Tag Archives: 道德哲學

論禮貌 On Manners – Karen Stohr

我讀的大學有一項很好的福利,就是畢業生能夠終生免費使用大學圖書館。有時候想看些比較冷門的學術書藉,一般圖書館沒有得借閱,網上也找不到下載,連Amazon也沒有preview可以試閱,這時候大學圖書館便很有用了。「論禮貌」是Thinking in Action哲學普級系列的其中一本,雖說是大眾向的哲學普級書藉,但內容比早前介紹過的Philosophy and乜乜系列要深入些。每一本書探討一個主題,文章內容大約等同大學一年級課本的程度,把原文的理論簡化並配合讀者熟識的有趣例子作解釋,很好讀。

現代人認為很多傳統禮貌和禮儀已經過時,更有些後現代學者,喜歡把禮貌解構為統治者的階級迫壓工具。這本書的作者在書中提出一個理論,她認為禮貌是道德的表達,整本書便是一層一層的推論,去說服讀者接受她的觀點。作者在開首第一章先引起讀者的興趣,借用電視劇Seinfeld作例子,問為什麼去別人家吃晚餐,要帶芝士紅酒才叫有禮貌,為什麼帶薯片汽水就沒有禮貌呢?

什麼禮貌的規則看似隨意決定,甚至因為各地的文化或時間不同,同一個行在一些地方是禮貌,但另一些地方卻是不禮貌。作者分別用Kant和Hume的道德理論,去解釋禮貌背後的意義和規律,而不重著於表面死板板的禮貌規則。。Kant的道德觀是對人的尊重,這解釋了為什麼要說「唔該」「謝謝」是禮貌,因為這不把別人當作工具。Hume則認為禮貌規則只是約定俗成的形式,用來表達人自身的良好品德。因此伊莿沙伯女王,與落後國家的使節晚宴時,放棄用刀叉這最基本餐桌禮儀,像他們一樣用手拿起食物,方是禮貌的表現。反而嘲笑不懂餐桌禮儀的人用錯刀叉,才是不禮貌的行為。

那誰去決定禮貌的規則呢?社會上有很多禮儀專家,他們著作禮儀書藉,在報紙雜誌寫禮儀專欄,作者引用Emily Post和Judith Martin作例子,我不認識她們但想必然是上一代西方著名的禮儀專家,而現代的例子則有Martha Stewart。作者認為禮儀專家並不是食古不化地,背頌一大堆傳統的禮貌的規則。禮貌的規則必需具實用性,會隨著時代轉變,例如男仕應否為女仕開門作例子。什麼謂之禮貌不能嚴緊的逐步推論出來,而是借用亞里士多德的道德觀,禮儀專家擁有分辨禮貌與否的智慧,他們憑著心目中理性社交模型,具有權威性的說了便算數。

有些人批評禮貌很虛偽,例如面對不喜歡的人也要打招呼微笑,收到不喜歡的禮物也要說很高興謝謝。作者認同這些禮貌是一種表演,而根據Kant每一個人都有台前和幕後兩個面孔。台前的面孔是理想的自我形像,儘管真實幕後的自已不能時常做到,但那是一個讓人自已進步向上的目標。而這個台前的形像並非單方面的欺騙,而是別人也要禮貌地假裝沒看到幕後,大家互相配合才能維持台前的形像。這個禮貌台前的形像,讓陌生人與之間留有一點距離,讓人保持自尊和互相尊敬。

有時候我們會基於禮貌說一些白色謊言,但在Kant的道德理論中,任何謊言也是不道德的。作者引用其他哲學家的道德理論,如Plato,St. Thomas Aquinas,John Stuart Mills等去說有些大話是無害甚至有益。作者提出白色謊言的兩個解說,禮貌的回答並不一要正面答覆真假陳述,可以避重就輕選擇性地回答禮貌的癈話。例如朋友問你她的衣服好看嗎,你可以回答說這顏色很搶眼。第二個解說是問題和答案不能單純按照字面意義去理解,因此禮貌的回答案便不構成謊話。例如乞丐問你有沒有零錢,他的問題實際是問你拿零錢,而你回答他說沒有,並不是指你身上沒有零錢,而沒有給他的零錢。

