Tag Archives: 哲學

哲學功課: Locutionary Acts and Illocutionary Acts

通常我們批評別人只說不做,但在語言哲學當中,說話也是一個行為,說話也是在做事。當然捲動舌頭發出聲音本身已經是一個行為,但這只是語言行為當中最表面的一層。深入一層的內語言行為是說出一句說話時,在表達出那句說話本身的意思。再深入一層的外語言行為,是那句說話起的實際的作用,如法官宣讀判詞,在婚禮上答我願意,向別人許下一個承諾,這些語言行為與一般可以分辨真偽的陳述說話,有著本質上的不同,因為說話本身就有一個力量。最深入一層的後語言行為,便是透過說話去達到某些目的,例如婚禮上答我願意目的只是為了嫁入豪門。這篇功課探討如何劃分內語言行為和外語言行為的界線。

In “How to do Things with Words”, J.L.Austin challenges the traditional view of philosophy language that the meaning of utterances concerns about its truth value. He proposed the concept of speech act, instead passively describe what is being said, he bring froth a new idea that identify a critical feature of speaking, which is “saying is doing”. He classify utterance into two categories, performative utterance and costative utterance. Costative utterance is more or less the traditional account of sentence, in which it concerns about how to interpret the meaning of statement in the sentence. A statement is stating some fact and some reference which can be denotated and resolved its sense and then determine the truth value of the statement. For example, the sentence “My school is on top of Burnaby Mountain” is a statement stating some fact about the school of the speaker which can be verified by the listener once “my school” is deference to “Simon Fraser University” and “Burnaby Mountain” is denotated to a particular place that the listener knows about. On the other hand, performative utterance has no truth value attached, rather the speaker is trying to archive something with the utterance. The major concern of the sentence, for example a command or an instruction, is about what the speaker intended to archive. For example, when the speaker says “Get me a cup of tea”, there is no true of false regarding the sentence, he is instructing the listener to fetch him a cup of tea.

Austin further divide the performative utterance into three sub-categories. When a person speaks, he is actually performing three acts at the same time. On the surface level, he is preformance a locutionary act, that he is making some sound, speaking some words and uttering a sentence that means a certain thing literally. In short it is the act that he is speaking. On the second level, there is the illocutionary act, what the speaking is doing when he is speaking. He could be promising something, ordering someone or stating some facts through his speech. In short it is the act in his speaking. The last level is prelocutionary act, it is the intention of the speaker through the act of speaking, he could be trying to draw someone’s attention, pleasing someone or insulting someone. In short it is the act behind his speaking. Austin points out that costative utterance is a special kind of performative utterance where the act performed is to state something. He also points out that a sentence with illocutionary verbs will make the sentence a illocutionary act, but some sentence without any illocutionary verbs can also be a performative utterance under the right context. For example, the sentence “I will be there tomorrow” has an implicit meaning that I promise I will be there tomorrow.

Searle disagrees with Austin distinction on locutionary act and illocutionary act in the article “Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts” [2]. His paper is divided into two major sections. In the first half of the paper he try to show that Austin account on the boundary between locutionary act and illocutionary act is wrong, “reduces the locutionary-illocutionary distinction to trying and succeeding in performing an illocutionary act” [2, p409]. In the second half of the paper, he propose his own boundary between locutionary act and illocutionary act by introducing the concept of propositional acts. In the following sections, I will examine Searle’s argument in details and point out how he failed to show that Austin is wrong about louctionary act and illocutionary act.

Searle agrees with Austin on the first two level of locutionary act, the phonetic act that is the act of making some sound, the phatic act that is the act of uttering some words, but he disagree on the rhetic act that constitute the sense and reference of the sentence in the utterance. On the rhetic act level, he thinks that the meaning of the utterance is the same as the illocutionary, “there are not two difference acts but two different labels for the same act” [2, p407]. He argue that if someone says “Get out”, the rhetic act is he told me to get out, which is essentially the same as the illocutionary act. In short, “the verb phrases in the reports of rhetic acts invariably contain illocutionary verbs” [2, p411]. There is no way to give an indirect speech report of a rhetic act which does not turn the report into the report of an ilocutionary act.

Let me show Searle is wrong by employing two counter examples. In the simple examples used in Searle’s article, it is indeed very hard to distinguish the the rhetic act and illocutionary. However when we consider a more complex example, we can clearly mark distinction between locutionary act and illocutionary. Under many circumstance, the surface meaning of the speech can be very difference from the illocutionary act. Imagine that there is a secret agent who is is contacting his undercover spy to exchange some information and issue further instructions in a coffee shop. They both agreed on using some secret code word, let’s say for example on surface they are talking about NHL games, but in reality they use the score of the games and the number on the hockey player’s jersey to encode secret messages. In this case, on the surface the locutionary act are just talking about hockey, but the illocutionary act has totally different meaning, maybe they are talking about their next assassination plan. Here we have a clear cut distinction between locutionary act and illocutionary act that the two are not the same.

