rights only give animals some protection that is less than what Regan has claimed? How about animals have inherent rights to survive as a species, so human can kill individual animal but we should not drive them into extinction? How about animal have inherent rights for not being harmed by human if there is no conflict of interest, so we can build animal factories to provide food supplies for us, but we cannot kill birds in the city unless they become environmental hazards? Regan gives no reason why we should draw the line of the inherent rights that animals enjoy the same as human rights.

In conclusion, Regan’s argument for the animal rights is invalid. Giving that all living beings share the same inherent rights, we cannot logically deduce this inherent rights equals to human rights that we are familiar with.

In Don Marquis’ paper “An Argument that Abortion is Wrong”, he argues abortion is morally wrong for the same reason as murder. His argument is different from the standard pro-life argument that stress that the fetus is both human and alive, therefore the fetus has right to life. By using a different approach, Don Marquis’ argument avoids the controversial in the debate of whether fetus is qualified as a human whom process the right to life.

Marquis starts his argument with asking why killing an adult human is wrong. (p.130) Killing is wrong because killing deprives the victim of a future value. The killing victim suffers the misfortune of a premature death which consists of the loss to the victim of the future goods of the consciousness. In general, killing is wrong because it deprives the victim of a future like ours (FLO).

Marquis then further explains the FLO theory is a sufficient reason for killing is wrong. First he argues the nature of misfortune in terminal disease is the loss of FLO, which also the same for premature death. He also argues murder is the worst crime because it deprives the victim all of his future, not merely part of it. Then he argues the FLO theory does not the pit-falls of traditional pro-life arguments. The FLO theory is compatible with euthanasia because those who seek euthanasia have no future. The FLO theory has no implication to animal rights, since animal life is not a life like ours. Therefore why killing is wrong can be explained using the FLO theory alone. At last he applies the FLO theory to abortion. Killing fetuses deprive the FLO of the fetuses, therefore abortion is immoral. (p.133)

The FLO theory seems to provide a sound argument on why abortion is immoral. However under strict scrutiny, the FLO theory actually contradicts to Marquis’ own view on abortion (p.84) [1]. In the beginning of his essay, Marquis stated abortion is not immoral under rare instances. “Such cases include abortion after rape and abortion during the first fourteen days after conception when there is an argument that the fetus is not definitely an individual.” (p.126). If the morality of abortion is judged by the FLO theory alone, there should be no exceptional cases for fetuses from rapes and fetuses under fourteen days old. The fetuses from rapes have the same FLO as other fetuses, so their abortion should also be immoral. In the case of the first two weeks post conception, twinning is possible; abortion may cause the loss of FLO for two individuals instead of one. Killing those fetuses deprives their FLO(s); therefore abortion is also wrong in these cases.

Marquis did not explain the criteria to make abortion moral for the rare cases in his paper. It is obvious that using FLO theory cannot grant him the morality of abortion in the rare cases he stated.s In order to defense his view, he may attempt to use traditional moral theories, such as Unitarianism, Categorical Imperatives or Social Contract Theory, to overrule the FLO theory in the rare cases. Regardless of which moral theory he chooses to defense the exceptions, once he introduces a moral theory other than the FLO theory into his argument, he opens the flood gate allow us to re-evaluate the morality for the not so rare cases. Is kill fetuses from rape ok because the mother does not want the baby? Why not extend the fourteen days limit to the 3rd trimester? If there are fundamental moral principles that can overrule the FLO theory, according to the Occam’s razor, why can’t we simply use the fundamental moral principle and get rid of the FLO theory?

Until Marquis come up with satisfying explanation for morality of abortion in the rare cases or he can explain away the future good of those fetuses. He must either withhold the application of FLO theory to abortion for not contradicting himself or he must revise his view to accept abortion is wrong even in those rare cases.

[1] P.84 In addition, Marquis mentions as exceptions cases of rapes, when the fetus is anencephalic (partially or completely lacking a brain), and when the abortion is performed during the first fourteen days after conception. Given the number of these exceptions he allows himself at the outset, it tempting to say that Marquis is really a moderate rather than strictly pro-life, but because his emphasis is on the claim that abortion is seriously wrong, I will put him in the pro-life camp.