送禮物和收禮物也是一個學問,作者分別用Kant道德理論的imperfect duties和功用主義道德理論,去分析什麼時間我們應該要送禮物,收到不喜歡的禮物時又應該如何回應。要求別人送禮物一般被認為是不禮貌,應該要送禮物的情況下沒有送也是沒有禮貌。送禮物的心意,比禮物本身重要,因此收到非惡意的禮物時,說道謝也是應有的禮貌。現代人送現金卡代替禮物,而很多大公司也有退禮物的服務。用功用主義去分析,能夠把不合用的禮物換其他東西,或索性自已選擇合心水的禮物,無擬是有益合道德的事,但作者認為這樣送禮久缺了心意,讓送禮的學問在禮貌規則中變很不再重要。

鄰居可以泛指家住隔壁的人,也可以指短時間在一起的人,如坐飛機乘電梯等。物理上的接近距離,讓人與人之間產生一些特別的責任。鄰居之間要保持一個不遠不近的距離方為禮貌,而作者認為鄰居之間的禮貌也是有道德根據。其一是扮作看不見他們不小心讓你看到幕後的面孔,讓他們保持台前的自尊,例如著睡衣倒垃圾或兩公婆吵架。其二是當鄰居有緊急需要時,我們有責任幫助他們,例如隔壁心臟病發我們幫他叫救護車,或坐飛機隔離位倒瀉水,我們幫他拿紙巾。至於何謂遠何謂近的距離,則中間有很多灰時地帶,每一個文化也有不同的慣例。

待客之道也是禮貌的一種,餐桌如何擺放刀叉與道德無關,但待客之道並不只是餐桌擺設,而是讓客人感到舒適,讓他們對款待感到開心。作者認為待客之道不可缺少品味,她引用Hume有關品味的理論,說明品味並不只是華麗,必須有實際功用和與環境配合,主人要從客人的角度去考慮。古代品味的例子有Jane Austin小說,現代的例子則是Marha Stewart,她把品味簡化為容易學習的技功,任何人不用花太多時間也能學懂如何有品味。待客之道是一種美德,因此也與道德拉上關係。

看完這本書,我大致上認同作者說禮貌與道德的基本關係,只是作者並沒有提供更詳細的論述,如何去分析某一特定禮貌規則是否合時宜。這本書提供一個很好的理論架構,去分析某一行為是否禮貌,又或者兩套互相衝突的禮貌規則碰上時如何去取捨。不過作者在書中的一些理論很粗疏,有點拿來主義的味道,看見那個道德理論合用,便順手拈來去解釋禮貌,完全無視不同道德理論互相排斥之處。作者主要以Kant和功用主義為主,有些說不通的地方則拿Aristotle的德行論出來過橋,不過我很奇怪作者完全沒有提及社會契約論。大慨她避重就輕整個論點的最大死穴,如果禮貌是基於社會契約論,那便中正禮貌批評者的下懷,禮貌並沒有任何客觀規則可言。作者是西人不能奢求她懂中國哲學,不過如何能夠多加一些章節,講述儒家中禮和道德的關係,本書的理論便能更加豐富了。

Ecological Ethics, An Introduction – Patrick Curry

近年潮流興環保,我一直對這個議題很有興趣。剛好大學開辨環境道德哲學的課,很可惜上課時間不適合,我沒有機會修讀。只好把課本買回來自已看,這本書是便是該課的課本。這是本環保理論的入門書藉,書中總括介紹由淺綠至深綠,各種不同的環境倫理的理論。全書只有短短一百五十頁,但內容十分豐富,要閱讀大量資料也不容易。由於只是入門的關係,書中盡量中肯地的介紹各個理論,至於對各個理論的批評和討論,這課還有另外一本巨形磚頭書。

這本書最初幾章先介紹道德理論的基礎,客觀道德觀與相對道德觀的不同,解釋道德上訴諸自然的謬誤,宗教道德觀和現代世俗道德觀的分別。接著簡介傳統三大道德理論,亞里士多德的德行論,康德的責任論和功用主對的後果論。傳統道德觀一直以來也是人本思想為中心價值,環境道德觀則主張人類不再是價值的中心,提倡以動物,所有生物,或整個地球的生態為價值的中心。道德中心價值取向的不同,必然會有要在人類和環境作出取捨的情況,這亦是環保議題中最具爭議的課題。書中舉出殺蟲藥作為例子,殺蟲藥會損害環境,但卻是滅蚊控制瘧疾的有效手段,在環境和人命之間,該如何選擇才合乎那種道德呢。