Searle also made a wrong assumption that locutionary act must always has three parts. In fact a locutionary act can only consist of the first two parts or even just the first part, but there can still be an illocutionary act associated with the same utterance. For example, a brain injury patient lost his function in speaking, so he can only make isolated words or he is even only capable of making incomprehensible noise, although his can still think clearly inside his mind. Imagine a scenario that the patient want to get the attention of the nurse, he would try to speak something or make some noise to get the attention of the nurse. The illocutionary act of his utterance is very clear, but yet the rhetic act or the pahtic act is totally missing, only the phonetic act of the loctionary act remains. This example also demostrate that locutionary act is very different form illoctionary act. Even the utternace is totally meaningless on the surface, under some context the meaningless utterance could actually mean something that the speaker is trying to do.

In the second half of the paper, Searle attempt to reconstruct the boundary of locutionary and illocutionary by introducing a new layer, propositional act, above the phatic act in the place of rhetic act used to be. He started with stating three linguistic principles. Then he try to point out Austin neglects those three principles in his original theory in spech act to explain why Austin is wrong. His first argument (point 3) is less controversal, Austin’s attempt to identify specific illocutionary verbs and the endless distinction of different types of illouctionary acts is futile. The cataglory of illocutionary force of utternace is not precise, there can be more than one way to distinguish different types of illocutionary acts.

Searle’s next argument on Principle of Expressiblity (point 1 and 2) tries to point out that “for every illocutionary act one intends to performs, It is possible to utter a sentence the literal meaning of which is such as to determine that its serious literal utterance in an appropriate context” [2, p418]. He thinks that given proper translation and detail description, the meaning of an illocutionary act can be expressed by a sentence literally, so that the Austin’s separation between the said-meaning and the meant-force does not exist. Searle assume “the meaning of a sentence is determined by the meanings of all its meaningful components” [2, p415] which is not always true. The meaning of a sentence can sometimes determined by what is missing from its meaningful components, so that the listener can deduce the true meaning of the sentence from what is omitted from the sentences when it is compare against the normal components of that type of sentences. In a situation that a person has to say one sentence to two listeners but at the same time convey two different meanings to the two listeners with the prerequisite that one of the listener cannot know the meaning that is intended for the other listener. For example, a businessman introduce a customer to his long time business partner. The businessman praise the customer such and such during the introduction in front of the customer. To the customer, the illocutionary act is about using the praises to say something good about the customer. But to the business partner, the illocutionary act is about using what is not praised to indicate something bad about the customer. If the omission in the locutionary act is the true intend of the illocutionary act, then it is impossible to express the illocutionary act in a plain literal sentence, no matter how many details you put into the sentences.

Searle introduce propositional act, the act of expression the proposition, which is a specific type of illocutionary act that the intend of the sentence is merely stating the content of the sentences. Austin thinks that this type of performative utterance act bears the truth value of the content of the sentences just like traditional costative utterance. Searle argues that a propositional act has two components, the statement act itself which is the act of stating, and the statement object which is the content of what is stated. The statement act is like any other act that it does not have true or false. A statement object is a proposition that we can evaluate its truthfuliness. I think Searle are force to introduce this arkward layer of the proposition act in order to complete his speech act theory because he get rid of the rhetic act layer of locutionary act. Let’s recall Austin’s definition of locutionary act, especially the definition of rhetic act, is that the speaker is saying the literal meaning of the sentence. Statement act is actually a special kind of illocutionary act that the meaning of illocutionary act overlap with the meaning of rhetic act. Let me use the same technique employed by Searles earlier in the article but flip it, there is no way to give a report of an illocutionary act which does not turn into giving an indirect speech report of a rhetic. For example, he said “Simon Fraser University is in Burnaby”, the illocutionary act is that he is stating Simon Fraser University is in Burnaby which is exactly the same as the rhetic act.

In conclusion, I successfully defence Austin’s account on the locutionary act and illocutionary act from Searle’s attack by showing counter examples that clearly mark the boundary between locutionary and illocutionary acts. In addition, I also refute his claim that illocutionary act can be express in a literal sentence that in his account makes locutionary act no longer necessary. At last, I demostrated that the introduction of propositional act is redundant if we keep the distinction of locutionary act and illocutionary act. Propositional act is just a special case of illocutionary act that actually overlap with locutionary.

References:
[1] J.L. Austin, “Performative Utterances”
[2] J.R.Searle, “Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts”

The Big Questions – Steven E. Landsburg

經濟學家轉行寫哲學,會寫出什麼樣的東西出來呢?「大問題」是經濟學家Steven Landsburg,娛人娛已的著作。勉強可以歸類哲學通識,但說到底只不過是他發牢騷的散文。他用經濟學的理性思考方法,配合數學理論和邏輯推理作基礎,像萬用刀般用同一招,去解決所有有關人生意義,世界如何存在,道德善惡抉擇,宗教信仰,等等一切哲學難題。他的思想很另類新奇,有些想法連我讀哲學時也沒聽過。只不過推理卻不甚緊嚴緊,觀點看似成理,但論點有待嚴格檢定。始終這書玩票意味甚濃,寫得太學術性便會悶人趕客,現在讀起輕鬆有趣剛剛好。

世界存在的本質是什麼?作者認為世界的本質是數學,數學上可能存在所有的訊息,便構成物理上所有可能存在的世界。這個見解十分獨特有見地,讀者要自已看推論才能領會。

作者特別厭惡反智群體,他用了很多篇幅去挖苦宗教狂熱份子,用行為經濟學去分析他們的信仰。結論是他們口中所說的信仰,與通過行為表現出來的心中不乎。很多教徙視為真理的教義也全無意義,死後會怎樣怎樣是空口說白話,說到底不能影響教徙行為的信仰,只不過是蒼白無力一堆的語言文字。不過他並不是一面倒地反宗教,他也批評無神論者不合理的理點。先不問立場,只看推論是否合理,也研究哲學的正道。他對於生命和靈魂的看法很特別,把靈魂定性為訊息,而訊息是不生不滅,也可以算是永生一種。他作了一個的很好的比喻,假如我有一幅獨一無異的窗簾布,在星期日失火燒了,那窗簾布的圖案在星期一還存不存在呢?

作者提出的道德理論很有創意,是後果論的加強版,借用統計學和市場自由選擇,用成本效益計算,對世界有何益處或壞處。以人願意付出什麼來換取什麼,作為道德行為的指引。用這個純計數的方法,倒可以輕易解決一些千古道德悖論,儘管結論未必容易讓人接受,但其推論可無懈可擊。例如後果論的其中一個悖論,是說有五個需要器官移植的病人,若殺無辜第六個人去救他們合乎道德。作者提出的解決辨法,是五個只能活四個,只要抽生死簽公平公正,五分四的存活機會,總好過比一定死亡,經濟學上純理性人會如何選擇,答案十分明顯。

他還寫很多古靈精怪的題目。作者是經濟學家,對反智的左派保護主義者,很自然會冷嘲熱諷一番。從知識論,量子物理學,到希臘神話,作者也可以用數學去分析一論。環保份子口口聲聲為後代著想,自已卻不去生育,讓後代不能來到世上,豈不是更大罪。作者的政治觀很有說服力,管理國家如管理幼兒園。如果我們教小朋友那些事是不對,為什麼大人卻放大幾千幾萬倍去做,還宣揚自已是在正確必要的事呢?作者對大學選科也有意見,他主張讀文學無用,文章寫得不好是因為思想混亂,學得再多文學也不會有幫助。只要對題目有充份了解和思路清晰,自自然然便會寫得一手好文章。文學應該和打球一樣只是嗜好,不應浪費精神時間在大學主修。

我自已是工程師出身,與經濟學家一樣,也是用習慣純理性思考的人。這本書用數學這把尚步寶劍,砍開一切難題的解決方法,正合我心意。如何任何問題也可以套入算式,計出一個客觀的答案,世界便會簡單美妙得多了。

Ecological Ethics, An Introduction – Patrick Curry

近年潮流興環保,我一直對這個議題很有興趣。剛好大學開辨環境道德哲學的課,很可惜上課時間不適合,我沒有機會修讀。只好把課本買回來自已看,這本書是便是該課的課本。這是本環保理論的入門書藉,書中總括介紹由淺綠至深綠,各種不同的環境倫理的理論。全書只有短短一百五十頁,但內容十分豐富,要閱讀大量資料也不容易。由於只是入門的關係,書中盡量中肯地的介紹各個理論,至於對各個理論的批評和討論,這課還有另外一本巨形磚頭書。

這本書最初幾章先介紹道德理論的基礎,客觀道德觀與相對道德觀的不同,解釋道德上訴諸自然的謬誤,宗教道德觀和現代世俗道德觀的分別。接著簡介傳統三大道德理論,亞里士多德的德行論,康德的責任論和功用主對的後果論。傳統道德觀一直以來也是人本思想為中心價值,環境道德觀則主張人類不再是價值的中心,提倡以動物,所有生物,或整個地球的生態為價值的中心。道德中心價值取向的不同,必然會有要在人類和環境作出取捨的情況,這亦是環保議題中最具爭議的課題。書中舉出殺蟲藥作為例子,殺蟲藥會損害環境,但卻是滅蚊控制瘧疾的有效手段,在環境和人命之間,該如何選擇才合乎那種道德呢。

淺綠的環保理論是以人本道德為主,只有人類才有本然價值,其他動物和環境只有功用價傎。淺綠理論以資源管理為出發點,環保是人類可持續性發展必需要克服的難題。其中最有名的淺綠理論是救生船論(Lifeboat Ethic),地球就像一艘太空船,其維生系統有物理性的限制,人類不能無限制地使用資源。淺綠理論最為大眾接受,但反對者認為只考慮人類利益並不能真保護環境。