淺綠的環保理論是以人本道德為主,只有人類才有本然價值,其他動物和環境只有功用價傎。淺綠理論以資源管理為出發點,環保是人類可持續性發展必需要克服的難題。其中最有名的淺綠理論是救生船論(Lifeboat Ethic),地球就像一艘太空船,其維生系統有物理性的限制,人類不能無限制地使用資源。淺綠理論最為大眾接受,但反對者認為只考慮人類利益並不能真保護環境。

中綠環保理論仇舊是以人類為主心,但把本然價值擴大到包括動物或其他生物。其中最出名的有三個理論。Peter Singer以後果論為基礎的動物解放運動(Animal Liberation),把動物的快樂也納入計算功用內。Tom Regan以責任論為基礎的動物權利主義(Animal Rights),認為每一隻動物也有與人類同等的生存權。Paul Taylor的生物中心論(Biocentrism),把人類與其他動植生命置於相同的任置,人類對其他生命也有相同的道德責任。

深綠環保理論與淺綠和中綠的最大分別,是價值的取向從個體層面跳升到全部的層面,包括一切生物和死物。當環境和人類的利益相違時,容許否定人類利益的必然取向。書中介紹以下幾個主要的深綠理論:

土地倫理(Land Ethic)把土壤,水,動植物,統統給舉本然價值,把人類視為生態環境的一份子。它認為合乎道德的事情,必需能夠保存生態環境的一致性,隱定性和美麗,反之便是錯誤的事情。反對者認為土地倫理大大限制人類的自由,並妨礙人類使用天然資源的權利。

蓋亞理論(Gaia Theory)認為地球是一個超級生命體,人類是地球身上的害蟲,當地球受夠人類時,它便會作出反擊,讓生態回覆正常。反對者認為蓋亞理論沒有科學根據,事實上蓋亞便是希臘神話中大地之神的名字。另外蓋亞理論和土地倫理內容太過空泛,很容易被指為綠色法西斯主義,以地球為名義侵犯個人的自由和權利。

深環境論(Deep Ecology)認為非人類生物有本然價值,不應只要對人類的功用去衡量,人類沒有權利去減少物種的豐富性。因此人類必需要改變生活模式,並逐漸少人口數目,讓其他生物有生存的空間。深環境論還是一個新紀元運動,要從思想上去改變人類中心的思考,讓人們明白環境也是人的一部份,讓人的心靈連接到環境上。

深綠理論(Deep Green Theory)否定人類中心主義,認為人類並沒有特別的道德位置,大自然的本然價值,可以凌駕人類的利益。他們認為除了每個人自願性的轉變外,社會結構也要作出改變。

左翼生態中心主義(Left Biocentrism)同時否定資本主義和社會主義,認為兩者皆是工業主義的一體兩面。他們把馬克思的階級理論,推展到全部生物的層面,認為人類在剝削其他生物。他們認為地球並不屬於任何人,人類有責任過簡單的生活,以減少對環境的傷害。他們反對經濟發展和全球化,但認為馬克思理論還是人本思想,仍然會傷害環境。其他物種的利益,比任何個人,家庭,社區或國家的利益更加重要。簡單而言,儘管人們認為救謢車救人是好,坦克車殺人是壞。但在環境的角度,坦克車和救謢車是沒有分別,都會帶來環境破壞。

地球宣言(The Earth Manifesto)是個大雜燴,把前面提及的種種理論,寫下來成為行動宣言,還順手加入滅貧,民主,和平等宣言。地球宣言好聽是好聽,可是流於不切實際,特別是宣言中的理念有衝突時,宣言並沒有說明解決的方向。

環境女性主義(Ecofeminsim)和傳統女性主義的理論,應用在環境問題上,把男性對女性的不平等,申延至人類對自然的不平等上。女性主義反對理性爭辯,認為人應該用感情去感受大自然。不談責任或權利的問題,人類要像母親般把大自然好好的照顧。

有些深綠支持者,更把環保提升到宗教的層面,他們認為人類的主要宗教,皆無法滿足環保問題的訴求。他們想回到土著的精神生活,放棄人類現代文化的生活,重回原始人與大地共存的生活模式。