中綠環保理論仇舊是以人類為主心,但把本然價值擴大到包括動物或其他生物。其中最出名的有三個理論。Peter Singer以後果論為基礎的動物解放運動(Animal Liberation),把動物的快樂也納入計算功用內。Tom Regan以責任論為基礎的動物權利主義(Animal Rights),認為每一隻動物也有與人類同等的生存權。Paul Taylor的生物中心論(Biocentrism),把人類與其他動植生命置於相同的任置,人類對其他生命也有相同的道德責任。

深綠環保理論與淺綠和中綠的最大分別,是價值的取向從個體層面跳升到全部的層面,包括一切生物和死物。當環境和人類的利益相違時,容許否定人類利益的必然取向。書中介紹以下幾個主要的深綠理論:

土地倫理(Land Ethic)把土壤,水,動植物,統統給舉本然價值,把人類視為生態環境的一份子。它認為合乎道德的事情,必需能夠保存生態環境的一致性,隱定性和美麗,反之便是錯誤的事情。反對者認為土地倫理大大限制人類的自由,並妨礙人類使用天然資源的權利。

蓋亞理論(Gaia Theory)認為地球是一個超級生命體,人類是地球身上的害蟲,當地球受夠人類時,它便會作出反擊,讓生態回覆正常。反對者認為蓋亞理論沒有科學根據,事實上蓋亞便是希臘神話中大地之神的名字。另外蓋亞理論和土地倫理內容太過空泛,很容易被指為綠色法西斯主義,以地球為名義侵犯個人的自由和權利。

深環境論(Deep Ecology)認為非人類生物有本然價值,不應只要對人類的功用去衡量,人類沒有權利去減少物種的豐富性。因此人類必需要改變生活模式,並逐漸少人口數目,讓其他生物有生存的空間。深環境論還是一個新紀元運動,要從思想上去改變人類中心的思考,讓人們明白環境也是人的一部份,讓人的心靈連接到環境上。

深綠理論(Deep Green Theory)否定人類中心主義,認為人類並沒有特別的道德位置,大自然的本然價值,可以凌駕人類的利益。他們認為除了每個人自願性的轉變外,社會結構也要作出改變。

左翼生態中心主義(Left Biocentrism)同時否定資本主義和社會主義,認為兩者皆是工業主義的一體兩面。他們把馬克思的階級理論,推展到全部生物的層面,認為人類在剝削其他生物。他們認為地球並不屬於任何人,人類有責任過簡單的生活,以減少對環境的傷害。他們反對經濟發展和全球化,但認為馬克思理論還是人本思想,仍然會傷害環境。其他物種的利益,比任何個人,家庭,社區或國家的利益更加重要。簡單而言,儘管人們認為救謢車救人是好,坦克車殺人是壞。但在環境的角度,坦克車和救謢車是沒有分別,都會帶來環境破壞。

地球宣言(The Earth Manifesto)是個大雜燴,把前面提及的種種理論,寫下來成為行動宣言,還順手加入滅貧,民主,和平等宣言。地球宣言好聽是好聽,可是流於不切實際,特別是宣言中的理念有衝突時,宣言並沒有說明解決的方向。

環境女性主義(Ecofeminsim)和傳統女性主義的理論,應用在環境問題上,把男性對女性的不平等,申延至人類對自然的不平等上。女性主義反對理性爭辯,認為人應該用感情去感受大自然。不談責任或權利的問題,人類要像母親般把大自然好好的照顧。

有些深綠支持者,更把環保提升到宗教的層面,他們認為人類的主要宗教,皆無法滿足環保問題的訴求。他們想回到土著的精神生活,放棄人類現代文化的生活,重回原始人與大地共存的生活模式。

最後一章引用書中的環境理論,討論地球環境面對的最大難題,就是地球上的人口太多。根據科學家的計算,若果人類要有歐洲發展國家舒適的生活質素,就算把可以提高能源效率的新科技計算在內,地球只能夠支持大約二十億人口,可是現在地球人口超標三倍。綠色科技發展追不上人口增長,要人們大幅減少物質生活則不受歡迎,這個問題正是深綠環境理論的試金石,看看如何把環境放在人類的利益之上,限制人類無節制地生育。其實把地球視為支持人口的資源,去計算二十億人這個數目,便已經違反深綠的理念。若要把人類對環境的影嚮減到最少,人類必需更加大量地減少人口,才能夠讓人類和其他物種和平共存。

哲學功課﹕The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge

在傳統認知論中,知識等於真實的信念加上合理相信的理由。在尋找合理的理由時,我們采用歸納法,從已經被肯定的知識中,推論相信新知識的合理理由。可是這裹有一個問題,若每一項知識也是從先前的知識推論出來,那層層遞進地推論追溯上去,那最初的知識如何肯定呢。傳統上基礎主義認為在知識的最底層,是一些不需論證自我肯定的基礎知識,作為所有知識推論的基礎。調和主羲則否定有基礎知識的存在,所有知論的推論是個巨大的循環,只能檢視整個知識系統的一至性,有沒有內部矛盾或對世界觀測的不協調。這篇功課討論調和主義理論本身的問題,探討調和主義能否成立。

The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge

In this essay, I am evaluating Bonjour’s coherence theory of empirical knowledge (CTEK) against foundational theory of empirical knowledge (FTEK). First, I will outline what is the regress problem and compare the responses from FTEK and CTEK. Then I will examine the objection against CTEK regarding its relationship with external world. I will further extend the objection by arguing CTEK is asserting a fundamental assumption that the external world itself has to be coherent for CTEK to be justified. At last I am going to conclude CTEK is unsuccessful in overcome the objection in strictly epistemological sense but it is successful in practical sense.

Since Plato, traditional view of knowledge is justified true belief. A piece of belief is only qualified as knowledge if it is justified. A belief is justified based on the validity and soundness of its argument, which is implicitly depends on the premises used in the argument are also justified. Each premise on its own is also a piece of belief which required the justification of the premise’s premises. As a result, we have a regression of justifications for premises that keep tracing back, which is known as “the regression problem”. FTEK deals with the regression problem by stating there are some foundation beliefs at the very bottom of chains of premises and the regression terminates when the basic beliefs are reached. There are two version of FTEK. The strong version stated that the basic beliefs are self-justified without the need of further premises. The weak version stated that the basic beliefs are initially credible that are likely to be true. The CTEK rejects the notation of basic beliefs, instead of having the regression of premises go on infinite linearly, the inference is circular. An epistemic system is justified by its internal coherence.

However, the circular nature of CTEK runs into the problem of begging the question, which a belief cannot be justified unless it is already justified. The solution is to reject the linear conception of inferential justification and uses a holistic or systematic conception of inferential justification instead. CTEK separate the justification into two categories, justification of a particular belief and the global justification of the entire cognitive system. The justification of a particular belief appears linear, since the premises regression will soon reached some acceptable beliefs in the context. If no acceptable belief is reached, the premises regression will continue moving in a circle. In this case, the justification of the overall knowledge system comes under questions. In CTEK, the justification of the entire system is based on its degree of coherence. A coherent system must be internally consistence, which means there is no internal conflict, but it has more than just consistency. Coherent is the systemic connection between the components of the system, how observable facts can be explained and predicted. The justified knowledge system is the one with the highest degree of coherences out of all the alternative consistence systems.

In the paper, Bonjour lists three objections to CTEK on questioning the fundamental questions of the connection between coherence and justification. Out of the three objections, Bonjour spends most of the paper in defending against objection number two, the relationship of CTEK and external world. I think this is the strongest objection against CTEK and I also think Bonjour successfully defends CTEK against this objection. However, Bonjour omitted an underlining assumption in his defence that the external world has to be coherent in order to justify his argument. In the following paragraphs, I will first out the objection, go over Bonjour’s response to the objection and illustrate his hidden assumption with a counter example.

The strongest objection to CTEK is that since CTEK is justified only in terms the internal coherence of the beliefs in the system, it does not have any relationship with the external world. A self-enclosed system of beliefs cannot constitute empirical knowledge. Bonjour’s defense is pretty straight forward, it simply link the coherent belief system in CTEK to observable facts from external world. He argues that in CTEK, the coherent system of beliefs must also coherent with reliable observation of the external world in long run. When a particular observation does not coherent with the belief system, CTEK can either neglect the particular observation as an incoherent exception to the belief system or refine the belief system to include the new observation. If there are too many incoherent exception observations accumulated in the belief system, the belief system will become less coherent with the world and eventually it will be replaced by a more coherent belief system. The belief system is continuously updating itself upon new observation to maintain its degree of coherence. The input from external world has causal relationship with the CTEK belief system where the belief system is justified by its coherence with observable facts of the external world. One of the key pieces in Bonjour’s argument is to establish what can be constituted as reliable observations yet at the same time is not a basic belief. He argues that spontaneous introspective beliefs on spontaneous sensa beliefs are very likely to be true. The reliability of cognitively spontaneous beliefs is part of the coherence system along with the observation of the external world. Therefore it is not a prior truth in the sense that it is required as the foundation for justification of the knowledge.