最後一章引用書中的環境理論,討論地球環境面對的最大難題,就是地球上的人口太多。根據科學家的計算,若果人類要有歐洲發展國家舒適的生活質素,就算把可以提高能源效率的新科技計算在內,地球只能夠支持大約二十億人口,可是現在地球人口超標三倍。綠色科技發展追不上人口增長,要人們大幅減少物質生活則不受歡迎,這個問題正是深綠環境理論的試金石,看看如何把環境放在人類的利益之上,限制人類無節制地生育。其實把地球視為支持人口的資源,去計算二十億人這個數目,便已經違反深綠的理念。若要把人類對環境的影嚮減到最少,人類必需更加大量地減少人口,才能夠讓人類和其他物種和平共存。

PHIL120 Moral Philosophy 道德哲學

PHIL120 說起道德﹐很多人會聯想起性行為﹐婚外情等題目﹐其實這些只是道德的一小部份。道德很笵圍很廣泛﹐讓我們分辨什麼事情是對﹐什麼事情是錯﹐什麼是善﹐什麼是惡。我這個學期修讀了道德哲學課﹐探討什麼是道德這個問題。雖然這課道德哲學是一年級的課程﹐但不是那種幾百人的大班﹐只有三十多人的小班。讀哲學不能擠在巨型講室單向接收課本內容﹐學生必須與教授在課堂內有互動討論。不過一年級學生大多數很少發問﹐不知是害羞還是無心向學﹐上課時更有不少人拿著手提電腦上網。反而我們幾個兼讀的成年人﹐上堂前讀熟指定閱讀課文﹐是堂上與教授討論的中流扺柱﹐令到課堂的氣氛活潑不少﹐沒有大班教學那麼沉悶。

道德的客觀性

上第一課時教授就已經開宗明義﹐明確地指出一般人對道德的誤解。道德不可能是相對性的﹐不可能只是每個人的不同觀點﹐不可能依附在宗教或文化上。若果道德是相對性﹐那麼就沒有絕對的對與錯﹐任何有關道德的討論也會變得沒有意義。柏拉圖早已指出道德與宗教沒有關係﹐一來我們不能客觀地以神作為推論的起點﹐二來神諭沒有劃一性﹐明日的神諭可以推翻今日的神諭﹐根本不能用作分辨對錯的標準。道德必定超越文化的規限。我們不可能無條件認同其他文化的所有道德準標﹐難道有文化會殺嬰我們也不能批評他們有錯嗎﹖二來我們根本不能清楚介定文化的範圍﹐難道黑社會文化也有黑社會殺人的道德嗎﹖道德必定是一套客觀的普世標準﹐不論任何時間也是放諸四海皆準的真理。道德哲學就是找出這一套善惡標準的方法。

這課分成為兩個部份。前半部講四大傳統道德理論﹐分別是功用主義﹐康德的道德責任論﹐社會契約論﹐ 和亞里士多德的德行論。每個道德理論也有完整的推論﹐可以合理地解釋一般的道德問題﹐如殺人﹐偷竊等。可是每個道德理論也有其限制性﹐在一些具爭議性的課題﹐採用不同的理論配合不同的前設﹐會得出不同的結論﹐這正是這些議題為什麼具爭議性的原因。下半部探討現今社會熱門的道德爭議﹐包括安樂死﹐墮胎﹐死刑﹐動物權益﹐環保等議題。教授會羅例正反相方常見的論據﹐然後以不同的道德理論去作批判思考﹐讓我們看清楚那些論據不合理之處。每篇指定閱讀課文均是這些課題的重要論文。或許我不認同某些文章的立場﹐但全部文章都寫得很有說服力﹐是寫批論性文章的極好的學習對象。

下面我會簡單講述四大道德理論的內容。至於堂上討論的道德課題 ﹐因為涉及太多推論和背景資料﹐很難在這兒作一個簡單總結﹐有機會在另外撰文細說。有趣與的朋友﹐可以參看我那兩篇有關墮胎動物權益的功課。

功用主義

功用主義可以用一句話來總結﹐道德上的善或對﹐就是給最多人最大的快樂。功用主義可以細分為三個部份。第一部份是結果論﹐以結果來衡量一件行為的對錯。第二部份是好的定義﹐快樂就是好﹐痛苦就是壞。第三部份就是平等性﹐在計算功用的結果時﹐每個人的快樂和痛苦也佔同樣比重。