Bonjour based CTEK’s justification on the coherence of the belief system and the reliable observation of external world in long run. Let’s granted that the belief system and the observations are reliable, however Bonjour failed to address the underlining assumption that the external world is coherence in long run. If the external world is not coherence, then no belief system can stay coherent due to CTEK has a causal relationship with the external world. Bonjour uses the spontaneous visual belief a red book and the lack of spontaneous visual of a blue book to illustrate how the belief system is linked to the external world. What if there is a chance that the book randomly change colour every time I observe it? How can I conclude there is a red book on my desk but not a blue book on my desk? Even though I can trust my spontaneous beliefs from my sensa of the book, I cannot trust the object under my observation stays the same between my two observations. It is possible that the cover of the book is made of the latest colour changing e-paper technology, which in the case we can provide a coherent account for the observable fact. However, it is also possible that there is no scientific theory can possible explain why the book change its color. It could be the act of God and it is simply a miracle that the book changed from red to blue for no apparent reason. The CTEK justification adopt an objective clock work world view that rule out the existence of any supernatural power, such as an omnipotent God who defies all laws of physics.
In theory, we cannot epistemological justify the CTEK because we cannot epistemological justify the world is coherent. Hume argues that “Uniformity of Nature”, which is essentially the same as coherence of the world, cannot be justified, yet it is rational and non-optional for us to accept the habit of inductive inference. Practically, we can assume the world is coherent almost all of the time and take it as a weak foundation that it is probably initially true until shown otherwise. CTEK is actually a very weak FTEK in disguise; the base belief of CTEK is that the world is coherence to provide the foundation to build coherent belief systems.

However, it would be totally absurd to argue the world is not coherent. If the world is not coherent, then even FTEK is not possible to have any knowledge system. Just like FTEK cannot convince the ultimate skeptic, CTEK also fail to convince the ultimate skeptic that there is justification on any knowledge. Given the fact that assumption of the world is coherent must dialectically acceptable in the context of any knowledge theory to have any meaning, we can grant this assumption a priori status outside of any epistemic dialog. With this particular exception, I conclude that CTEK is successful in overcoming the objection regarding the relationship of coherent belief system and the external world.

Reference:
[1] Laurence Bonjour, The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge, Philosophical Studies 30 (1976) p281-312

Philosophy of History – Mark Day

近幾年香港重建舊區舊建築物時﹐常常聽到有關保育的訴求。當年清拆舊天星碼頭時﹐我曾花很多時間參與網上討論﹐辯論天星頭碼的歷史價值﹐同時亦感到自己知識上的不足﹐對於什麼是歷史意義這個核心問題﹐也只有從閱讀網上和報章評論而來一知半解的認識。雖然清拆天星已時隔多年﹐我還是對於自己在這方面知識的貧乏很介懷。最近終於立下決心﹐花了三個月時間潛心學習﹐讀畢大學歷史哲學入門的課本。這本書與我預期的答案有點不同﹐與其說這科是講述歷史哲學﹐不若說是講述歷史學的哲學。這本書從淺入深﹐介紹所有重要的歷史理論。歷史並不止是過去發生的事情﹐而是從人怎樣去看待歷史﹐去認識歷史與人的關係。

書本的第一章介紹歷史學之父Ranke的歷史理論﹐他認為歷史是從檔案中重組昔日的精神。由於人類的記憶不可靠﹐歷史學者對於歷史文本抱有懷疑精神﹐不能盡信任何一手或二手的記錄﹐對比現存的所有資料去找出答案。歷史學者不可能知道發生的所有細節﹐所以閱讀歷史時要分辨清楚什麼是原本的記錄﹐什麼是歷史學家後來加上去的自己演譯。他認為解釋歷史現像比分析歷史系統重要﹐他把歷史論述和歷史證據放在第一位。歷史把現在與過去聯繫起來﹐透過歷史保存和歷史對話﹐讓歷史得以應用來明白現在。歷史的記錄不單只是文字﹐古董﹐遺跡﹐影像也是重要的歷史素材﹐也必需要通過歷史學的批判﹐研究它們為現在帶來的影響。

第二章介紹Collingwood的歷史學的方法論﹐他批評歷史不應只把歷史資料剪貼拼湊而成﹐因為歷史資料的表像記錄不能盡信﹐會被記錄者的自身利益扭曲。歷史學者的責任﹐便用歷史學的思考法則﹐像偵探一樣抽絲剝繭﹐從文字風格推斷資料的真確性﹐從記錄者的身份推斷其可信性﹐研究現存文本和失存文本的關係﹐從而看穿第一手資料的表像﹐重組事情發生的真相。嚴守歷史學思考法則的重要性﹐便是防止任人隨便解釋扭曲歷史﹐無視歷史證據的連貫性﹐破壞現在與過去之間的因果關係。

第三章介紹分辨歷史證據可信性的方法﹐最基本是採用貝氐統計邏輯(Bayesianism)﹐接下來便要為證據提出解釋﹐推論和檢定歷史假設中的因果關係。歷史證據可能出現不同的解釋﹐好解釋要對不同證據有前後連貫性﹐歷史假設中不能有太多發想當然耳的空白﹐與所有證據都吻合的解釋﹐便是最簡潔有力的解釋。