功用主義的問題﹐其實分別是三部份的內在問題。若果道德只用結果來衡量﹐很容易會變成為求目的不擇手段﹐成為大多數人侵犯小數人權利的藉口。若果快樂就是好﹐痛苦就是壞﹐那麼無痛苦的虛擬世界就是最好的世界﹐那The Matrix的電腦豈不是在行善。若果我的快樂和非洲飢民的快樂也佔同樣比重﹐那麼我把錢花在吃大餐而不捐給飢民﹐在功用主義的定義中就是行惡。平等性令到道德的要求太過嚴格﹐道德會淪為沒有人會認真執行空中樓閣。

康德的道德責任

康德認為道德是客觀性﹐可以用人類的理性去推論出來。他認為動機是分辨一個行為善惡的標準。若一個人做一件事﹐是出於想達到某些目的﹐這件事就不是善。若他在做同一件事﹐他並不是要求達到任何目的﹐他的行為出於道德責任﹐他就是在行善。道德責任可以分為兩種。第一種是完全責任﹐人不論在任何時候也不應該﹐如殺人。第二種是不完全責任﹐人應該要間中做﹐但不需要任何時間也做﹐如捐錢。至於有人那些道德責任﹐他提供兩個檢定的方法。第一個方法是黃金定律。簡單來說就是已所不欲﹐勿施於人。若果你不想每個人都做一個行為﹐又或者邏輯上不可能每個人都做同一行為﹐這個行為就是惡。第二個方法是以人為本﹐簡單來說就是不可以利用他人作工具。每一個人也有理性﹐可以自主作出決定﹐若果利用他人作為工具﹐就是不尊重他人的理性﹐否定他們作出決定的能力。

康德道德責任主要有兩大問題。第一﹐同一個行為若配上不同的動機﹐就可以左右是否通過黃金定律的結論。第二﹐道德責任論推論出一些很明顯違反常識的結論﹐最出名的是殺手敲門的兩難題。若果有個人被壞人追殺躲藏在你家﹐殺手來敲你門問你知不知那個人在那裏。康德認為對殺手說謊是不道德﹐你應該要供出那個人的藏身地點﹐好讓他給殺手殺害。

社會契約論

社會契約論認為道德只是人與人之間的建立契約﹐讓人類可以生活得更加好。試想象一個沒有法律沒有道德的原始地方﹐每個人也有自由作任何事情。因為沒有人可以憑力量長久統治﹐這個地方將成為每個人與每個人為敵的可怕地方。人類出於理性和自利的天性﹐就會走在一起商議﹐達成一個約束每個人行為的共識﹐建立起一個大家能夠安居樂業的生活秩序。道德就是人與人之間的和平條約﹐規定每個人的道德權利和義務。

社會契約論有兩個問題。第一﹐社會契約並不是必然地需要全人類的參與。只要大部份人簽定和約有足夠的力量﹐就可以對剩下來的小部份人為所欲為。社會契約不能解釋為什麼種族歧視或性別歧視是不道德。第二﹐在社會契約中﹐只有能夠履行道德義務者﹐才有參與契約的資格﹐才可以擁有道德權利的保護。社會契約不能解釋小孩或智障人士的基本人權。

亞里士多德的德行論

德行論與先前三大道德理論不同。先前三大道德理論﹐是套分辨一個行為是善是惡的準則。德行論則把決定善惡的方法反過來。善的行為是出於人性中好的本質﹐惡的行為是出放人性中惡的本質。亞里士多德決定本質好壞的方法﹐簡單地說就是孔子的中庸之道。兩個極端就是壞﹐在極端中間的就是好。舉個例子﹐勇氣是好的本質﹐但太少勇氣是懦弱﹐太多勇氣就是好勇鬥狠﹐兩個極端是壞的本質。行善可以培養好的本質﹐好的本質就是快樂之道﹐而人生的意義就是追求快樂。

德行論聽起來好像沒有問題﹐可是對我們應如何分辯善惡完全沒有幫助。亞里士多德沒有說明﹐如何劃分好壞本質的界線。一個人也不殺是極端﹐見一個殺一個也是極端﹐中庸之道豈不是要殺一半人﹖

哲學功課﹕墮胎的道德爭議 Is Abortion Morally Permissible or Wrong?