第四章指出歷史學與科學是分別﹐兩者同樣是講求證據﹐但科學的本質是實證學(Positivism)﹐可以把證據數字化和通遍化﹐歸納出科學法則﹐再從法則推論出結論。但歷史並非科學﹐歷史不能做科學重覆實驗﹐沒有足夠的數據去歸納通則。研究歷史只能分析每件事的因果關係﹐再從中推論中事件與事件之間的規律﹐再按情況判斷每個規律應用的優先次序和輕重。

第五章確立歷史學中的因果關係﹐這章先指出其他否定因果歷史學家的謬誤﹐如果歷史事件間沒有因果關係﹐那事件與事件只是獨立的偶然發生﹐那便談不上任何的歷史解釋。比較不同的歷史事件﹐可以讓我們明白因果關係﹐讓我們從歷史的不同條件去﹐去推論不同條件下原因和影響。歷史理論幫助我們認清歷史﹐其中有三個必需條件。第一歷史理論必需具功用解釋﹐輸入歷史事件輸出事件的結果和關係。第二歷史理論解釋社會層面﹐因為個人層面涉及太多不可知的變數﹐不可能以理論去解讀。第三歷史理論提供一個模型﹐去說明各種因果連結的關係。通過比較不同歷史事件相同與相異之處﹐來證明歷史理論的解釋是否站得住腳。歷史理論解釋事件為何發生﹐與及在缺乏類似條件的情況下﹐事件為何沒有發生。可是歷史理論的最大挑戰﹐是如何分辨什麼是合理解釋﹐什麼是順口開河胡扯的歷史故事。

第六章提出自然史觀歷史理論的問題﹐歷史理論建主在綜合法則的重覆性﹐但每一件歷史事件都是獨一無異﹐已經發生的歷史不會再重覆﹐如果兩者之間毫無關連﹐那前者如何可以解釋後者的發生呢。歷史事件肯定歷史理論的正確﹐同時歷史理論也被用來解釋歷史事件﹐可是當歷史事件與已知的理論不乎﹐便會出現需要修改歷史理論﹐還是把歷史視為特例的選擇。歷史學家可以揉合不同的歷史理論﹐去解釋歷史事件如何發生﹐但對於預測未發生的事件卻完全沒有頭緒。當然在歷史事件發生後﹐歷史學家還是可輕易地解釋事件如何發生。至於該引用那一個歷史理論﹐則每一個歷史事件也要作不同考慮﹐不能憑空只從歷史理論作出推論﹐否則可能會與現實相差千里。研究歷史除了從歷史理論出發外﹐也可以從歷史論述的角度﹐把歷史以比喻形式演譯﹐重組歷史人物的想法和行動。

第七章探討如何從演譯歷史去找出歷史的意義﹐可是歷史學家面對一個悖論﹐歷史本身對處身其中人﹐不需要歷史學定的演譯已有其意義。歷史學家的演譯是另外一層的歷史意義﹐是歷史對現代人或歷史學家的意義。通過演譯歷史﹐讓人感受到當時發生的感情﹐去想像體驗其他人的經驗﹐並且對自身的體驗有意識。體驗必需通過歷史證據﹐而歷史證據可以分為兩種﹐一是外在行為的描述﹐二是內心文字的記錄﹐不論採用那種證據﹐也會遇上心靈哲學中﹐既然兩個人不可完全一樣﹐那如何去感受別人思想的難題。Collingwood認為歷史學家在寫歷史時﹐必需要把歷史在腦內重新演出﹐從外在發生的事件記錄﹐去剖析當事人的想法。他更進一步認為所有的歷也都是思想的歷史﹐不過這個說法有一大漏洞﹐便是需然歷史人物會有想法﹐但事件並不一定按其所想地發生。

第八章提出歷史學要為過去人物的思想和行為﹐找出合理的歷史解釋。通過合理的解釋﹐把思想與思想﹐思想與行為連結起來。要理解去生的行為﹐可以把行為本身視為對另一個問題的答案﹐而追問這個行為到底為當事人決解了什麼問題。當然人類行為並非科學法則﹐也會有違反理性的情況出現。要明白行為的理由﹐先要代入過去的角色中﹐用他們的視野去思考﹐在理論上不合理的事情﹐在他們信念和動機的前題下﹐可能在實際上變為合理。一個人的想法和行為﹐受當到他當時身處的社會的影響﹐所以歷史學家亦要考慮當時的社會背景。

第九章提出歷史的客觀性和主觀性的問題﹐到底歷史知識是普世性並超越時間﹐還是必須在當時的默絡裏解讀。歷史相對論者(historicism)認為人類的想法不停在改變﹐歷史學家不應用現代人的眼光去看過去的歷史﹐要追溯至原本事件的記錄和起源﹐不要被多年來堆積起來的解讀誤導。由於歷史學家也受制他們的時代﹐不論如何去解讀過去的歷史﹐總會帶有其處身時代的偏差﹐那客觀的歷史根本不可能存在。Max Weber認為每個人皆有其價值觀﹐只要歷史學者記錄的歷史不受其價值觀影響﹐那就乎合客觀歷史的條件。歷史中可以如實記錄其他人的價值和意見﹐只要沒有作者自身的意見便可以。可是選擇記錄什麼或不記錄什麼﹐也是一種價值取向亦會影響歷史的客觀性。Gadamer認為解讀歷史是與過去的對話﹐歷史學者不能對過去任意詮譯﹐必需要回答過去其他歷史學者的解讀﹐並要在對話中保持開放的心態﹐自己的意見可以隨著對話而改變。