這個學期我修讀了道德哲學。這科除了講解道德理論外﹐還會從道德哲學的角度﹐去討論現今社會常見的道德問題。這篇功課是探討墮胎是否合乎道德。在一般有關墮胎的道德爭議中﹐爭論的問題是胎兒是否算是人﹐擁有人類的基本生存權。毫無疑問新生嬰兒一定是人﹐但正如我們不會說雞蛋等於雞﹐同樣道理受精卵不可能算是人。那從受精卵至出生的十月懷胎裏﹐胎兒那一刻起才可以算是人﹐才可以受到人權的保護呢﹖

法律定義上一般把胎兒分為三個時期。第一個時期是出生到二十個星期左右。這個時期的胎兒還未成形﹐沒有心跳也沒有腦波活動﹐在法律上第一時期的胎兒不能算是人。第二個時期大約到六至七個月﹐這個時期的胎兒還不能在母體外獨立生存﹐胎兒是否算是人具爭議性。第三個時期是六七個月直至嬰兒至出﹐這時期的胎兒已可以憑醫學儀器幫助﹐在母體外獨立生存。基本上第三個時期的胎兒與早產嬰兒沒有分別﹐所以除非母親生命健康受到威脅﹐法律禁止在懷孕後期進行墮胎。

胎兒從那一刻開始是人的問題﹐只是墮胎爭議中最粗淺的一環。哲學家Judith Thomson提出著名的小提琴家思想實驗﹐說明就算胎兒當是人﹐母親依然擁有墮胎的權利。假設有個小提琴家患了一個很奇怪的病﹐昏睡不起需要另一個人身體去提供養份去繼續生存。那個小提琴家的支持者把你綁架了﹐用管道把你的身體和小提琴家連接起來﹐用你的身體來當他的維生儀器。小提琴家自然是人也擁有生存的權利﹐但他沒有權利使用你的身體當他的維生儀器。儘管沒有你的身體小提琴家會死亡﹐你也絕對有權把管道拔掉。在道德上你沒有責任去救小提琴家﹐而要整天陪他睡在病床上。當然若果你自願救人犧牲自由是一件值得稱讚的善行﹐但你要選擇自由也沒有人可以指責你做錯。同樣道理胎兒有生存的權利﹐但胎兒沒有權利用母親的身體當維生儀器﹐墮胎正是母親行使她的身體主權。

哲學家Don Marquis則從另外一個角度去反對墮胎﹐避開了胎兒有沒有人權的爭議﹐亦間接地繞過Thomson提出母親有墮胎的權利。他先解釋為什麼殺人不合道德﹐是因為殺人剝奪了受害人的所有未來。墮胎就是剝奪了胎兒的所有未來﹐因此墮胎等同殺人一樣的不道德。我這篇文章就是探討Marquis的立論是否充份﹐檢視他能否合理地推論出墮胎等同殺人的結論。這篇是我修讀哲學幾年以來﹐破天荒第一次拿到A級成績的功課﹐努力總算沒有白費。

Is Abortion Morally Permissible or Wrong?

In Don Marquis’ paper “An Argument that Abortion is Wrong”, he argues abortion is morally wrong for the same reason as murder. Marquis criticizes the classic anti-abortion argument and the pro-choice arguments both face problems that are mirror image of one another, hence a stand-off results. (p.129) By using a different approach, Don Marqui claims his argument can avoid the stand-off results in the debate of whether the fetus is qualified as a human whom process the right to life. In this paper, I am going to show Marquis’s argument will also end up having a stand-off result.

Marquis starts his argument with asking why killing an adult human is wrong. (p.130) Killing is wrong because killing deprives the victim of a future value. The killing victim suffers the misfortune of a premature death which consists of the loss to the victim of the future goods of the consciousness. In general, killing is wrong because it deprives the victim of a future like ours (FLO).

Marquis then further explains the FLO theory is a sufficient reason for killing is wrong. First he argues the nature of misfortune in terminal disease is the loss of FLO, which also the same for premature death. He also argues murder is the worst crime because it deprives the victim all of his future, not merely part of it. Then he argues the FLO theory does not the pit-falls of traditional pro-life arguments. The FLO theory is compatible with euthanasia because those who seek euthanasia have no future. The FLO theory has no implication to animal rights, since animal life is not a life like ours. Therefore why killing is wrong can be explained using the FLO theory alone. At last he applies the FLO theory to abortion. Killing fetuses deprive the FLO of the fetuses, therefore abortion is immoral. (p.133) Here I summarize Marquis’ argument in standard form:

  1. It is wrong to cause loss of FLO
    2. Abortion cause loss of FLO of the fetus
    3. Therefore abortion is wrong

In premises 1, Marquis did not take every case of FLO into consideration. He did not consider the cases when FLO is contradictory to our moral intuition. Let me illustrate the problem of FLO using a thought experiment. Assume a patient has a very rare disease that requires a very expensive medicine to keep him alive. With the help of the medicine, the patient can live pretty much a normal life without any suffering. Take away the medicine will definitely cause a loss of FLO to the patient. Are we morally required to pay for the medicine of the patient? Without doubt, it is a very charitable act if someone chooses to pay the medication bill for the patient. However, there is nothing morally wrong if we choose to spend the money on our personal enjoyment instead of keeping the patient alive. On the other hand, it is patently wrong if the patient purchases the medicine from us and we fail to deliver the medicine and cause a loss of FLO. It is not always wrong to cause a loss of FLO, unless doing so neglect our duty. Therefore premise 1 is not true.

The obvious reflective reply to my objection is to insist that always our duty to preserve any FLO. We should donate every dime we have to keep the patient alive. We are only allowed to keep the minimal living standard so that we will not starving to death, which generate more loss of FLO. All the extra money we spend on personal enjoyment should go to pay for the medication bill of others. Obviously this claim is absurd. No reasonable man will agree he has no right to decide how to spend his money. No one will agree he is morally obligate to give everything he has to preserve the FLO of others. Those who make this claim without taking a vow of poverty like the Catholic priests does are hypocrites. Hypocrites’ moral arguments do not carry much weight. I highly doubt Marquis, as a university professor, not a Catholic priest, would reply this objective by saying every man is morally required to take the vow of poverty in order to avoid loss of FLO.

Marquis may attempt to reply my objection by refining his premise: It is morally wrong only when someone take away the FLO of others; it is not morally wrong if someone chooses to do nothing and let the FLO of others perish. In another word, killing is morally wrong but letting die is morally acceptable. He could apply Philippa Foot’s argument that there is an important moral difference between killing and letting die. This distinction is best captured by saying that one person may or may not be the agent of harm that befalls another (p.174). Since abortion is an active act that takes away the FLO of the fetus, abortion is still morally wrong.

I don’t think Marquis can revise his premise by separating active killing and passive letting die without contradicting himself. Marquis says premature death is misfortune. Premature death is a misfortune, in general, because it deprives an individual of a future of value. We know that killing us is wrong. What makes killing us wrong, in general, is that it deprives us a future of value. Thus, killing someone is wrong, in general, when it deprives him a FLO (p.131). According to his claim on why killing is wrong, there should not be any difference in the case of letting die. Letting us die also deprives us a future of value. Thus, letting someone die is wrong, in general, when it deprives him a FLO. Marquis cannot reject my objection using FLO alone; therefore premise 1 is still false. Granted, he could use the agent of harm principle to save premise 1. However do so would nullify his claim that FLO theory alone is sufficient to justify why killing is wrong, thus nullify his claim that the FLO theory alone is sufficient to show that abortion is seriously wrong.

Marquis may try to revise his premises to render the thought experiment in my objection irrelevant to the debate of abortion. He can agree that we are not morally required to pay the expensive medicine for the patient. Sometimes a loss of FLO is morally acceptable because it is not our duty to perverse that FLO. He may revise his premises to the following standard form:

  1. It is wrong to cause loss of FLO that is our duty to preserve
    2. Abortion neglects our duty to preserve the FLO of the fetus
  2. Therefore abortion is wrong

My expensive medicine thought experiment may no longer irrelevant under the new premises, since it is quite clear that we don’t have any duty to pay the medicine bill for the patient. Yet, I can modify Judith Thomson’s violinist thought experiment so that Marquis cannot resolve the stand-off using the FLO theory alone. Assume there is a patient having a rare disease that requires expensive medicine to keep him alive. Your bank has a bug in the computer system. They setup an auto transfer to deposit every one of your pay check to the bank account of the patient. The patient needs the money to buy the medicine to stay alive. If you stop the transfer, the patient cannot afford the medicine and he will die. Fixing the problem will cause a loss of FLO. Is it moral for you to ask the bank to stop the transfer? What if the patient needs the medicine only for nine months and then he will fully recover? What if you want to setup an auto transfer to your own account, but entered the account number of the patient by mistake? The patient’s right of a FLO does not automatically translate into your duty to preserve his FLO. The supporter of abortion might say a fetus’s right to life does not entail its right to use someone else’s body to preserve its life (p.127). This implies the woman has no duty to preserve the FLO of the fetus. However, an opponent of abortion might point out that a woman’s right to use her own body does not entail her right to end someone else’ life in order to do what she wants with her body (p.127). This implies the woman has the duty over the loss of FLO of the fetus. Therefore, there is a missing link between the fetus’s right of FLO and the woman’s duty to preserve the fetus’ FLO.