第十章深入討論第六章中提過的歷史論述﹐以說故事的方式來記錄歷史。在二十世紀中歷史論述被分類為文學多於歷史﹐但作者認為歷史論述在歷史學中﹐佔有重要的位置﹐能夠讓讀者抽離現在的時空﹐跳進歷史當中感受當時的經驗。歷史故事有角色人物﹐亦有故事主線結局﹐說故事的人介入的多少﹐決定了歷史論述深淺厚度。歷史論述像說故事一樣要有起承轉合﹐主線可以在意料之外﹐但必需要在情理之中﹐故事前後穩含因果關係﹐有主旨貫通整個故事。Hayden White把不同歷史學家的歷史論述綜合總結﹐發展出超歷史學(Metahistory)﹐從歷史學家說故事修辭手法的異同﹐去重組歷史的知識和解釋。歷史論述與歷史小說的分別﹐在乎論述中的真實性。可是歷史學家為讓論述看起來更加真實﹐在論述中加插一些後世歷史學家不可能得知的瑣事。歷史論述可分為微觀和宏觀兩種﹐前者是把不同歷史人物的自我論述結合﹐從不同角度去觀察同一件事情。微觀歷史論述是集體回憶﹐但集體回憶並不是共同回憶﹐因為每個人的記憶也有不同。宏觀論述整合集體回憶中的分歧﹐把故事中所有觀點整合為統一的﹐超越事件中每個個體或組織的超論述。

第十一章解答歷史與歷史真相的問題﹐到底歷史與過去發生的事情之間﹐有著什麼的關係呢。無可否認過去曾經發生﹐歷史真實論者認為﹐多少程度上歷史能夠反映真實的過去。反真實論者認為形而上並沒有真實﹐一切只是取決於人的思想和言語﹐那歷史亦沒有所謂真實與不真實之分。反代表論者不否認真實的存在﹐但他們認為語言不能代表真實。除了歷史陳述是否真實外﹐綜合所有歷史陳述後的歷史系統也要被檢定是否真實。就算每一句歷史陳述為真﹐但如果只是選擇性地節錄某些陳述﹐結論給人的印像可以與事實相反。歷史真相會隨著時間而變得模糊﹐第一手資料也因為記錄者的個人利益不可以盡信﹐歷史學家只能盡量對比不同的歷史證據﹐與現存和新發現的證據互相印證﹐從中推論中比較可信的版本。歷史真相的一個難題﹐是如何連接過去的真相與現在的真相﹐歷史學家不可能對過去作出直接觀察﹐過去能印證真相的證據也可能隨時間而消失﹐能夠把歷史知讓流傳下來只有歷史論述。

第十二章探討歷史證據與歷史理論的關係﹐到底歷史學家的背景信念﹐會否預先決定他所得出的歷史結論。當歷史證據與歷史理論不乎時﹐歷史學者可以選擇把證據視為特列﹐亦可以選擇修改理論去包含新的證據﹐兩個選擇也可以保持理論內部的一致性﹐但卻是互不相容又同等同質的理論。兩個不同的歷史說法﹐兩者皆與現存的證據相容﹐必定一個是對一個是錯﹐只是我們沒有辨法分出來。很多事候不同的說法對基本事實也一致認同﹐分歧在論述﹐解釋﹐詮釋歷史意義上。社會解構論者認為﹐歷史也是權力關係下的產物﹐歷史說法可以從歷史學者的社會背景去分析。探討歷史知識本質的問題﹐很自然會追朔知識的本筆認知論的問題﹐到底先驗性的知識存不存在﹐會否隨時間而轉變﹐語言對知識有什麼限制﹐何謂知識的合理解釋等等。歷史知識除了知道什麼的問題外﹐還要問知道了該如何用的問題﹐作者認為要通過開放歷史論述﹐才能把過去的歷史連結到未來。

雖然不用交功課不用考試﹐但看這本書和寫這篇讀書筆記的時間﹐不比正式修讀該課為少。這篇讀書筆記花了三個週末才寫成﹐把課本前前後後讀了至少三篇。我對歷史是什麼這個問題﹐仍然沒有一個答案﹐但在閱讀過程當中﹐倒學懂很多不同的答案。我自己讀理科出身﹐比較接受科學觀式的歷史理論﹐可是歷史學始終是人文學科﹐歷史學主流對歷史的意義的見解﹐並不是描述客觀的歷史真理﹐而是透過論述和詮釋﹐連接過去的人與現在的人的思想。