In conclusion, the duty to preserve other’s FLO is in conflict with the rights to control one’s own body in the case of abortion. The FLO theory could not resolve the question on it is whose duty to preserve other’s FLO. The FLO theory leads right back to the stand-off result Marquis attempted to solve in the first place. Therefore Marquis failed to solve the stand-off result in the abortion debate.

哲學功課: Tom Regan’s Argument on Animal Rights

In Tom Regan’s “The Case for Animal Rights”, he argues the rights theory is the most satisfactory moral theory to justify the goals of animal rights movements (p.393). In this paper, I will examine Regan’s argument and show the rights theory cannot lead to the conclusion that it is morally wrong for human to kill animals.

Regan begins with claiming all individuals who are the experiencing subjects of a life have inherent values. The inherent value is independent of the usefulness of the individual. Unlike the utilitarianism, this view in principle denies that we can justify good results by using evil means that violate individual rights. Treating others in ways that fail to show respect for the other’s independent value is to act immorally, to violate the individual’s right (p.393). Since we accept the fact that human who lack of intelligence, autonomy or reason has inherent value. To be rational, we have to also accept the view that animals like them has no less inherent value. All who has inherent value have it equally, whether they are human or animal (p.394). Therefore we have to recognize the equal inherent value of animals and their equal right to be treated with respect.

I agree with Regan both human and animal have the same inherit rights. However he is too hastily to equate these inherent rights with human rights. We must first examine what is the content of the inherent rights exactly, only then we can determine how human should treat animals morally.

According to the rules of nature, animals high up in the food chain have the rights to prey on animals low in the food chain. It would be absurd to condemn lions killing gazelles for food being immoral. It would be even more absurd to persecute the lions for committing murders. It would be equally absurd to prevent the lions from killing the gazelles or any other animals, doing so would definitely drive the lions into extinction. It is quite obvious that it is moral for the animals to kill other animals for their own good. Following the same rules of nature, it is moral for animal to honor special relationship within their own species, such as wolf packs. So it must be moral for human to take the welfare of other Homo sapiens more important than members of other species. Since human and animal share the same inherent rights, it is only moral to allow human kill animals as resources and allow human being speciesism.

In response to my objection, Regan may argue that I have confused positive rights with negative rights. My objection is based on human and lions have the same positive rights of killing other animals, but he is suggesting animals have negative rights in the form of a moral protection from harms, since every subject of life have the same inherent negative rights. The lions do not have moral capacity to fulfill their moral duty, so we cannot apply moral judgment on whether it is wrong for the lions to kill the gazelles. On the other hand, human possess rationality or moral autonomy, so it is wrong for human to violate our moral duty by harming the animals.

Regan’s response did not answer my objection at all. I was asking where the inherent rights come from and suggest a reasonable way to determine its scope. Regan merely repeat his conclusion without showing us how to derive the inherent rights equal to moral protection from harm. If human have inherent rights of being speciesism, then human has no moral obligation for not harming the animals. The human rights of infants and retarded can be justified by the inherent right of human speciesism, then the inherent rights of all experiencing subjects do not include protection from harm in all circumstances. Why can’t the inherent rights only give animals some protection that is less than what Regan has claimed? How about animals have inherent rights to survive as a species, so human can kill individual animal but we should not drive them into extinction? How about animal have inherent rights for not being harmed by human if there is no conflict of interest, so we can build animal factories to provide food supplies for us, but we cannot kill birds in the city unless they become environmental hazards? Regan gives no reason why we should draw the line of the inherent rights that animals enjoy the same as human rights.

In conclusion, Regan’s argument for the animal rights is invalid. Giving that all living beings share the same inherent rights, we cannot logically deduce this inherent rights equals to human rights that we are familiar with.